Atomic Assurance by Lanoszka, Alexander

Atomic Assurance
a volume in the series
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt
A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress . cornell . edu.
Atomic 
Assurance





Copyright © 2018 by Cornell University
The text of this book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License: https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. To use this book, or parts of this 
book, in any way not covered by the license, please contact Cornell University 
Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our 
website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.
First published 2018 by Cornell University Press
Printed in the United States of Amer i ca
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Lanoszka, Alexander, author.
Title: Atomic assurance : the alliance politics of nuclear proliferation /  
 Alexander Lanoszka.
Description: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2018. |  
Series: Cornell studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical   
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018016356 (print) | LCCN 2018017762 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781501729195 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501729201 (ret) | ISBN  
9781501729188 | ISBN 9781501729188 (cloth ; alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Nuclear nonproliferation— International  
cooperation. | Nuclear arms control— International cooperation. |  
Nuclear arms control— Government policy— United States. | 
Nuclear  nonproliferation— Government policy— United States. | 
United  States— Foreign     relations—1945–1989— case studies.
Classification: LCC JZ5675 (ebook) | LCC JZ5675 .L36 2018 (print) |  
 DDC 327.1/747— dc23





 Introduction: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation 1
1. How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation 10
2. American Security Guarantees during the Cold War,  
1949–1980 29
3. West Germany, 1954–1970 48
4. Japan, 1952–1980 79
5. South  Korea, 1968–1980 110
6. Nuclear Proliferation and Other American Alliances 132
 Conclusion: Understanding and Managing Alliances  






It took many years for this book to come together. At Prince ton University, 
John Ikenberry was especially helpful and generous; he never let me lose 
sight of the big picture. Tom Christensen, Keren Yarhi- Milo, and David Car-
ter provided extensive and varied feedback. Aaron Friedberg provided use-
ful commentary and support— through the Bradley Foundation—at a criti-
cal juncture when this proj ect was still in its infancy. I also benefited 
im mensely from fellowships at the Security Studies Program and the Dickey 
Center for International Understanding at the Mas sa chu setts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and Dartmouth College, respectively. At MIT, where I was 
a Stanton Fellow, I am grateful for the mentorship I received from Barry Po-
sen and Frank Gavin. Indeed, Frank has been a wonderful ally over the 
years. I learned much from Owen Coté, Vipin Narang, and Jim Walsh as well 
as Henrik Hiim and Julia Macdonald. The Stanton Foundation contributed 
funding to this proj ect. At Dartmouth, I held a manuscript workshop that 
saw the participation of Bill Wohlforth, Steve Brooks, Ben Valentino, Jeff 
Friedman, Brian Greenhill, Joshua Shifrinson, and Katy Powers. Tim Craw-
ford drove up from Boston and took the lead at that workshop, providing 
me with a new vision for the manuscript.
I have many other friends and colleagues to thank,  whether for the sup-
port they provided or for the feedback they gave when I was working on 
this book. They include Alexander Alden, Dan Altman, Danny Bessner, Mat-
thew Fuhrmann, Kiichi Fujiwara, Kate Gheoghegan, Mauro Gilli, Andrea 
Gilli, Tsuyoshi Goroku, Brendan Green, Kristen Harkness, Matthew Kroe-
nig, Raymond Kuo, Akira Kurosaki, Christine Leah, Andreas Lutsch, Rupal 
Mehta, Rohan Mukherjee, Leah Sarson, Jonas Schneider, Luis Simón, Henry 




Hunzeker, in par tic u lar, read numerous drafts over the years. I could not 
have asked for a better friend. Sandy Hager, Leonie Fleischmann, Iosif 
Kovras, Ronen Palan, Inderjeet Parmar, and Madura Rasaratnam are among 
the many scholars and friends who have made City, University of London a 
wonderful place to work. I apologize to  those whom I forgot to mention. I 
also thank Roger Haydon, for his superb assistance, and the staff at Cornell 
University Press. They are all consummate professionals—it was a plea sure 
to have the opportunity to work with them. Robert Art and the reviewers 
gave terrific feedback that helped me to clarify and to improve key parts of 
the book.
Emmanuelle Richez entered my life when this book was already  under 
review. She has been a tremendous source of love and comfort, motivating 
me always to see the bright side of  things and to power through the work 
that needed to be done when this proj ect was in its final stages. I am very 
grateful to have her support.
Fi nally, I want to thank my  family. I have trea sured their emotional sup-
port and encouragement. Some of the issues raised by this book acquired a 
personal significance for my relatives and me, as we have become alarmed 
by the geopo liti cal developments in Poland’s region that began in 2014. I es-
pecially thank Danusia, Kasia, Rafał, and my grandparents Marianna and 
Tadeusz. Most of all, I thank my parents, Anna and Marek, to whom I dedi-





The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation
Tensions  were high on the Korean Peninsula. Fears of nuclear proliferation 
 were rife, and a newly elected American president had gone on rec ord say-
ing unflattering  things about the South Korean government. Such was the 
context in mid-1977 when the American ambassador in Seoul met with vari-
ous government officials and scientists, in part to discuss what could be 
done to prevent South  Korea from undertaking nuclear weapons activities. 
During that meeting, a nuclear scientist proposed that one solution would 
involve the United States extending the same “nuclear umbrella policy” to 
South  Korea as that given already to Japan. This proposal struck the ambas-
sador as nonsensical.  After all, South  Korea benefited from a nuclear um-
brella thanks to its treaty alliance with the United States and the tactical 
nuclear weapons that American forces had stationed on its territory. The 
only change to the alliance was the full withdrawal of American ground 
forces from South  Korea— a policy for which President Jimmy Car ter had 
advocated during his presidential campaign. And so the ambassador wrote 
back to the State Department in Washington, decrying “the evidence of ig-
norance at very se nior government levels of  either costs or risks [sic] in-
volved in the weapons development program over and above seriously ad-
verse impact on US relationship [sic].”1
Car ter ultimately deci ded against his planned troop withdrawal, and 
South  Korea did not acquire a nuclear weapons capability, but the episode 
raises impor tant questions that continue to resonate into the twenty- first 
 century. Why did the alliance break down so as to create proliferation risks? 
And to what extent was the alliance responsible for restraining South  Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions?  These questions in turn speak to a much larger concern: 
what is the relationship between alliances and nuclear proliferation?
Ever since the United States forged its alliances with partners around the 
world at the beginning of the Cold War, many experts agree that alliances 
have yielded impor tant strategic benefits. Alliances enable the United States 
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to manage local conflicts, to prevent arms races, and to reassure partners that 
the United States  will defend them in a military crisis that involves a shared 
adversary. The result is that recipients of  these security guarantees feel less 
need to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Even when allies have pursued 
nuclear weapons development, the United States would coerce them into 
halting their ambitions. Such is the emerging narrative of the American ex-
perience of the nuclear era: that alliances are effective nonproliferation tools 
and that the Cold War is largely a story of American nonproliferation suc-
cess. This nonproliferation mission could become more challenging to un-
dertake if predictions of American decline are true and allies are growing in 
power relative to the United States.
This book challenges this emerging narrative by making two related 
claims. The first claim is that military alliances are impor tant tools for thwart-
ing nuclear proliferation, but they are more susceptible to breakdown and 
credibility concerns than some accounts in the international relations lit er a-
ture presume. Indeed, why alliances should ever be a  viable solution for nu-
clear proliferation is puzzling, since international agreements  ought to be 
fundamentally unbelievable in the absence of a world government that can 
enforce them. Even if we accept that strong commitments are pos si ble,  those 
very commitments risk emboldening  those allies to undertake aggressive for-
eign policies that are contrary to the interests of the United States.
The second claim is that although the United States has played a key role 
in enforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should be careful not 
to attribute too much success to the United States. It encountered severe dif-
ficulties in curbing suspect nuclear be hav iors of key allies like West Germany 
and Japan, to say nothing of  Great Britain and France— allies that feared 
American abandonment yet succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons. South 
 Korea often serves as an example of the effectiveness of American coercion, 
but the state of its nuclear program made South  Korea an easy target at a time 
when the United States wanted to demonstrate its commitment to nuclear 
nonproliferation. Moreover, the proliferation scare that took place during 
Jimmy Car ter’s presidency happened  after the United States had seemingly 
shut down South  Korea’s nuclear weapons program and strong- armed 
Seoul into ratifying the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That non-
proliferation campaign took place between 1974 and 1976. Safeguard viola-
tions persisted into the early 1980s. Put together, from the perspective of 
Washington, deterring nuclear weapons interest is easier than eliminating it 
once it has become activated. This is the main message of this book.
This book expands on  these arguments by investigating the link between 
alliances and nuclear proliferation using a series of case studies drawn from 
the Cold War. I consider two main questions. The first question is, how do 
alliances prevent nuclear proliferation? To answer it, I examine why some 
states that received security guarantees have tried to acquire nuclear weap-
ons and why many of them ultimately renounced such efforts by making 
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nonproliferation commitments. Both France and  Great Britain successfully 
acquired nuclear weapons, but only France does not need technological sup-
port from the United States to maintain them. Japan and West Germany do 
not have nuclear weapons but have enrichment and repro cessing capabilities. 
South  Korea has agreements with the United States that forbid it from having 
repro cessing capabilities to this day. We thus arrive at the second question: 
what was the role of the United States in its allies’ decisions to renounce 
nuclear weapons? To consider  these questions even further, it is worth clari-
fying the puzzle of nuclear proliferation from an alliance perspective.
The Puzzle of Alliances and Nuclear Proliferation
The standard view among international security experts is that guarantors 
like the United States face a conundrum when designing alliances. The so- 
called alliance dilemma is as follows. By offering a strong commitment, the 
guarantor demonstrates that it  will back its ally in the event of a militarized 
crisis that involves a shared adversary. However, the ally might exploit this 
favorable situation by pressing its claims against the adversary harder than 
it other wise would, thereby raising the likelihood of starting a war that the 
guarantor does not want.  Because the guarantor wishes to protect its repu-
tation for upholding its commitments, it might find itself intervening in this 
war to support its ally. All  things equal, the risk of entrapment— that is, of 
being dragged into an undesirable war— increases with the strength of the 
alliance commitment.2 Yet weakening the alliance commitment to lessen en-
trapment risks introduces new prob lems. The ally might fear abandonment 
when it starts to doubt the credibility of the guarantor and its security 
pledges. A weakened commitment might tempt the adversary to attack the 
ally, which may thus feel compelled to launch destabilizing preemptive mea-
sures.3
As a tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, the alliance commitment 
must be strong enough for the ally to view it as a credible deterrent against 
the adversary. Other wise, doubts about the guarantor’s stated pledges would 
lead the ally to discount the military value of the alliance and to reconsider 
its own armament choices. For the guarantor, the policy challenge becomes 
acute: how does one craft a security commitment that at once resolves the 
alliance dilemma and discourages nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior?
The difficulty of this policy challenge has led scholars to adopt conflict-
ing positions regarding the relationship between alliances and nuclear pro-
liferation. Some scholars downplay the alliance dilemma and emphasize the 
stabilizing impact alliances have for international politics.  These scholars see 
formal defense alliances as credible and thus the most desirable security in-
stitutions states can have.  Because formal alliance treaties are public and 
thus known to all other states, guarantors incur high reputation costs for 
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violating them.4  These alliances are the best for deterring adversaries and 
reassuring allies. Demo cratic states like the United States are especially good 
allies: the transparency of their institutions makes them more predictable, 
and the difficulties of shepherding alliance treaties through domestic ratifica-
tion pro cesses make their commitment choices stronger and more selective.5 
Entrapment concerns are overstated, since guarantors can attach conditions 
and specify the terms in which the alliance would be activated.6 Accordingly, 
written and public security guarantees (particularly  those issued by demo-
cratic countries) are credible, allay abandonment fears, and reduce incentives 
for nuclear proliferation. Yet other scholars see abandonment concerns as a 
pervasive feature of alliance politics, no  matter the po liti cal system of the 
state that dominates the alliance.  These scholars argue that such concerns 
encourage states to seek nuclear weapons in order to deter adversaries on 
their own.7
The prob lem with many existing alliance- based arguments is that they ex-
pect  either too  little or too much nuclear proliferation. Scholars who see 
demo cratically led alliances as relatively  free of pathologies have trou ble ex-
plaining the proliferation rec ord of American alliances. Of the thirty or so 
states that at least considered getting nuclear weapons at one point since 
1945, over half of them  were aligned with the United States.8 In contrast, only 
three nuclear proliferators had defensive alliances with the Soviet Union: 
China, North  Korea, and Romania. Five of fourteen NATO allies at least 
considered getting nuclear weapons by the 1970s, but only one out of seven 
Warsaw Pact members committed the same offense. Scholars who see alli-
ances as inherently problematic face a dif fer ent challenge. If abandonment 
concerns are so acute, then why do allies only seldom move to acquire nu-
clear weapons? Unfortunately, we are yet to have an account that specifies 
the precise conditions  under which states sufficiently fear abandonment so 
that they begin desiring nuclear weapons.
Many allies ultimately renounced their efforts to acquire nuclear weap-
ons, but to what extent  were such reversals the result of alliance politics? The 
academic lit er a ture is also divided on this question. Some scholars dismiss 
security explanations of nuclear proliferation altogether, emphasizing 
instead such variables as leaders’ beliefs or economic growth strategies.9 
However, a school of thought has recently emerged— one that stresses the 
restraining role of American alliances with re spect to nuclear proliferation. 
Nicholas Miller claims that the threat of American sanctions has deterred 
nuclear proliferation, especially  after the United States demonstrated its 
commitment to nonproliferation by suppressing South Korean and Taiwan-
ese nuclear activities in the 1970s.10 Gene Gerzhoy similarly maintains that 
threats of alliance abandonment— meted out by the United States— have 
curbed proliferation risks, whereas Francis J. Gavin concludes that nonpro-
liferation has been as much a pillar of American  grand strategy as contain-
ment (in the Cold War) and openness (since 1945).11 Yet close scrutiny reveals 
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impor tant shortcomings in  these claims. American nonproliferation efforts 
against South  Korea and Taiwan  were done quietly so as not to alarm China 
and Japan, making it debatable as to  whether  those efforts signaled Ameri-
can nonproliferation interests widely and clearly.  Those states have also 
relapsed into nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior  after having been sanc-
tioned. Moreover, if abandonment fears provoke nuclear interest, then how 
can credible threats to abandon an alliance altogether reverse that interest? 
Fi nally, nuclear nonproliferation may have been a by- product of American 
foreign policy, rather than a core aim of it. Ridding South  Korea of nuclear 
weapons helped ensure stability on the Korean Peninsula when the United 
States pursued rapprochement with China. For diplomatic and possibly eco-
nomic reasons, the Ford administration did not push Japan as hard as it 
could have for Japan to make clear nonproliferation pledges.  Whether nu-
clear reversals resulted from alliance politics remains an open empirical 
question.
the argument
How do guarantors like the United States design commitments that at 
once mitigate the alliance dilemma and reduce nuclear proliferation risks? 
To what extent are alliances responsible for curbing the efforts of  those states 
interested in acquiring nuclear weapons? I advance a new theoretical frame-
work in chapter 1 that begins with the observation that nuclear security 
guarantees contain much ambiguity despite involving existential stakes. The 
recipients of  these guarantees have good reason to worry about abandon-
ment: no world government exists to ensure that their received commitments 
would be honored, and the written commitments that they receive are often 
vague. Consequently, as much as allies pay attention to the foreign policy doc-
trines of their guarantors, they desire more than  simple pledges of support.
Allies thus tend to believe that in- theater conventional military deploy-
ments are necessary for bolstering commitments to extend deterrence.  These 
deployments are not just “trip wires” that help deter an adversary by threat-
ening the involvement of the guarantor should its ally be attacked. They 
have war- fighting capabilities and are tangible repre sen ta tions of the nuclear 
security guarantees that  these states receive.12 States see the credibility of 
their security guarantees tied to such deployments as troops more so than 
even tactical nuclear deployments, despite how the latter  matter for extended 
nuclear deterrence. As long as  these commitments appear stable, abandon-
ment fears  will not intensify, and the temptation to develop nuclear weap-
ons  will be limited. Moreover,  these troops have the additional benefit of 
helping to restrain the ally’s foreign and defense policies. For example,  those 
troops’ participation in joint military planning with the ally’s own armed 
forces reduces entrapment risks. And so alliances are useful for deterring 
nuclear proliferation. However, if allies anticipate or suddenly experience 
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unfavorable conventional redeployments (i.e., large, unilateral troop with-
drawals), then their abandonment concerns rise to a level much higher than 
normal. They begin to doubt their security guarantees enough to embark on 
a set of be hav iors related to nuclear proliferation, which range from hedg-
ing strategies to the active pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
Unfortunately, the guarantor  will experience severe challenges in its ef-
forts to reverse the nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior of its ally. To be-
gin with, the guarantor needs to repair the security guarantee that the ally 
now perceives as sufficiently broken to warrant nuclear weapons pursuit. 
To reassert its security guarantees and to soothe intensified abandonment 
fears, new agreements that credibly restore or preserve troop levels are nec-
essary. Yet  these agreements are difficult to forge if the under lying circum-
stances that broke the security guarantee in the first place still exist. Other 
diplomatic levers have limited efficacy and could be counterproductive: 
threatening the withdrawal of more troops or the termination of the alliance 
altogether so as to isolate the ally  will only exacerbate abandonment con-
cerns. I thus argue that the best pos si ble recourse available to the guarantor 
is its economic and technological power over the ally. If the ally depends on 
 those nonmilitary goods from the guarantor, then the ally might have to re-
consider its nuclear activities in the interest of its own welfare. Absent such 
leverage, the guarantor  will have trou ble getting the ally to renounce nuclear 
weapons credibly. In the event that the ally decides to reverse its nuclear be-
hav ior, it may do so for reasons that have  little to do with the coercion— 
threatened or applied—by its guarantor.
In  going about  these nonproliferation efforts, the guarantor must have a 
clear and strong interest in preventing nuclear proliferation and perhaps 
even in preserving its security guarantees. At first glance, an eagerness to 
limit the spread of nuclear weapons seems to dominate American foreign 
policy. The United States withheld major atomic secrets from its biggest co-
ali tion partner in World War II and the Manhattan Proj ect,  Great Britain. In 
1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act so as to restrict other coun-
tries’ access to nuclear information possessed by the United States. A  later 
amendment to this act still reiterated its nonproliferation princi ples, thus be-
coming a source of frustration to some presidents who contemplated nuclear- 
sharing arrangements with other countries. Indeed, Congress has passed 
laws like the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Pressler Amend-
ment to advance nonproliferation objectives. Nevertheless, I contend that 
American interest in nonproliferation is variable. Although American deci-
sion makers may agree in princi ple that nuclear proliferation is highly ob-
jectionable, the desire to satisfy other foreign policy interests could have the 
potential to undercut nonproliferation efforts. As the American campaign 
against Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program indicates, sometimes narrow 
foreign policy interests—in this case, improving relations with China to ex-
ploit the Sino- Soviet split— can strengthen nonproliferation efforts.
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To evaluate my argument, I use a qualitative research design that I elabo-
rate  toward the end of chapter 1. The empirical bulk comprises three inten-
sive case studies on West Germany, Japan, and South  Korea.  These three 
American allies also represent most- likely cases for when an alliance with 
the United States inhibited nuclear interest. For each of  these cases, I rely on 
deep archival research. The primary documents I collected and discovered 
serve as process- tracing evidence. They allow me to test the causal mecha-
nism and the implications of my theory against several leading alternative 
arguments that prioritize adversarial threats, domestic politics, and the pres-
tige that states might see in nuclear weapons.  Because I am skeptical of how 
alliances can halt nuclear weapons activities definitively, I allow for the pos-
sibility that  these other causal pro cesses can affect a state’s decision to cease 
its proliferation- related be hav ior.
Chapter 2 sets up the main case studies of this book by reviewing the his-
tory of American security guarantees during much of the Cold War. I show 
how and why American presidents from Harry Truman to Jimmy Car ter de-
signed their alliance commitments and implemented their strategic doctri-
nal visions. Of interest in this chapter is President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
adoption of the New Look, the stated emphasis of “flexible response” in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and President Richard Nixon’s ar-
ticulation of the Nixon Doctrine. American presidents consistently preferred 
a military strategy whereby the United States provides the “nuclear sword” 
and allies supply the “conventional shield.” Nevertheless, the implemen-
tation of this strategy varied over time and in intensity between Western 
Eu rope and East Asia. We thus have variation in how allies might assess the 
security guarantees they receive.
Chapters 3 and 4 together form a controlled case comparison of West Ger-
many and Japan. Both countries are similar along several key dimensions: 
their roles in World War II, liberal demo cratic po liti cal regimes, spectacular 
economic reconstruction and growth in the postwar period, and hosting of 
a large- scale American military presence. Despite  these similarities, West 
Germany began considering nuclear weapons development in the mid-
1950s. Thereafter it had an ambiguous stance with re spect to nuclear non-
proliferation.13 Japan started its nuclear hedging be hav ior about a de cade 
 later. Differences in their strategic situations led  those two allies to vary in 
how they perceived changes in their security guarantee and in their subse-
quent be hav iors.
Chapter 3 shows that, as a mostly landlocked country, West Germany was 
affected by Eisenhower’s stated objectives of relying more on nuclear weap-
ons at the expense of such conventional military deployments as ground 
power. Its abandonment fears intensified when news reports appeared in the 
United States that suggested large- scale troop withdrawals from West Ger-
many and Eu rope  were being planned. Shortly afterward West Germany 
entered a short- lived trilateral initiative with France and Italy to develop 
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nuclear weapons.  Because the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson ad-
ministrations exhibited impor tant continuities from  those of the Eisen-
hower administration, West Germany had  little motivation to renounce 
nuclear weapons fully. I show that the United States attempted vari ous alli-
ance solutions to  little avail and had difficulty leveraging its economic power 
to secure vari ous agreements from West Germany during the 1960s. I pro-
vide evidence that alliance coercion might not have been so decisive in curb-
ing West German be hav ior as now presumed. Explanations that emphasize 
domestic politics better account for West German decisions regarding the 
NPT.
Chapter 4 demonstrates that Japan was attuned to Eisenhower’s New 
Look  because of its geography. Indeed, Japan remained quiescent  until 
China’s first nuclear detonation in 1964—an event that shook the Japa nese 
leadership and forced it to attend more carefully to American security guar-
antees. As the American military involvement in Vietnam slowly unrav-
eled, Japa nese leaders became apprehensive of American alliance support 
and began to ratchet up their nuclear activities, giving national priority to 
a centrifuge program. Though Japan relied on the United States for the 
development of its civilian nuclear program, such de pen dency was not 
enough to eliminate American unease regarding its nuclear policy. Like 
West Germany, Japan ratified the NPT  because of domestic politics and an 
international safeguards agreement that it was able to secure.
Chapter 5 addresses South  Korea, a critical case for my theory  because the 
American government initiated plans for major troop withdrawals from the 
peninsula on several separate occasions. In fact, the United States barely con-
sulted with South  Korea when it openly sought troop withdrawals in 1970 
and 1977. Moreover, the first of  these troop withdrawals reflected the Nixon 
Doctrine—an impor tant shift in American defense policy. The magnitude of 
 these unwanted redeployments should have provoked a response from 
South  Korea. Therefore, my theoretical framework must have empirical 
validity in this case. I demonstrate that South  Korea’s nuclear efforts are 
comprehensible only from the perspective of its alliance with the United 
States. That is, South  Korea first explored and  later began a nuclear weapons 
program in reaction to Nixon’s troop withdrawals from its territory. South 
 Korea tried to operate this program secretly. Yet once Washington discov-
ered it, it pressured Seoul to cancel the primitive nuclear weapons program. 
South  Korea’s nonmilitary dependence on the United States contributed to 
this result. Underscoring the difficulties of mounting a nonproliferation 
campaign, the story does not end  there. Car ter sought to withdraw all 
American forces from South  Korea— a move that some observers speculate 
incited further efforts by South  Korea to develop nuclear weapons secretly. 
Safeguard violations persisted into the early 1980s.
Chapter 6 reviews a set of smaller case studies to expand the variation of 
my study.  These cases are  Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and 
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Taiwan. I argue that my theory can illuminate why both  Great Britain and 
France sought nuclear weapons and why only France succeeded in acquir-
ing an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent capability. I show that Norway largely 
abstained from nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior for domestic po liti cal 
reasons. For its part, Australia was alarmed that its received security com-
mitments  were not backed by military power. It subsequently tried to ac-
quire nuclear weapons, only to cancel the proj ect when the  Labor Party came 
to power. Taiwan feared abandonment due to the prospect of Sino- American 
rapprochement and the waning of its received military commitment from 
the United States. I highlight how Taiwan evaded many coercive efforts by the 
United States to shut down its nuclear weapons program.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main argument and discusses the broader im-
plications of this study for both international theory and policy. The core 
message of this book is that alliances are more effective in deterring poten-
tial nuclear proliferation than in curbing  actual cases of nuclear prolifera-
tion. This book thus has implications for how we think about such topics in 
international relations theory as credibility, coercion, American primacy, and 
the  great power management of weaker states, more generally. For policy 
makers and prac ti tion ers, the findings demonstrate that the retraction of 
such military assets as troops can provoke intense abandonment fears even 
if the nuclear basis of extended deterrence remains unchanged. Upholding 
alliance commitments is insufficient: such pledges need to be coupled with 
credible military support. Though no one seriously argues that nuclear 
nonproliferation is easy, the rec ord of alliances is much more mixed than 
commonly presumed with re spect to being tools for curbing  actual nuclear 
activities. A lot depends on the economic and technological leverage that 
the United States might have over the proliferating ally. If its relative global 
position continues to erode, Washington  will experience greater difficulties 
in reversing the nuclear undertakings of its allies. As such, it  will need to be 
even more forward- looking and careful in adjusting its alliance commitments.
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chapter 1
How Alliances (Mis)Manage 
Nuclear Proliferation
When we think of nuclear proliferation, the countries American leaders 
have recently seen as adversaries often come to mind: Iraq, Iran, and North 
 Korea. And yet when we take a historical perspective, we see that many 
American friends and allies have at least considered acquiring nuclear 
weapons. France and  Great Britain even succeeded in developing their own 
nuclear arsenals. Con temporary efforts made by the United States to reas-
sure South  Korea and Japan often serve to stifle their potential appetite for 
nuclear weapons, since they both face the dual threat of a rising China and 
a nuclear- armed North  Korea.  These observations suggest that the connec-
tion between alliances and nonproliferation is not straightforward. How 
can alliances best reduce nuclear proliferation risks? And how have  these 
security institutions curbed the efforts of  those allies that have pursued 
nuclear weapons, if at all?
This chapter develops a theoretical framework of how alliances are useful 
for preventing nuclear proliferation– related be hav iors among their mem-
bers but less useful for stopping a program once it has started. Five propo-
sitions flow from my account. First, military alliances might not keep allies 
from acquiring nuclear weapons as much as the conventional wisdom sug-
gests. Second, in- theater conventional forces are crucial for making Ameri-
can extended nuclear guarantees credible. Third, the American coercion of 
allies who started, or  were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has 
played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than assumed. 
Fourth, the economic or technological reliance of a security- dependent ally 
on the United States, if utilized, works better to reverse or to halt any ally’s 
nuclear bid than anything  else. Put together,  these claims suggest one more 
proposition: that is, deterring an ally from initiating a nuclear program is 
easier than compelling an ally to terminate a program. In making  these 
claims, I do not offer a unified account that illuminates both the start and 
stop of an ally’s nuclear interest. Indeed, my argument allows for the pos-
sibility that nonsecurity motivations could explain why such interest ends. 
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My framework also allows for greater variability in states’ abandonment 
fears than do existing accounts.
This chapter proceeds by describing first what my book seeks to explain: 
the nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior of a treaty ally. I then review 
current understandings of alliances and nuclear proliferation before devel-
oping my own theoretical framework. Last, I discuss my research design as 
well as several alternative explanations.
Key Definitions
I strive to explain the nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior of treaty allies. 
By “treaty allies,” I mean  those states that receive a formal security guaran-
tee via a formal alliance treaty. This type of treaty formalizes a “relationship 
of security cooperation between two or more states and involving mutual 
expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues  under 
certain conditions in the  future.”1 By “nuclear proliferation– related be hav-
ior,” I refer to  those nuclear activities undertaken by an ally that deliberately 
serve to develop an indigenous capacity for producing explosives that use 
fissionable materials. Sometimes an ally might indeed have an explicit and 
dedicated nuclear weapons program. Alternatively, an ally might be trying 
to acquire enrichment or repro cessing capabilities in the absence of proper 
safeguards or international agreements so that it could one day activate a 
nuclear weapons program when necessary— that is, the ally is seeking a la-
tent nuclear capability.  Table 1 lists all the nonsuperpowers— along with 
their geopo liti cal alignments and Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
status— known to have nuclear weapons programs or enrichment and repro-
cessing capabilities.
My dependent variable differs from standard mea sures used in statistical 
studies of nuclear proliferation. Drawing on a commonly used dataset, many 
researchers code nuclear proliferation in terms of  whether states do nothing, 
explore the nuclear weapons option, pursue a nuclear weapons program, 
or acquire nuclear weapons.2 Yet this approach has prob lems. To begin 
with, scholars disagree over how to mea sure nuclear proliferation effort, 
since distinguishing empirically  those states that have “explored” from  those 
that have “pursued” is difficult.3 Rather than using systematic mea sure ment 
criteria to code states’ nuclear activities, datasets often rely on ex post facto 
statements and secondary sources. The result is that they can include Indo-
nesia on the basis of its leaders’ statements but miss such cases as Japan, 
Italy, and West Germany despite their efforts to acquire repro cessing and 
enrichment capabilities while deflecting international scrutiny.4 Moreover, 
the states that have acquired the capacity to enrich uranium, to repro cess 
plutonium, or to do both overlap with the states coded as nuclear prolifera-
tors (see  table 1). Sometimes states have no intention to acquire nuclear 
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 Table 1  Nonsuperpower nuclear proliferation, 1945–2012
Country Alignmenta NW Yearsb ENR Yearsc NPTd
Algeria Soviet 1983–2012 1992–2012 D: 1995




Australia US 1956–73 1972–83; 
1992–2007
S: 1970; D: 1973
Belgium US — 1966–74 S: 1968; D: 1975
Brazil US* 1953–90 1979–2012 D: 1998
Canada US — 1944–76; 
1990–93
S: 1968; D: 1969
China Soviet 1955–2012 1960–2012 D: 1992
Czechia Soviet/US* — 1977–98 S: 1968; D: 1969
Egypt Soviet/US* 1960–74 1982–2012 S: 1968; D: 1981
France US 1946–2012 1949–2012 D: 1992
(West) Germany US — 1964–2012 S: 1969; D: 1975
India None 1954–2012 1964–73; 
1977–2012
Never signed
Indonesia None/US* 1965–67 — S: 1970; D: 1979
Iran US*; None 1976–2012 1974–79; 
1985–2012
S: 1968; D: 1970
Iraq Soviet* 1976–95 1983–91 S: 1968; D: 1969
Israel US* 1949–2012 1963–2012 Never signed
Italy US — 1966–90 S: 1969: D: 1975
Japan US — 1968–2012 S: 1970; D: 1976
 Korea, North Soviet/China 1965–2012 1975–93; 
2003–12
S: 1968; O: 2003
 Korea, South US 1959–78 1979–82; 
1997–2012
S: 1968; D: 1975
Libya Soviet* 1970–2003 1982–2003 S: 1968; D: 1975
The Netherlands US — 1973–2012 S: 1968; D: 1975
Norway US — 1961–68 S: 1968; D: 1969
Pakistan US* 1972–2012 1973–2012 Never signed
Romania Soviet 1985–90 1985–89 S: 1968; D: 1970
South Africa US* 1969–1991 1967–2012 D: 1991
Sweden None 1946–69 1954–72 S: 1968; D: 1970
Switzerland None 1946–70 — S: 1969; D: 1977
Syria Rus sia 2000–12 — S: 1968; D: 1969
Taiwan US; US* 1967–77; 
1987–88
1976–78 S: 1968; D: 1970
United Kingdom US 1945–2012 1952–2012 S: 1968; R: 1968
Yugo slavia None 1954–65; 
1974–88
1954–78 S: 1968; D: 1970
a * indicates non– treaty alignment. See Herbert K. Tilemma, “Cold War Alliance and Overt Military 
Intervention, 1945–1991,” International Interactions 20, no. 3 (1994): 270–277.
bYears of nuclear weapons (NW) activities from revised 2012 list of nuclear proliferators for 
Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative 
Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 866–867, http:// falcon . arts . cornell . edu / crw12 
/ documents / Nuclear%20Proliferation%20Dates . pdf. Some of  these dates are debatable.
cEnrichment and repro cessing (ENR) plant operation years from Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin 
Tkach, “Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 32, no. 4 (2015): 443–461.
dS: signature; D: deposit; O: withdrawal. Data from United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http:// disarmament . un . org / treaties / t / npt.
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weapons, but they may be pursuing hedging strategies that leave policy 
options open in the event that their security environment deteriorates fur-
ther.5 Accordingly,  because I specify that any effort to acquire enrichment 
and repro cessing capabilities without proper safeguards or international 
agreements constitutes nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior, my defini-
tion helpfully excludes benign cases like the Netherlands and Belgium. Of 
course, being party to the NPT does not always imply peaceful nuclear in-
tentions, but that is for case study research to sort out.
Prevailing Understandings of Alliances and Nuclear  
Proliferation– Related Be hav ior
Treaty alliances involve written- down, and often public, pledges to aid an 
ally following an attack by a third- party aggressor. Accordingly, rational 
choice perspectives take such alliances to be credible institutions. For one, 
reneging on written pledges that are publicly vis i ble damages a state’s rep-
utation. By breaking a promise to support an ally, the unfaithful state  will 
find it harder to form new alliances or craft new agreements.6 Adversaries 
could become bolder and challenge the other alliance commitments of the 
guarantor. For another, violating an alliance treaty can incur domestic costs. 
Alliance treaties must be shepherded through domestic legislative bodies— a 
pro cess that usually requires building co ali tions and burning po liti cal capi-
tal. Governments should endure the pain of this pro cess only if they believe 
in the importance of the alliance for national security reasons. Democracies 
should thus be the most reliable security partners that states can have. Their 
leaders are more constrained by their formal agreements to follow through on 
their promises, whereas autocratic leaders might approach their commitments 
more cavalierly.7 When promises of military support are verbal or tacit, as in 
the case of informal alliances, the guarantor can disclaim responsibility for the 
ally without risking domestic backlash or reduced international standing.8
Still, alliances should be neither too credible nor too incredible due to what 
Glenn Snyder calls the alliance dilemma.9 Making too strong a security guar-
antee shields the costs of aggressive be hav ior for that receiving ally. A moral 
hazard prob lem thus arises. From the perspective of the guarantor, it fears 
entrapment— the risk that it would be dragged into a conflict against its 
wishes. However, if the guarantor makes too weak a guarantee to an ally, 
then it could leave the security concerns of its ally unaddressed. From the 
perspective of the ally, the unreliability of its guarantor makes it fear aban-
donment when confronted with a threatening adversary. Several solutions 
for managing this dilemma are available to the guarantor, such as specify-
ing conditions and using precise language in the alliance treaty.10
One benefit of resolving abandonment fears is a reduced risk of nuclear 
proliferation. In arguing that states might seek nuclear weapons for reasons 
cHAPter 1
14
of security, domestic politics, and prestige, Scott Sagan conjectures that a 
power ful security motive for nuclear interest is the worry that a major power 
guarantor  will not fulfill its commitments.11 Avery Goldstein elaborates on 
this argument, contending that  middle powers like France and  Great Brit-
ain  under bi polar ity and anarchy have a strong strategic rationale to discount 
the protection offered to them by a superpower and to acquire their own nu-
clear arsenals.12 Dan Reiter finds that troop deployments can bolster alli-
ance commitments and curb nuclear proliferation.13 Similarly, Philipp Bleek 
and Eric Lorber highlight the importance of security guarantees in limiting 
the spread of nuclear weapons.14 Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs claim 
that strong allies would act on abandonment fears and acquire nuclear weap-
ons.15  These accounts are unclear as to how strong commitments can pre-
vent proliferation and entrapment risks si mul ta neously.
This research has generated impor tant insights, but several key issues re-
main. Formal alliances backed by demo cratic guarantors like the United States 
are allegedly very credible, yet many countries aligned with the United States 
have tried to acquire nuclear weapons (see  table 1). As for Goldstein’s study, 
not all  middle powers  under bi polar ity or anarchy succeeded in acquiring 
nuclear weapons, if they had tried to do so at all. Statistical research has 
also yielded mixed findings on alliances. One analy sis finds that having an 
alliance with a major dampens the likelihood that a state  will acquire (or 
even consider) nuclear weapons, whereas another notes that “nuclear de-
fenders do discourage a deepening of nuclear proliferation among protégés, 
but  there is not much difference between states possessing or lacking nu-
clear defenders in terms of the likelihood of having a nuclear weapons 
program.”16 Nevertheless, a stress test has found that alliances are weakly 
correlated with dif fer ent mea sures of proliferation.17 We thus need a rigor-
ous and predictive theory that takes a more sophisticated view of how aban-
donment fears wax and wane. In many accounts abandonment fears are 
constant, resulting  either from the institutional design of the alliance or 
from idiosyncratic circumstances. Consequently, arguments about aban-
donment fears causing nuclear proliferation are difficult to falsify. The chal-
lenge then involves identifying the conditions  under which abandonment 
fears reach a certain threshold whereby states become especially likely to 
seek their own nuclear weapons.
How Alliances Affect Nuclear Weapons Interest
In this section, I address the foregoing analytical issues. I first discuss how 
alliances best reduce the likelihood of states from wanting nuclear weapons. 
I then describe how guarantors can adjust their alliances in a way that cre-
ates proliferation risks. Thereupon I illuminate the challenges that guaran-
tors face in suppressing nuclear interest.18
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how alliances best prevent nuclear proliferation
 Because no central government in the international system exists, states 
have to optimize between arming (internal balancing) and forming alliances 
(external balancing) to obtain security.19 Following World War II, when the 
United States and the Soviet Union  were striving to acquire and improve 
their nuclear capabilities, weaker states came to depend more on alliances 
for their security. They thus received nuclear security guarantees— a form 
of extended deterrence whereby the guarantor dissuades an adversary from 
attacking its ally by threatening unacceptable costs.20 Yet  those weaker states 
could not take their received nuclear security guarantees for granted. Un-
like in previous historical periods, alliances in the nuclear age often feature 
vague commitments regarding collective defense despite the existential 
stakes involved,21 and so states continuously evaluate  whether and how their 
guarantors would aid them in a pos si ble militarized crisis that involves a 
nuclear- armed adversary. I argue that states determine the credibility of their 
nuclear security guarantees with reference to their guarantor’s strategic pos-
ture. Two  factors are critical: foreign policy doctrine and conventional mili-
tary deployments. Of  these two  factors, conventional military deployments 
are more impor tant.
Foreign policy doctrine helps allies to understand the security orientation 
and interests of their guarantor. It allows them to evaluate the extent to which 
their interests converge with  those of the guarantor. If interests converge, in-
sofar as the survival and security of the ally are deemed vital to  those of the 
guarantor, then the guarantee  will seem believable.22 However, states do not 
wish to rely on rhe toric alone: interests can change and even diverge with 
circumstances. States want to determine  whether the guarantor is bearing 
costs to support the alliance—is the guarantor putting its money where its 
mouth is?
Hence the importance accorded by the ally to the in- theater conventional 
military deployments of the guarantor, particularly  those on the ally’s terri-
tory. Such forward basing reflects the degree to which the guarantor is sink-
ing costs into the ally’s security. Troops are also hostages that convey 
commitment— they bind the guarantor in  future decision- making so that the 
guarantor follows through on its promises.23  These deployments can include 
ground troops and non- nuclear- armed (perhaps dual- capable) aerial and 
naval forces. Conventional military deployments  matter  because they consti-
tute a credible commitment device on the part of the guarantor to respond 
militarily on its ally’s behalf. Any act of aggression against the ally impli-
cates the involvement of the guarantor’s armed forces stationed on that ally’s 
territory. The guarantor has “skin in the game” such that it would face pres-
sure to respond if its forward- deployed forces are threatened. This logic ex-
isted even before nuclear weapons. Prior to World War I, when asked how 
many British troops  were necessary for augmenting France’s security, French 
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general Ferdinand Foch quipped that “one single private soldier” was suf-
ficient and that “we would take good care that he was killed.”24
Yet a major reason why forward conventional military deployments 
 matter is that they bolster what security experts call deterrence- by- denial: 
they directly raise the cost of war to the adversary. If the guarantor’s con-
ventional forces have the ability to hold off an attack just long enough for 
reinforcements to arrive, the adversary  faces a lower likelihood of winning 
on the battlefield without using nuclear weapons.  Those forward deployments 
might even defeat the invading force. In contrast, in the absence of such 
forces, a nuclear security guarantee hinges on deterrence- by- punishment— 
that is, the promise that the guarantor would impose unacceptable costs on 
an aggressive adversary by way of a devastating nuclear riposte. Interna-
tional relations scholars generally agree that deterrence- by- denial is more 
effective than deterrence- by- punishment. Robert Pape argues that success-
ful coercion depends on disrupting the target militarily rather than hurting 
its population, whereas John Mearsheimer contends that failures in conven-
tional deterrence are likely when the adversary believes a blitzkrieg—or 
lightning attack—is easy.25 Paul K. Huth offers statistical evidence that deny-
ing an adversary the ability to win on the battlefield quickly and decisively 
enhances deterrence.26
Making deterrence- by- punishment strategies believable is difficult pre-
cisely  because nuclear weapons are involved. Consider how the nuclear 
balance can shape perceptions regarding the credibility of a security guar-
antee when we consider only nuclear weapons. If the adversary has nuclear 
supremacy,  whether in terms of more or better nuclear weapons, then it 
could blackmail the guarantor at the ally’s expense. If the guarantor and the 
nuclear- armed adversary each possess a survivable second- strike capabil-
ity, then the guarantor might be tempted to surrender the ally  under nuclear 
parity in order to avoid nuclear devastation. In other words, the security in-
terests of the guarantor and  those of its ally become decoupled. Indeed, 
many American allies engaged in nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior 
when Washington was losing or had lost nuclear supremacy over Moscow. 
In contrast, deterrence- by- punishment may be more credible when the guar-
antor has nuclear supremacy such that it can launch a disarming first strike 
against the adversary.  Under  these circumstances, the adversary might not 
risk armed conflict, even with the guarantor’s ally.27 However, the benefits 
of nuclear supremacy should not be overstated if both sides incur unaccept-
able damage in a nuclear war.28 In one analy sis, Matthew Fuhrmann and 
Todd Sechser find that stationing nuclear weapons on an ally’s territory does 
not bolster deterrence effects,  because  those nuclear weapons represent sunk 
costs rather than provide constraints on  future decision- making.29 Accord-
ingly, an unfavorable nuclear balance  matters to the degree that it would 
make allies even more attentive to the doctrinal and conventional military 
foundations of their received security guarantees.30  Unless the adversary can 
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certainly disarm the guarantor with a bolt-from- the- blue strike without in-
curring unacceptable harm—an extremely difficult task— the conventional 
military protection that the guarantor offers its ally remains valuable.
Conventional military deployments also benefit the guarantor  because they 
attenuate the entrapment risks normally associated with strong alliance com-
mitments.31 To bolster deterrence of a shared adversary, forward- deployed 
forces should coordinate their operational planning and engage in joint 
military exercises with the host government’s military. That way they can fight 
together as an effective, integrated force on the battlefield. Some alliances 
exhibit tight coordination: the American- led Combined Forces Command 
retains war time operational control of the South Korean military, having re-
linquished peacetime operational control in 1994.32 All  things being equal, 
the greater the depth of planning coordination and integration, the better 
the guarantor can detect and restrain unwanted be hav ior by the ally. More-
over, conventional military deployments mitigate some of the weaknesses 
associated with mea sures that experts have identified as helpful for reduc-
ing entrapment risks. Consider, for example, the use of greater treaty preci-
sion and conditions to specify narrowly the circumstances  under which an 
alliance commitment becomes active. Though  these tools are helpful by 
themselves, the guarantor may have difficulty assigning culpability when 
an unwanted dispute begins. Conventional military deployments can com-
plement  these mea sures,  because they monitor certain aspects of the ally’s 
own defense planning as well as its command and control structures. Mili-
tary attachés could assist intelligence efforts in pro cessing local armed 
forces’ messages and providing  human intelligence.33 During the Cold War, 
military intelligence units accompanied American and British forward- 
deployed forces in frontline states like West Germany. Some overseas mili-
tary installations even served as intelligence bases.34
To be sure, the extent to which conventional military deployments reduce 
entrapment risks must not be exaggerated. Although “U.S. basing agree-
ments do, of course, limit aspects of a host country’s sovereignty,” Alexan-
der Cooley and Daniel Nexon argue that “beyond occasional provisions for 
joint consultations over security arrangements, [basing agreements] do not 
generally govern other host- country institutions.”35 Indeed, host govern-
ments often regain sovereignty rights over time by renegotiating their basing 
agreements with Washington.36 Furthermore, embassies offer a better resource 
for intelligence gathering. According to Michael Herman, “Cold War espio-
nage was closely linked with the position of intelligence officers as agent- 
runners and recruiters, operating from embassies  under diplomatic cover.”37 
At the American embassy in Seoul, for example, foreign ser vice officers and 
intelligence analysts collaborated in evaluating South Korean proliferation 
risks. Conventional military deployments have the capacity for reducing 
entrapment through joint planning and intelligence, but  these deployments 
do not eliminate its possibility.
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how alliance adjustments can provoke  
nuclear proliferation
Despite their benefits, forward deployments can be materially and finan-
cially costly for the guarantor. They can strain defense bud gets and take 
money out of the domestic economy. To be willing and able to shoulder  these 
costs signifies commitment.38 They are thus sensitive to changes in its stra-
tegic posture, whereby the guarantor changes its foreign policy objectives 
to diverge from  those of the ally. Nixon’s attempt at rapprochement with 
China and its effects on Taiwan is one such instance. Alternatively, domes-
tic economic concerns might induce the guarantor to exploit the relatively 
inexpensive substitution effects of nuclear weapons to replace manpower 
unilaterally. The Eisenhower administration partly implemented the New 
Look for this reason.39
What ever their cause,  these changes can adversely affect the security of 
the ally and stoke abandonment fears, especially if they are major, unfore-
seen, or unilateral from the ally’s perspective. I hypothesize that such changes 
make recipients of nuclear security guarantees more likely to seek their own 
nuclear weapon arsenals.40 Proliferation seems to be a drastic response, yet 
it has a strategic logic. When an ally confronts a nuclear- armed adversary, 
nuclear weapons provide the ally with a deterrent capability so that one day 
it can resist the coercion of that adversary.41 In other words, the ally engages 
in “true self- help” be hav ior in balancing against the adversary.42 Even if the 
ally decides to pursue a hedging strategy instead by actively developing la-
tent nuclear capabilities, the ally could still position itself in such a way as 
to gain certain coercive benefits.43
My argument assumes that in engaging in nuclear proliferation– related 
be hav ior, the ally has a bona fide interest in obtaining technologies related 
to the development of nuclear weapons. That is, it is not using the threat of 
nuclear proliferation as a bargaining chip for extracting new security assur-
ances from the guarantor without any intention to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Admittedly, states have incentives to represent their resolve and capabilities 
to get better agreements with friends and enemies in the absence of a world 
government. Since guarantors like the United States appear to have a strong 
interest in nuclear nonproliferation, the ally might believe that it could bluff 
and exploit that interest in order to draw additional assurances.44 However, 
I believe that my assumption is tenable. As one of Aesop’s fables warns us, 
crying wolf is dangerous when no wolves are around. The ally would have 
to send a nuclear signal loud enough for the guarantor to receive and inter-
pret in the intended manner before responding favorably. Yet nuclear feints 
are difficult and even dangerous to do effectively: if the signal is too loud, the 
ally could catch the unwanted attention of an adversary and cause an in-
cident; if too quiet, the signal could have no effect whatsoever.45 Fi nally, the 
argument that the ally is exploiting the guarantor’s interests in nonpro-
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liferation is paradoxical. How can uncertainty over the guarantor’s  future 
be hav ior provoke the use of a strategy— nuclear bluffing, in this case— that 
relies on the ability to predict the behavioral responses of the guarantor?
how alliances might reverse nuclear proliferation
The guarantor could lose a lot from the spread of nuclear weapons, even 
among its allies. Nuclear weapons undercut the ability of the superpower 
guarantor to proj ect its power and influence as well as to control escala-
tory dynamics.46 Accordingly, when it learns or suspects that its ally might 
be seeking an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent, the guarantor has incentives 
to thwart such ambitions as quickly and as comprehensively as pos si ble. 
To begin with, diplomatic relations with affected allies and adversaries are 
at stake, especially if the guarantor is seen as not  doing enough to restrain 
the proliferating ally. It could even be seen as culpable if its (perceived) 
inaction benefits the proliferator at the expense of  others. Local security 
dilemmas could subsequently intensify.47 Although the ally seeks nuclear 
weapons to satisfy its defense needs,  others could see its be hav ior as suf-
ficiently threatening that they acquire their own new weapons. As such, 
the guarantor prefers its ally to dismantle its nonpeaceful nuclear pro-
gram. It might perhaps wish to monitor all nuclear activities, denying its 
ally enrichment and repro cessing capabilities as well. Such a comprehen-
sive nonproliferation campaign would address any international doubts 
about the ally’s willingness and ability to restart its nuclear weapons pro-
gram. How can the guarantor get the nuclear genie back into the alliance 
 bottle?
I argue that pursuing this task is extremely challenging for the guarantor. 
States that have deci ded to undertake a nuclear weapons program typically 
do so recognizing and accepting the risks and costs involved. And so the 
guarantor is no longer deterring its ally from seeking nuclear weapons. The 
guarantor is instead trying to compel that very ally to stop its proliferation- 
related be hav ior— a harder undertaking, since scholars agree that deterrence 
is easier than compellence.48 Moreover, the alliance  bottle is broken and must 
be fixed first, requiring the guarantor to undo the harm inflicted on the se-
curity guarantee that prompted the ally to desire nuclear weapons in the first 
place. Reasserting security guarantees is challenging when the affected ally 
has had its faith in its received commitments badly shaken at a time when it 
 faces a hostile threat environment. The guarantor might have to make cred-
ible commitments to restore troop levels or to retain existing troop levels. 
Yet making such commitments believable is difficult when the guarantor has 
already revealed an interest in limiting them. Alternatively, the  factors that 
led to the unfavorable alliance adjustments in the first place could still exist. 
The guarantor might have enduring economic prob lems or irrevocably dif-
fer ent foreign policy interests.
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Certain proposed alliance solutions are also counterproductive. Military 
action is one option, but using military force against an ally would lack cred-
ibility and make the guarantor look unhinged to its other security partners.49 
Gene Gerzhoy identifies another option. He claims that threats to abrogate 
the alliance altogether could compel a proliferating state to renounce hav-
ing an in de pen dent nuclear arsenal.50 Yet such threats risk deepening aban-
donment fears even if they are conditional on the disavowal of nuclear 
weapons. A paradox also arises: how can abandonment fears trigger nuclear 
weapons interest but abandonment threats end it? Moreover, terminating 
an alliance is difficult. Besides, public alliance treaties cannot be removed 
on a whim: in the case of the United States, a major procedural pro cess that 
involves Congress and multiple government outfits is necessary for disman-
tling them. The de cade spanning Nixon’s overtures to China and the termi-
nation of the American alliance with Taiwan is instructive. Fi nally, if carried 
out, ending an alliance could have undesirable diplomatic repercussions 
among other allies. They might begin to fear abandonment themselves, 
whereas the adversary could perceive a “win dow of opportunity” to attack.51
Disruptive, nonmilitary policy instruments hold slightly more promise. 
One potential ave nue available to the guarantor is the extent to which the 
ally depends on the guarantor for economic growth— that is, how exposed 
is the ally’s economy to the coercion of the guarantor. The higher the ratio 
of trade with the guarantor to gross domestic product is one metric for eval-
uating this level of vulnerability. Alternatively, the guarantor might cut off 
or promise forms of aid that the ally believes is necessary for the ally’s goals, 
be it the maintenance of domestic rule or the viability of its economic pro-
grams. The ally could also be susceptible to the manipulation of financial 
flows that it receives from the guarantor. Monetary sanctions are another 
tool. By attacking the value and stability of the ally’s currency, the guaran-
tor could create inflation, increase debt burdens, and disrupt local economic 
planning. Alternatively, the guarantor could seize highly valued assets be-
longing to the ally.52 All  things being equal, the ally wishes to avoid  these 
types of economic sanctions  because it does not wish to experience economic 
difficulties that weaken its hold on power at home and empower potential 
opposition groups. It might desire avoiding such hardship if it already  faces 
a hostile threat environment.53  Because it derives more from the relationship 
than does the guarantor, the dependent ally should be more willing to con-
cede when coerced strongly.54 Absent such leverage, the nonproliferation 
challenge for the guarantor  will be severe.
Economic sanctions still have limited efficacy in absolute terms even if 
they are relatively more effective tools. Robert Pape argues that economic 
sanctions are in effec tive  because “pervasive nationalism often makes states 
and socie ties willing to endure considerable punishment rather than aban-
don what are seen as the interests of the nation.” Furthermore, states are 
institutionally  adept at working around the sanctions that could be leveled 
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against them.55 Indeed, the ally should anticipate the sanctioning effort of 
its guarantor, thus factoring this expected cost into its decision to seek nu-
clear weapons. Nevertheless, complete skepticism over sanctions would be 
unwarranted.  After all, the empirical rec ord of sanctions is highly biased 
 because they are implemented in the hardest cases. Just as it is easier to de-
ter than to compel, the best sanction is one that does not have to be used.56 
Nevertheless, as Daniel Drezner shows, states might infrequently use sanc-
tions against their allies, but when they do, they are more likely to extract 
concessions from them than from adversaries.57 Moreover, the ally might un-
derestimate the likelihood or costs of a sanctioning effort when it decides to 
embark on a nuclear weapons program. The benefits of such a program could 
outweigh  those potential costs amid a hostile security environment. Fi nally, 
and most importantly, sanctions can be especially effective if they directly 
target the nuclear activities of the proliferator. Sometimes allies also desire 
nuclear energy in order to sustain economic growth. Rather than threaten 
to harm the economic interests of the ally directly, the guarantor could block 
access to the credit, technologies, and resources necessary for developing 
nuclear power  whether for military or for civilian purposes.58
So far this discussion presumes that the guarantor has an overriding inter-
est to halt an ally’s nuclear interest. Despite the strategic incentives involved 
for valuing nonproliferation and despite how some scholars postulate that 
nuclear nonproliferation has been a key pillar of American  grand strategy for 
much of the Cold War and  after, I believe that such an assumption is un-
warranted.59 I argue that interest in the nonproliferation mission depends 
on  whether key decision makers are pursuing foreign policy goals that are 
complementary or inimical. Sometimes foreign policy goals are complemen-
tary with nonproliferation. Consider, for example, a situation in which the 
guarantor wishes to improve relations with an adversary,  either for their 
own sake or to balance against another adversary.60 In so  doing, the guaran-
tor might wish to restrain the nuclear ambitions of an ally  because the guar-
antor wants to assure the adversary of its bona fide intentions to cooperate 
or to prevent that ally from sabotaging the rapprochement effort. However, 
foreign policy goals can work at cross- purposes with nonproliferation: the 
guarantor may wish to retrench and thus retract certain military and po liti-
cal commitments. Although the guarantor would prefer not to see nuclear 
weapons spread for strategic reasons, it might have difficulty striking a bal-
ance between reassurance and geopo liti cal divestment. The ally  will recog-
nize that the guarantor is pursuing conflicting foreign policy goals, thereby 
complicating any nonproliferation effort.
To the extent that an ally does end up renouncing nuclear weapons, my 
argument is open to the possibility that it does so for multiple, even non-
alliance, reasons. To be sure, I do not argue that alliance considerations are 
unimportant in an ally’s decision to reverse its nuclear proliferation– related 
be hav ior. Nevertheless, alliance coercion could be one  factor among many—it 
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may not even be decisive for the final outcome. If the ally has  adopted a 
hedging strategy, then it might stop its nuclear activities once it assesses the 
security environment to be such that nuclear weapons have become unde-
sirable. Alternatively, the ally might find that rejecting international demands 
for inspections or antinuclear treaty commitments are no longer useful,  either 
 because their complaints regarding a nonproliferation agreement have been 
addressed or  because their foreign policy orientation has changed. Fi nally, 
the ally might have succeeded in acquiring certain technologies— such as the 
ability to enrich uranium or to repro cess plutonium—it had always wanted 
while stopping short of building nuclear weapons. The ally might have sim-
ply wished to be in a better position so as to acquire  those weapons in the 
 future if international circumstances might necessitate them.
five propositions
Five propositions flow from this discussion. First, alliances are less useful 
than often presumed with re spect to the prevention of nuclear proliferation 
among their members. Second, in- theater conventional military forces are 
key for boosting American extended nuclear guarantees. Third, alliance 
coercion— though it may still be impor tant— has played less of a role in nu-
clear nonproliferation than some accounts suggest. Fourth, the best tool 
available to the United States, if it decides to use this tool, is leveraging the 
economic or technological dependence the security- dependent ally has on 
it.  These propositions ultimately suggest a fifth proposition: deterring a nu-
clear weapons program is easier than compelling the reversal of one.
Alternative Arguments
Aside from pushing back against the view that American nonproliferation 
efforts  were decisive, I evaluate my argument against several alternative ex-
planations for nuclear proliferation: the adversary thesis, the domestic poli-
tics thesis, and the prestige thesis. With re spect to why states might renounce 
nuclear weapons,  these arguments do not necessarily rival my own. My 
skepticism over how alliance coercion can definitively stop  actual nuclear 
programs allows other  factors to be influential.
the adversary thesis
The adversary thesis posits that threat emanating from the adversary is 
alone sufficient to explain nuclear proliferation. To clarify, my theory as-
sumes that an adversarial threat exists, since abandonment fears would 
have no salience in its absence. Hence the United States could withdraw 
large numbers of forces from Western Eu rope in the 1990s without much 
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risk of nuclear proliferation. Yet some might argue that adversarial threat—
irrespective of the guarantor’s own actions— drives nuclear proliferation. 
When the adversary poses a threat, the ally ratchets up its nuclear weapons 
activities. When the adversary poses less of a threat, the ally reduces  those 
activities. This alternative argument narrowly reflects Stephen Walt’s assertion 
that states respond to threats rather than capabilities in making alignment 
decisions.61
Both my theory and this counterargument are “realist”: they each see 
states engaging in nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior as a response to ex-
ternal stimuli. They also assume conflictual preferences and unitary state-
hood.62 However, my theory is distinct in assuming that states would prefer 
to depend on their alliances and that adversarial threat is at most a necessary 
but not a sufficient  factor for their nuclear interest. In contrast, the adversary 
thesis assumes that states believe that their alliances are always unreliable 
and only serve as a temporary expedient in a self- help world. States react 
more to the conduct of their adversary than to that of their guarantors.
Of course, a state might view an adversarial threat as more severe when 
facing pos si ble abandonment by a major power. Conversely, the ally might 
be more dismissive of the threat if it is adequately assured of its received 
security guarantees. To disentangle  these overlapping variables, I examine 
how leaders construe their threat environments before substantive changes 
in security commitments occur. For my theory to be empirically valid, lead-
ers should see the severity of the adversarial threat as a function of the reli-
ability of the alliance support they receive. Alternatively, their evaluations 
of the adversarial threat should remain unchanged when the guarantor un-
favorably adjusts its security commitment made to the ally. If perceptions 
of the adversarial threat drive nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior before 
any such changes, then my argument would be invalid.
the domestic politics thesis
The domestic politics thesis offers a more contrasting perspective on nu-
clear proliferation. By asserting that international state be hav ior results 
largely from internal stimuli, the domestic politics thesis emphasizes regime 
survival rather than state security. Specifically, as Etel Solingen argues, de-
cisions to acquire nuclear weapons  after the NPT entered into force reflect 
governing leaders’ preferences over their state’s role in the global economy. 
Outward- looking regimes  favor greater integration with the global economy 
in order to increase their domestic legitimacy through economic growth. 
They eschew nuclear weapons development  because it could reduce their 
country to pariah status and cause trade- destroying security dilemmas. 
Inward- looking regimes legitimate themselves through nationalism and thus 
 favor economic self- sufficiency.  These regimes are more likely to develop 
nuclear weapons, since they serve not to deter attack but to rally their 
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populations, to stir nationalist rhe toric, and to divert attention away from 
domestic prob lems.63 The domestic politics thesis thus postulates that nu-
clear interest is insensitive to changes in the external threat environment. A 
nuclear weapons program could cease with the emergence of an outward- 
looking regime. To be sure, Solingen restricts her analy sis to the NPT period, 
but the motivation for  doing so is unclear given the perceived fragility of 
the nonproliferation regime during the 1970s. Governments wishing to en-
gage with the international community might have been disinclined to ac-
quire nuclear weapons even before the NPT was signed in 1968.
the prestige thesis
The final alternative argument is the prestige thesis, whereby leaders do 
not implement rational and materialist cost- benefit calculations in their nu-
clear decision- making. Leaders instead might perceive nuclear weapons as 
being intrinsically valuable,  because  those weapons confer prestigious sta-
tus on the states that possess them.64 In Jacques Hymans’s schema, leaders 
who are oppositional nationalists are prone to nuclear weapons interest, 
 because they have heightened threat perceptions and exhibit excessive con-
fidence in their country’s ability to face adversaries. For this rare type of 
leader, “the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is not only a means to the 
end of getting; it is also an end in itself.”65 Other leaders might hold con-
trary views— namely, that nuclear weapons are so fundamentally distaste-
ful and immoral that no conceivable strategic situation could merit having 
them. Such leaders might believe that  these weapons could even undermine 
national prestige. Leaders drawn from socie ties steeped in antimilitarist 
norms are more likely to hold such views.  These antimilitarist norms could 
be po liti cally manifest in social movements, large- scale protests, public opin-
ion polls, and even in de pen dent media coverage on issues relating to nu-
clear policy, alliance politics, and the defense industry.66 The prestige thesis 
overlaps with the domestic politics thesis, not least  because antimilitarist 
norms are likely to be salient in democracies, which in turn are likely to 
be outward- looking.67 Nevertheless, the prestige thesis allows leaders of 
inward- looking regimes to vary in their beliefs about the value of nuclear 
weapons.
the nonexclusivity of alternative arguments
 These alternative arguments do not necessarily rival my own framework. 
I argue that alliances might not be the effective instruments for thwarting 
 actual cases of nuclear proliferation, as they are sometimes heralded for 
 doing. Accordingly, decisions to cease proliferation- related be hav ior can 
have dif fer ent or complex  causes.68 For example, the ally might desire nuclear 
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weapons following a perceived breakdown in its alliance but then renounce 
 those desires to mollify its adversary. Alternatively, alliance adjustments 
might spark nuclear interest, but a change in regime type or leadership could 
lead to a cessation of proliferation- related be hav ior. In such instances, alli-
ance coercion might have been not a primary  factor in the nonproliferation 
outcome but at best a secondary  factor, especially if the guarantor experi-
ences significant difficulties in obtaining the ally’s compliance. Indeed, I 
generally share Scott Sagan’s observation of “nuclear weapons proliferation 
and restraint have occurred in the past for more than one reason: dif fer ent 
historical cases are best explained by dif fer ent causal models.”69
Empirical Strategy
The following chapters evaluate how alliances can inhibit nuclear prolifera-
tion by investigating the five propositions outlined earlier. Three intensive 
cases on West Germany, Japan, and South  Korea are the empirical core of 
this book (chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively). Complementing  these cases is 
a set of smaller cases contained in chapter 6. This chapter expands the vari-
ation of my study by considering  whether and how alliance politics can ex-
plain the French and British cases of proliferation success as well as the 
varying levels of nuclear interest exhibited by Australia, Norway, and Tai-
wan.  Because this complementary chapter strives to determine the external 
validity of my framework, it does not draw on the same level of theory- 
testing and deep archival work as the three intensive cases do. Why, then, did 
I choose the cases of West Germany, Japan, and South  Korea for intensive 
analy sis?
 These three cases are all most-likely cases for alliance ties to  matter for 
curbing nuclear proliferation risks. Some scholars have called West Germany 
and Japan “effectively semi- sovereign states,” meaning that they have had 
 little foreign policy autonomy in the Cold War so as to render them suscep-
tible to American pressure.70 With re spect to West Germany and South  Korea 
especially, scholars have even argued that  these allies  were coerced into 
renouncing any nuclear interests that they might have had. If alliances are 
imperfect instruments for managing nuclear proliferation risks in  these 
most- likely cases, then one won ders about states that are less dependent 
on their relationships with the United States.
Other methodological reasons lead me to prioritize  these three cases. The 
cases of West Germany and Japan together form a controlled comparative case 
study research design. They exhibit impor tant similarities on several key di-
mensions that plausibly affect their foreign and defense policies. They  were 
both defeated aggressors in World War II and subsequently hosted a large 
American military presence that was originally an occupying force but 
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evolved to become “trip wires” against communist aggression. They are also 
postwar success stories: they became wealthy liberal democracies that provide 
extensive social benefits to their citizens, who in turn have cultivated strong 
antimilitarist norms. But despite  these similarities, their geo graph i cal differ-
ences made them diverge in their susceptibility to changes in American  grand 
strategy and force posture.  These changes had varying implications for how 
both states should perceive their received nuclear security guarantees.
Though South  Korea owes its existence to a Cold War partition similar to 
the one that created West Germany, I analyze South  Korea for dif fer ent rea-
sons. For one, South  Korea is a critical case for my theory  because the United 
States initiated plans for several major troop withdrawals without much, if 
any, consultations with the South Korean government. Both of  these plans 
for troop withdrawals reflected impor tant changes in American  grand strat-
egy and so should provoke the nuclear response that my theory expects. For 
another, the South Korean case exhibits high values on  those in de pen dent 
variables that reflect the alternative explanations. South  Korea faced a hos-
tile international environment during the 1960s and the 1970s due to the 
double threat posed by Maoist China and North  Korea. At this time, the na-
tionalist Park Chung- hee led an authoritarian regime in South  Korea. Fi-
nally, South  Korea was a security- dependent ally that also needed economic 
and technological support from the United States, thus making it highly vul-
nerable to alliance coercion.
For all three intensive case studies, I rely on extensive archival evidence 
that I gathered from multiple archives, the Foreign Relations of the United States 
documentary rec ord, and the secondary historical lit er a ture. Unfortunately, 
direct “smoking gun” evidence is often difficult to obtain when researching 
such sensitive issues of national security as nuclear weapons policy. This 
prob lem is especially acute for countries like Japan and South  Korea, where 
ongoing security concerns have made  those governments unwilling to be 
fully transparent on how they dealt with  these issues in the past. Although 
the evidence is sometimes circumstantial,  these documents still provide in-
sights into the decision- making pro cess of American leaders and their in-
terlocutions with their allied counter parts.
I structure my analyses in the following manner. I first review the strate-
gic and domestic contexts of each country. I then describe the nuclear 
proliferation– related be hav ior that they undertook. Thereupon I examine 
evidence that alliance adjustments prompted  those allies to engage in such 
activities before considering the alternative arguments. Specifically, I inves-
tigate  whether abandonment fears animated decisions to ratchet up nuclear 
proliferation– related be hav ior so as to determine the validity of the first and 
second propositions of my argument. The deck is admittedly stacked in  favor 
of the first proposition by examining cases of supposed alliance breakdown. 
Yet I still assess the alliance explanation against the alternatives to make sure 
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that the connection is not spurious.  After I summarize the findings regard-
ing why allies initiated such actions, my focus turns to why they stopped 
so as to address the validity of the third and fourth propositions of my 
argument. I look at how the United States might have used vari ous alliance- 
related nonproliferation tools— reassurance, nuclear sharing arrangements, 
abandonment threats, and nonmilitary tools—to compel states into re-
nouncing their nuclear interests. To determine  whether allies ended their 
nuclear interest due to American- led coercion, the evidence must do more 
than to show that security assurances and economic ties framed the non-
proliferation effort. For example, the actions and rhe toric of the ally’s leader-
ship should reveal a sensitivity to  actual or threatened applications of non-
military sanctions, bowing to such pressure by canceling suspicious nuclear 
programs or adopting stronger international safeguards. Conversely, the 
guarantor should be hamstrung in its efforts to coerce a much more eco-
nom ically resilient ally. Once I assem ble the evidence, I summarize the main 
findings and consider again the alternative arguments. By checking  whether 
the four propositions all have empirical validity, support is built for the 
broader argument that deterring proliferation- related be hav ior is easier 
than compelling a reversal of it.
This chapter explains how alliances are more effective in deterring potential 
nuclear proliferation than in compelling nuclear reversals. For the first part 
of my argument, I emphasize the doctrinal and military infrastructure that 
supports the security guarantees that allies receive. The original treaty un-
derwriting the partnership does not fully determine the scope of subsequent 
entrapment and abandonment concerns— indeed, abandonment fears con-
stantly exist. What varies is their intensity. And so guarantors invest in their 
alliances with varying levels of conventional military commitments and rhe-
torical pledges. In- theater conventional military commitments also have 
the benefit of addressing entrapment risks. Nor do demo cratic guarantors 
have a unique advantage in credibly extending nuclear deterrence.  After all, 
the stakes are existential: recipients of treaty commitments are looking for 
more than pieces of paper when they evaluate  whether their guarantor 
would support them in a militarized conflict with a nuclear- armed adver-
sary. They want to see that their guarantor has “skin in the game” and can 
provide deterrence- by- denial. They are thus acutely sensitive to major and 
unfavorable conventional military redeployments that the guarantor might 
make for economic or geopo liti cal reasons. When such events occur, their 
abandonment concerns intensify so as to stimulate nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior. Unfortunately, the guarantor  will have difficulty in trying 
to end such be hav ior, if it is so inclined to stop it. Of course, no one argues 
that it is easy, but some scholars do assign special powers to military alli-
ances in curtailing proliferation efforts. In the event that the ally does 
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renounce nuclear weapons, it could do so for reasons unrelated to alliance 
coercion. Fi nally, this chapter describes the alternative arguments and out-
lines my empirical strategy. Before I turn to the cases, however, a histori-




American Security Guarantees  
during the Cold War, 1949–1980
 Because chapters 3 through 6 address the nuclear proliferation– related 
be hav iors of major American allies, I should chronicle the evolution of 
American Cold War strategy. I show how American decision makers con-
structed and adjusted their security commitments overseas between 1945 
and 1980. As such, this chapter has two purposes: first, to introduce impor-
tant concepts, historical events, and topics that  will be frequently men-
tioned throughout the empirical chapters; and second, to outline variation 
in how decision makers implemented changes in American strategic pos-
ture and, by extension, the security guarantees provided to American al-
lies. Of course, several basic continuities characterized American strategy 
during the Cold War. Aside from broad agreement on the need to contain 
the Soviet Union, American decision makers believed that nuclear superi-
ority over the Soviet Union was necessary for securing American strategic 
interests. Nevertheless, the nuclear balance evinced impor tant changes 
throughout the Cold War: the United States lost nuclear superiority by the 
time Lyndon Johnson had left the presidency. The United States began de-
signing and developing weapons systems in the 1970s so as to try regaining 
nuclear supremacy by the late 1980s. Some presidents like Dwight Eisen-
hower and Richard Nixon wanted to rely more than  others on the nuclear 
deterrent while its allies bear more of the conventional defense burden. All 
presidents wanted to reduce the American troop presence abroad— either 
in Eu rope or in East Asia—at some point when they  were in office.
Still, the extent to which American decision makers successfully adjusted 
their alliance commitments varied. This variation  matters for the empirical 
chapters, since I  will use it to explain why and when key allies began to dis-
trust American security commitments sufficiently to desire nuclear weap-
ons. To or ga nize the following discussion, I divide the historical period  under 
review into four distinct phases: 1949–1952, 1953–1960, 1961–1968, and 1969–
1980. For each of  these periods, I consider several issues that bear on the 
individual case studies, including American military planning for nuclear 
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and conventional wars, force posture changes, threat perceptions, and the 
economic  factors that constrained American Cold War strategy.
1949–1952: The Beginning of Commitment
Geopo liti cal circumstances compelled Washington to provide regional secu-
rity outside the Western hemi sphere  after World War II. Whereas the United 
States had retreated to its own neighborhood when World War I ended, the 
expansionist threat posed by the Soviet Union now raised the perceived costs 
associated with isolationism.1 The devastation wrought in Eu rope and ad-
vances in weapons technology combined to negate the sense of insularity 
that the United States had long enjoyed. With industrial centers vulnerable to 
conquest by the Soviet Union, the United States could no longer afford to be 
disinterested in the security of  others lest transnational communism expand 
its global reach. In early 1949, the United States signed the North Atlantic 
Treaty with Canada and ten Western Eu ro pean countries to form the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organ ization (NATO). A few months  later, the Soviet Union 
detonated a nuclear device for the first time, much earlier than expected.2
Washington would have had the upper hand over Moscow in a nuclear 
war at this early stage of the Cold War. Strategic Air Command had over 120 
nuclear- capable aircraft, and the size of the stockpile was projected to grow 
to four hundred bombs by 1951.3 Yet this edge was tenuous. A 1949 report 
commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff found that an atomic air offensive 
would not “per se, bring about capitulation, destroy the roots of Commu-
nism, or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the 
 people.” To the contrary, such an attack would be counterproductive,  because 
“for the majority of the Soviet  people, atomic bombing would validate So-
viet propaganda against foreign powers, stimulate resentment against the 
United States, unify the  people, and increase their  will to fight.” This report 
estimated that an aerial campaign would “only” reduce Soviet industrial ca-
pacity by 30 to 40  percent. As a result, the Soviet Union could still exploit its 
conventional military advantage by conquering areas of Western Eu rope and 
elsewhere, though it would face massive logistical challenges amid likely 
fuel shortages. And so the United States would have experienced difficul-
ties defeating the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons alone thanks to Soviet 
conventional military power.4 That Moscow came into possession of nuclear 
weapons sooner than expected in 1949 meant that it could become bolder in 
taking the initiative and intimidating Western Eu rope.5
Countering the growing Soviet threat required the United States to mobi-
lize extensive resources in order to strengthen its allies, to establish both a 
conventional and a nuclear deterrent, and to prepare its population for pos-
si ble war. However, American decision makers realized that any successful 
policy of containment would be expensive to maintain and would require 
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extensive state intervention in the American economy. The po liti cal willing-
ness for undertaking  these actions was absent. Congress passed two tax cuts 
in the late 1940s, even overriding a presidential veto in 1948, and denied 
Truman’s request for tax increases to finance military expenditures.6 At-
tempts by the executive branch to legislate universal military training failed.7 
Indeed, early American Cold War foreign policy was subject to intense 
partisan debate over the extent to which the United States should pro-
vide military and financial assistance to Western Eu rope.8 Even American 
defense planners and strategists  were unsure of what parts of the world 
necessitated American protection. George Kennan famously distinguished 
between the advanced military- industrial core and the periphery so as to 
argue for the vital importance of the former. Yet other writings of his seem 
to reveal his support for curbing communist expansion anywhere it hap-
pened.9 When decision makers did converge on the desirability for an ag-
gressive military policy of containment, as articulated in a major policy paper 
called National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), they  were hamstrung 
by concerns over costs and practicality given the lack of domestic support 
for such an expansive strategy.10
North  Korea’s invasion of South  Korea in June 1950 removed  these con-
straints by clarifying for many the seriousness of the Soviet threat. It gave 
the Truman administration ample justification to increase defense expendi-
tures dramatically and the po liti cal capital to strengthen its alliance commit-
ments.11  Until 1950, the institutional form of NATO was weak, consisting 
largely of written pledges of members to come to an ally’s aid in the event 
of an attack per article 5 of the alliance’s founding document, the Washing-
ton Treaty. Formal policy coordination bodies  were largely absent, and the 
alliance had neither a central headquarters nor a secretariat to manage its 
operations.12 The Korean War provided new impetus for the expansion of 
alliance commitments in Western Eu rope. The United States deployed greater 
numbers of troops in Western Eu rope and pushed for improved policy co-
ordination in NATO. Alongside  these changes  were institutional upgrades 
to the alliance such as a centralized administrative body located in Paris. The 
Korean War also dispelled doubts about the desirability of defending East 
Asian countries against communist aggression.
The incipient nature of pre-1950 American security guarantees partly re-
flected uncertainty over how to deal with the now- vanquished aggressors of 
World War II. The defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945 and Imperial Japan 
in August 1945 marked the beginning of occupation in both countries. In 
Germany, the allied co ali tion had agreed at the Yalta Conference to divide 
the conquered territory into American, British, French, and Soviet zones 
of occupation. By contrast, the United States exercised exclusive administra-
tive control over Japan.  These allied zones of occupation could not last forever; 
despite their role in World War II,  these occupied socie ties had to reacquire 
some form of po liti cal sovereignty eventually. Nevertheless,  because tensions 
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mounted between Washington and Moscow, geopo liti cal realities circum-
scribed the extent to which  these defeated states  were able to determine 
their domestic and foreign policies. In 1949, the Western powers consolidated 
the non- Soviet Zones into West Germany. The Soviet Union established a 
communist satellite state that would become East Germany. Japan regained 
in de pen dence in 1952.
American (and other Western) decision makers soon faced an urgent di-
lemma when reconstituting the po liti cal sovereignty of  these defeated socie-
ties. West Germany could not remain weak vis- à- vis a strong and per sis tent 
Soviet threat. Yet it was unclear how a strong and in de pen dent West Ger-
many could be liberal demo cratic, amenable to American geopo liti cal in-
terests, or, most optimistically, both. To resolve this dilemma, American de-
cision makers  adopted several mea sures. First, the Western powers would 
maintain an extensive troop presence in West Germany, thereby limiting the 
West German government’s foreign policy options while posing a (limited) 
conventional deterrent to the Soviet Union. Second, West Germany would 
become a member of NATO and rearm  under its auspices. In the famous 
words of Lord Ismay,  these alliance commitments served to “keep the Sovi-
ets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” Third, the United States 
ultimately obliged the new West German government to make formal com-
mitments not to acquire certain weapons in exchange for the restoration of 
its po liti cally sovereign rights. The Final Act of the London Conference pro-
vides that West Germany was “not to manufacture in its territory any atomic 
weapons, chemical weapons, or biological weapons.”13 The agreement also 
noted how NATO would closely monitor West Germany’s armament activi-
ties. West Germany was in de pen dent but restrained. Marc Trachtenberg 
best describes the situation facing West Germany: “Germany was to be tied 
to the West, and in impor tant ways was made part of the West, but her free-
dom of action was to be curtailed, and she was not to have the same sover-
eign rights as the other western powers.”14
A similar fear regarding Japan confronted American decision makers. 
They did not want to see Japan reemerge as an aggressive military power. 
Nevertheless, Japan could not remain completely defenseless, especially 
 after communist forces took po liti cal control of the Chinese mainland in 
1949. American and Japa nese decision makers found a useful compro-
mise. Tokyo  adopted a constitution that renounced war and the acquisition 
of military forces, but it also entered into a bilateral security agreement 
with Washington when the Security Treaty Between the United States and 
Japan came into force in 1952. Similar to West Germany’s participation in 
NATO, this treaty with Japan advanced American interests  because it 
would perform the dual task of maintaining a bulwark against communist 
aggression while inhibiting Japa nese militarism.15 Moreover, it contained 
several provisions that delineated American basing rights on Japa nese ter-
ritory. For example, article 1 of the Security Treaty stipulated that Tokyo 
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would grant Washington the “right” to “dispose United States land, air and sea 
forces in and about Japan” in order to satisfy their mutual security needs.16
The Korean War thus prompted the expansion of American security com-
mitments around the globe. Aside from NATO and the Security Treaty with 
Japan, the United States contributed to the formation of the Australian, New 
Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951. It went on to sign 
bilateral alliance treaties with South  Korea (1953) and Taiwan (1955) in ad-
dition to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organ ization (SEATO; 1954). This last 
alliance entailed American security commitments to the Philippines, Thai-
land, and Pakistan.
Contemporaneous with  these new alliances was a significant expansion 
of the American military. Between June 1950 and December 1952, all the ser-
vices saw their forces increase. The number of Army divisions doubled 
from ten to twenty, the Navy saw an 80  percent increase in its ships, the Ma-
rine Corps added a third division, and the US Air Force more than doubled 
the number of wings. Total manpower increased from 1.45 million to 3.5 mil-
lion.17 With this military buildup, American troop deployments overseas 
grew considerably. In 1950 over 120,000 American military personnel  were 
stationed in Western Eu rope. This number  rose to almost 400,000 by 1954. 
Unsurprisingly, the Korean War also precipitated major increases in troop 
numbers in East Asia, from 147,000 in 1950 to over half a million in 1953.18 
 Because of their numerical inferiority to Soviet forces, the enlarged Ameri-
can forces stationed in Eu rope likely would not have prevailed in a war. As 
such, nuclear weapons appreciated in their deterrent value as they become 
more sophisticated, more power ful, and more plentiful  toward the end of 
the Truman administration.19 According to war plans from this period, the 
Air Force would deliver nuclear weapons not only against industrial cen-
ters but also against a growing list of targets that included nuclear facilities, 
airfields, and even “Soviet ground and tactical air forces.”20
Threat perceptions made the military buildup palatable, if not desirable, 
but it still represented a radical and expensive departure in American for-
eign and defense policy. The Truman administration earmarked $13 billion 
for defense spending in 1950, yet estimations of the defense bud get would 
increase the number several- fold over the next few years. The Truman ad-
ministration surmised that the “total annual bill for national security pro-
grams would stand at around $60 billion” by about 1955.21 When the fiscally 
conservative Eisenhower and the Republican Party won the presidency in 
1952, how such high levels of defense spending could last became uncertain.
1952–1960: Commitment and Nuclear Superiority
Ideas and beliefs over po liti cal economy influenced Eisenhower’s foreign 
policy. Eisenhower wished to maintain balanced bud gets, to control inflation, 
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and to avoid deficits.22 Even with re spect to national defense, his strong 
personal opposition to “statism” made Eisenhower want to control govern-
ment spending.23  Because of the drastic uptick in military expenditures 
during the Truman administration, Eisenhower confronted a stark choice 
upon becoming president. One option involved repudiating his beliefs and 
raising taxes to maintain his country’s military posture. The other option 
involved spending cuts that could endanger American national security. To 
overcome this conundrum, Eisenhower advanced a new approach to Amer-
ican foreign policy: the New Look.
Outlined in a policy document dated October 30, 1953, the New Look con-
tained at least two key features. First, though maintaining that the Soviet 
Union represented a significant threat to American national security inter-
ests, the New Look shifted emphasis away from conventional military forces. 
Instead, the United States would rely on “the capability of inflicting massive 
retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.” Accordingly, Washington 
would respond to Soviet aggression with the overwhelming use of its atomic 
capability— a strategy called “massive retaliation.” Second, the United States 
would assist its allies in becoming more capable of their own defense. De-
spite calling for reductions in American military assistance to Western Eu ro-
pean countries, the New Look contended that “it is essential that the West-
ern Eu ro pean states, including West Germany, build and maintain maximum 
feasible defensive strength.”24 The New Look was to provide an adequate 
deterrent to the Soviet Union without jeopardizing the American economy.
Relying on nuclear weapons also served a strategic rationale, since West-
ern decision makers recognized that they would not be able to match Soviet 
conventional forces in Eu rope. British defense planners observed  later in 
the 1960s that “any attempt by NATO to base its strategy for the defense by 
conventional means is impossible,  unless the Western nations drastically 
lower their living standards.”25 In deterring Soviet attack with the threat 
of using nuclear weapons at an uncertain threshold, the United States was 
also reassuring its Western Eu ro pean allies— especially West Germany— 
that it had their security in mind. Moreover, matching Soviet conventional 
military power on the continent required military expenditures that the 
United States would not and could not pay. NSC-162/2, the principal docu-
ment that describes the New Look, emphasizes this point in outlining the 
basic prob lems confronting American national security. Its opening section 
notes the need “to meet the Soviet threat to US security” without “seriously 
weakening the US economy or undermining our fundamental values and 
institutions.”26 The document  later stresses the health of the American 
economy as the sine qua non of allied perseverance over the Soviet Union.27 
With the New Look, Eisenhower hoped to reduce spending from $43 billion 
to about $33 billion.28 Cutting the size of the armed forces was necessary for 
fulfilling this objective.29
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The New Look depended on Washington maintaining nuclear superior-
ity over Moscow. Nuclear superiority compensated for Soviet conventional 
military superiority on the continent. If the Soviet Union could threaten a 
devastating nuclear strike on the American homeland, then Massive Retali-
ation would lose credibility. Nuclear war would have to involve the United 
States trading one of its own cities for Paris or Berlin— something that Eu-
ro pean statesmen would have trou ble believing. For this reason the so- called 
missile gap that emerged in the late 1950s between the two superpowers un-
nerved American allies. Vulnerability to a Soviet nuclear strike might in-
duce the United States to strike some bargain at their expense. To allay such 
worries, the United States invested extensively in its stockpile and delivery 
capabilities. Thus, from 1949 to 1960, the American nuclear arsenal grew 
from 250 primitive atomic weapons to eigh teen thousand atomic and ther-
monuclear weapons. Even as late as 1962, the Soviet Union possessed “only” 
several hundred nuclear warheads as well as a limited delivery capability 
served by bombers and rocket- fueled missiles.30 Pavel Podvig reports that 
the Soviet Union in 1962 “had about 100 Tu-95 and 60 3M bombers, which 
could deliver about 270 nuclear weapons to U.S. territory.” Ballistic missile 
development continued apace, but the deployment and readiness of Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) still remained very limited despite 
the “missile gap” controversy.31
The result was that at this time a nuclear war would have been especially 
unbearable for the Soviet Union. Consistent with the New Look, any con-
ventional aggression made by the Red Army would elicit a response that 
combined strategic and nuclear forces. MC-48— NATO’s strategic planning 
document that was approved in 1954— envisaged the “early use of nuclear 
weapons to stop a Soviet invasion” while NATO forces  were positioned on 
a forward defense line at the Weser, Fulda, and Lech Rivers.  These conven-
tional forces  were not expected to repel the Soviet invasion. Rather, their 
placement would “force the Soviets to concentrate their forces to break 
through and thus provide lucrative targets for NATO nuclear weapons.”32 
NATO revised  these plans with MC-70 in 1958, but it still called for the early 
use of nuclear weapons against a large- scale invasion force.33
The force requirements for the United States to defend East Asia from com-
munist aggression  were smaller. The Soviet military presence in this region 
was far more limited than in Eu rope. Communist China posed a threat with 
its massive army, but its military was qualitatively weak such that it had 
trou ble projecting military power over the Taiwan Straits, to say nothing of 
the South China and East China Seas.34 Still, in the mid-1950s, the United 
States did use the threat of nuclear force to defend the Kinmen and Matsu 
island groups in the Taiwan Straits.35 Indeed, the United States stationed 
nuclear- capable Matador missiles in Taiwan in addition to a troop garrison.36 
The same was true in South  Korea, where in 1958 the United States placed 
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280-mm nuclear cannons and Honest John nuclear- tipped missiles. A year 
 later the US Air Force deployed a squadron of nuclear- tipped Matador cruise 
missiles capable of hitting targets in China and the Soviet Union.37  These 
forces strengthened deterrence.  After all, the attritional nature of the Korean 
War revealed the inability of the United States to prevail against Chinese 
forces in a purely conventional war.
Reliance on nuclear weapons did not just result from Eisenhower’s fiscal 
conservatism and geopolitics. The economic prob lems facing Eisenhower 
 were structural: changes in the global economy  were making the status quo 
regarding overseas American deployments difficult to uphold. Specifically, 
the United States was beginning to incur a balance- of- payments deficit that 
threatened to complicate its ability to pay for its military expenditures 
abroad.38 Balance- of- payments refers to the net payments made for a state’s 
imports and exports of goods, ser vices, and financial capital. A balance- of- 
payments deficit means that the current account is negative, reflecting how 
the state is a net debtor in the global economy. Though market mechanisms 
should automatically correct any imbalances, one tool that a government can 
use to address a balance- of- payments deficit is to depreciate its national cur-
rency. By lowering the value of the national currency, the country’s exports 
should increase as its imports decline. This option was not available to Amer-
ican decision makers during the 1950s. At the time, governments fixed their 
exchange rates in keeping with the Bretton Woods system—an international 
economic regime that emerged  after World War II.  Under a fixed exchange 
rate system, states can make changes within their domestic economies in or-
der to rebalance payments, thereby satisfying their obligations to exchange 
their currencies at fixed rates. For deficit countries, the required adjustments 
have to exert a deflationary effect on internal prices so as to increase exports. 
For many Western governments during the 1950s and 1960s, such adjust-
ments  were po liti cally unattractive  because they meant compromising on 
social spending and high standards of living.
Compounding this situation was how the global economy relied on a two- 
tiered system in which states could use the American dollar (and the British 
pound sterling) in lieu of gold in international transactions. The reason for 
this system was straightforward. Global economic growth requires the ex-
pansion of international liquidity, but relying on gold exclusively, as is the 
case  under a gold standard, is problematic due to the limited supplies of this 
valuable metal. Though a two- tiered system was an appropriate solution to 
this prob lem, it had an impor tant weakness. If the country whose currency 
can be used in lieu of gold runs extensive balance- of- power deficits, then it 
risks stoking such inflation that other states would switch to gold. A conse-
quence of the attendant lack of liquidity is downward pressure on the world 
economy.39
Starting in 1950, the United States ran a large balance- of- payments deficit 
as its financial capital outflows exceeded its inflows. Paying for its global 
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presence contributed greatly to this deficit. By spending money on its military 
bases abroad, for example, the United States was increasing other countries’ 
supplies of foreign exchange and accumulating greater debt. Though the 
United States was favorably predisposed to supplying international liquid-
ity, the balance- of- payments deficit began to exert deflationary pressure on 
the American economy in the mid-1950s.40 Furthermore, American allies 
 were using their expanding foreign exchange reserves to purchase gold. 
 These gold purchases narrowed the supply of international liquidity, in-
creased the vulnerability of the greenback, and, by extension, enhanced the 
po liti cal power of surplus countries.41
1961–1968: Losing Nuclear Superiority
During his successful bid for the American presidency, John F. Kennedy 
campaigned on boosting economic growth and strengthening defense. 
Eisenhower, he charged, focused too much on controlling the bud get. An 
impor tant consequence of this inappropriately stringent fiscal policy was a 
neglect of military power. Eisenhower had allowed the alleged “missile 
gap” to grow unfavorably between the United States and the Soviet Union.42 
The Republican president had also neglected conventional forces. Kennedy 
declared that his presidency would rectify  these  mistakes. “Arbitrary bud-
get ceilings”  will now no longer compromise American national security.43 
A new doctrine— flexible response— would now replace the New Look, al-
lowing for a greater range of military options when confronting Soviet ag-
gression.
The extent to which the Kennedy administration would be able to meet 
the practical demands of flexible response was unclear. The policy was too 
expensive to implement. To be sure, spending on conventional weapons 
did increase during the Kennedy years. National defense outlays  rose from 
$48 million in 1958 and $54 million in 1964. During  those years, NATO’s 
conventional forces improved relative to Warsaw Pact forces. Thanks to im-
proved weaponry and the West German buildup, NATO could even plausi-
bly defend against a Soviet invasion.44 With some small tweaks to NATO 
forces, American military defense planners even believed that a robust con-
ventional defense against Soviet belligerence was pos si ble and that an im-
mediate recourse to nuclear weapons was unnecessary.45 But despite his 
earlier criticisms of Eisenhower’s austere fiscal policy, Kennedy soon found 
himself facing both old and new financial constraints. He initially felt pres-
sure to balance the annual bud get by controlling spending and  later stimu-
lating aggregate demand with tax cuts. Expanding social programs  were 
also costly.46 Thus, before his assassination, Kennedy was in fact calling 
for fewer defense outlays. The Johnson administration heeded his wor-
ries. By 1965, the increase in outlays to support flexible response had all 
cHAPter 2
38
but dis appeared— with defense spending falling to $50.6 million only to 
rise again to support the military effort in Vietnam ($81.9 million in 1968).47
Flexible response was also premised on unrealistic assumptions. Provid-
ing adequate civilian protection against nuclear attack was prohibitively 
costly and prob ably infeasible. Within two years the administration had to 
scuttle ambitious plans for an extensive network of underground shelters.48 
Indeed, administration officials became convinced that managing nuclear es-
calation was impossible. Francis Gavin offers evidence that Secretary of De-
fense Robert McNamara and other decision makers no longer believed that 
escalation control was pos si ble by targeting only the military assets of the 
Soviet Union. This nuclear doctrine ended up being only a fiction that the 
administration maintained to ease tensions within the Western alliance.49 As 
such, American defense planners still envisioned a devastating nuclear war 
that would begin with the United States targeting Soviet launch silos, air-
fields, and other military bases with nuclear weapons in addition to urban 
industrial areas.50 Even Kennedy believed that American conventional forces 
in Eu rope  were useful only for ensuring the  free status of West Berlin. Once 
the Berlin crisis was resolved, he thought, no further need for them existed 
 because any war with the Soviet Union would entail nuclear weapons use.51
The other constraint binding the Kennedy administration was the deepen-
ing balance- of- payments crisis. Early in his presidency, Kennedy established 
a committee tasked with devising a policy to manage the prob lem. The re-
sulting policy comprised three mea sures. First, the United States asked that 
 those states that acquired surplus dollars as a consequence of American mili-
tary spending abroad would desist from buying American gold. Instead, 
 these states would use their surplus dollars to acquire new military equip-
ment, thereby offsetting—as it  were— both American financial costs and their 
contributions to the deficit. Second, Washington would explore vari ous ini-
tiatives aimed at reforming the global monetary system. Third, it sought tariff 
reductions from Western Eu ro pean allies.52
This policy did not represent the full extent to which the United States 
would address the deficit. The Trea sury Department also dedicated itself to 
an additional mea sure:  under the direction of Secretary Douglas Dillon, it 
examined which government outlays overseas could be cut. Specifically, Dil-
lon advocated cuts to military expenses overseas. McNamara agreed, even 
pledging to cut  these costs by a third.53 Although  these reductions would 
improve balance- of- payments savings, they contradicted flexible response’s 
supposed emphasis on conventional military power. Had Washington been 
seriously committed to this strategic doctrine, it would have at least main-
tained the six divisions stationed in Western Eu rope without any sugges-
tion of their redeployment. Instead, debates ensued within the American 
government over the appropriate number of American troops in Western 
Eu rope and  whether any changes would have to be made.54 Decision mak-
ers even explic itly linked balance- of- payments considerations with the 
AmerIcAn securIty guArAntees durIng tHe cold wAr, 1949–1980
39
American conventional military presence when they met their West Eu ro-
pean counter parts.55
The Kennedy administration still paid lip ser vice to flexible response. 
One reason for maintaining this fiction was to ease intra- alliance tensions in 
Western Eu rope, especially  those centered on the “German question”— that 
is, how to empower West Germany without threatening its neighbors. If 
American decision makers openly acknowledged the prob lems associated 
with implementing flexible response, then the credibility of the American 
security guarantees would be severely compromised, and allies like West 
Germany would want their own nuclear weapons. American decision 
makers thus understood that a connection existed between nuclear strategy 
and the risk of nuclear proliferation by allies. Indeed, had Washington been 
more honest and declared that its conventional military presence was un-
necessary for deterring Soviet aggression, the thinking went, then Western 
Eu ro pean allies would decide against both improving their own conven-
tional forces and relying on American security guarantees.56
The rhe toric of flexible response was also useful in East Asia. The dual 
threat posed by a nuclear- armed Soviet Union and a non- nuclear- armed 
China implied that escalation could be rapid. The nuclear threshold was pre-
sumably even lower in an armed confrontation that would involve only 
China. Accordingly, McNamara believed that the local strategic environment 
presented another opportunity to cut defense expenditures.57 Yet the con-
cept of massive retaliation was unsavory in East Asia. Many critics  were 
pointing out (misleadingly) that the United States used nuclear weapons on 
Asians rather than on Eu ro pe ans in 1945.58 Moreover, the growing antinu-
clear and antimilitarist movement in Japan would have complicated efforts 
by the United States to legitimate its use of bases if extended deterrence re-
mained exclusively nuclear. Flexible response was thus more palatable to 
East Asian allies.
The one area in which the Kennedy administration’s policy was consistent 
with flexible response was in seeking centralized decision- making over tac-
tical nuclear arrangements. Centralized decision- making was necessary for 
ensuring that armed escalation would proceed appropriately in response to 
Soviet levels of aggression rather than ratchet up inadvertently. Neverthe-
less, the desire for centralization in this domain also conformed to the 
general American desire to monopolize western nuclear decision- making 
authority and intolerance for other countries’ nuclear weapons programs.59 
Illustrative of this view is the “no- cities” speech given at the University of 
Michigan: McNamara charged that “limited nuclear capabilities, operating 
in de pen dently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lack-
ing in credibility as a deterrent.”60
Seeking control over nuclear- sharing arrangements was manifest in one 
key policy: the Multilateral Force (MLF). The MLF was a formal nuclear- 
sharing arrangement that the Eisenhower administration had put forward 
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in December 1960. Such arrangements appealed to members of the Ameri-
can government  because it addressed growing concerns that Western Eu ro-
pean governments had an unfairly minimal role in nuclear decision- making 
in NATO. Prompting  these concerns was the emergence of medium- range 
ballistic missiles (MRBMs). In order not to risk diffusing  these weapon sys-
tems, American decision makers  were resistant to basing MRBMs in Eu rope 
despite calls from the Supreme Allied Commander Eu rope. To preserve de-
terrence while permitting some form of Eu ro pean participation, the MLF 
represented a favorable solution. Of course, the United States had already 
begun to implement informal nuclear- sharing arrangements in Western Eu-
rope in the form of the “dual- key system.”  Under this system, the United 
States managed nuclear warheads, whereas Eu ro pean allies had control over 
the missiles on which they would be mounted. In the event that both states 
agreed to launch a nuclear weapon, Washington would turn control of the 
warhead over to its ally. Nevertheless, this arrangement was becoming tech-
nologically outdated. The nuclear weapons used in the dual- key system 
 were tactical and thus unable to meet the threat posed by the expanding So-
viet arsenal of MRBMs.61
Another perceived benefit of the MLF is that it would enhance American 
credibility by institutionalizing further the American military presence in 
Western Eu rope. It would also leverage and sustain the superiority of the 
American nuclear arsenal.  After all, an emerging preoccupation of American 
decision makers at this time was the development,  actual and potential, of 
national nuclear forces in Western Eu rope. Such programs would undermine 
alliance cohesion.62 As an exemplary nuclear- sharing arrangement, the 
MLF would comprise a multinational fleet of ships and submarines manned 
by NATO crews and armed with multiple nuclear- armed ballistic missiles. 
Participating countries would jointly own the fleet and give their unan i mous 
consent before firing any missile.
Notwithstanding its origins in the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy 
and the Johnson administrations took up the MLF as a major component of 
their defense policy in Western Eu rope. Kennedy highlighted the impor-
tance of seaborne nuclear forces in a speech delivered before the Canadian 
Parliament in Ottawa on May 17, 1961.63 Yet the United States began a 
major effort to rally NATO members into supporting this initiative in 1963 
following the resolution of the Berlin crisis and a nuclear weapons system 
agreement with  Great Britain.64 The same motivations underpinned the 
Kennedy administration’s interest in seeing the MLF succeed despite the 
delay: permitting a robust Eu ro pean nuclear role in NATO, averting Eu ro-
pean nuclear proliferation, and addressing fears of discrimination among 
allies like West Germany.65 Resolving the nuclear status of West Germany 
was critical. Kennedy informed Macmillan that “if [the MLF] fails, the Ger-
mans are bound to move in much more dangerous directions. In the long 
run even  toward some partly clandestine arrangement with the French, or 
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if this should not work,  toward an in de pen dent nuclear effort in Germany— 
not now but in time.”66 Despite Kennedy’s stated fears over the effects of 
the MLF’s failure, the State Department most vigorously promoted the ini-
tiative to Western Eu ro pean allies during the Johnson administration.
The Johnson administration faced many of the same challenges and  adopted 
similar policies as its pre de ces sor. Shortly  after becoming president, Lyndon B. 
Johnson met with West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard in Texas to 
discuss military offset arrangements and balance- of- payments prob lems. An 
internal document that provided Johnson with talking points for this meet-
ing captures the continuity nicely: “The US  faces heavy pressure to reduce 
the overseas cost of its armed forces (e.g., Eisenhower proposal of drop- back 
to 1 division in Germany), and full offset is an absolute necessity if 6 division 
force is to be kept intact in Germany.”67 In another memorandum prepared 
ahead of Erhard’s visit, Dillon asserted that “our own balance- of- payments 
weakness is the most serious pres ent threat to the maintenance of our mili-
tary and po liti cal leadership in the  free world.”68 Such themes— balance- 
of- payments prob lems and the difficulty of maintaining existing military 
commitments— dominated Johnson’s foreign policy  toward Western Eu rope.
Though the Soviet Union and the United States  were nearing nuclear par-
ity by this point, the Johnson administration abided by its pre de ces sor’s 
strategic and doctrinal thinking regarding nuclear weapons.69  After all, many 
of Kennedy’s leading decision makers like McNamara, Rusk, and Dillon 
retained their cabinet posts  under Johnson. Thanks to this bureaucratic con-
tinuity, foreign policy officials still adhered to the rhe toric of flexible response. 
Within the Defense Department, McNamara still sought to streamline the 
American military and threaten reductions in American commitments in 
Western Eu rope. The State Department remained wedded to the MLF as 
the  future basis on which an American- led Eu ro pean deterrent force would 
be or ga nized. Fi nally, by participating in negotiations for a nuclear nonpro-
liferation treaty, the administration shared Kennedy’s goal of preventing 
further nuclear proliferation.
Johnson’s interest in advancing global nuclear nonproliferation objectives 
was more intense than Kennedy’s, however. China was one reason why this 
nonproliferation effort intensified. To be sure, Chinese efforts at acquiring 
nuclear weapons dated back to Eisenhower’s presidency, but by the 1960s 
many states had become apprehensive of Beijing’s nuclear ambitions. The 
Soviet Union quickly withdrew its support for the program before attempt-
ing to thwart it.70 American decision makers themselves feared that nuclear 
weapons would not only embolden an already aggressive and revisionist 
China but also trigger wider nuclear proliferation, particularly among Amer-
ican allies. At one point, the Kennedy administration even explored  whether 
to use military force to disrupt China’s nuclear program. The Johnson ad-
ministration revisited this option  after China first detonated a nuclear de-
vice in October 1964.71
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Also distinguishing Johnson from Kennedy was the war in Vietnam. Aside 
from containing communism in Southeast Asia, Vietnam mattered to John-
son partly  because of alliance politics. Defending Vietnam was critical for 
demonstrating American resolve in supporting weaker allies against foreign 
depredations, especially in areas that  were not vital to American security. 
Fredrik Logevall argues that credibility concerns— personal and domestic 
in addition to national— influenced Johnson’s decision- making.72 Indeed, 
the belief that commitments  were interdependent was in vogue among 
policy experts at this time.73 Accordingly, in the months  after China’s nu-
clear detonation, the Johnson administration began seriously contemplat-
ing  whether to Americanize the war. Retreating from Vietnam during this 
time might have, for example, hinted to China— and other aspiring nuclear 
proliferators—that de- escalation or withdrawal was a consequence of its 
newfound nuclear capability. Thus, in July 1965, Johnson chose to escalate 
the American military presence in the Vietnam War. The number of Ameri-
can military advisers and soldiers grew from sixteen thousand in 1963 to 
over half a million in early 1968. National defense outlays expanded dramat-
ically. The United States was spending about $82 billion on defense by 1968, 
an increase of about 50  percent from 1965.74 Military attention shifted away 
from Western Eu rope and turned  toward Southeast Asia.
Within several years, it became evident that uncertain American victory 
in the Vietnam War would be prohibitively costly in both blood and trea-
sure. Domestic opposition to the war intensified, particularly among young 
adults who feared that they would be selected in the national draft and 
shipped overseas. Protests rocked university campuses and cities across the 
United States.  After an antiwar candidate finished seven points  behind him 
in the New Hampshire Demo cratic primary, Johnson declared his decision 
not to seek reelection. In the same speech, made on March 31, 1968, he an-
nounced that he would unilaterally suspend aerial bombings over North 
Vietnam so as to pursue peace talks. In the presidential election that year, 
both Demo cratic candidate Hubert Humphrey and Republican candidate 
Nixon pledged to end the Vietnam War. But how would the United States 
withdraw from Southeast Asia without signaling a full retreat from its global 
commitments?
1969–1980: Nuclear Parity and the Consequences of the Vietnam War
By the time Johnson left office, the United States and the Soviet Union  were 
at nuclear parity.  Because both superpowers had a survivable second- strike 
capability, nuclear war would be suicide for both sides  under mutually as-
sured destruction (MAD). Worsening this situation further for the United 
States was that even a Eu ro pean conventional war had become more diffi-
cult. The fighting power of the US Army was depleted in Vietnam. The 
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domestic public opinion was turning against an activist American foreign 
policy.
The Vietnam War thus preoccupied Nixon’s presidency. That conflict was 
the center around which all other issues revolved, including relations with the 
Soviet Union and China.  Because tensions between Washington and Mos-
cow had eased over the course of the 1960s through détente, Nixon concen-
trated on developing a po liti cal solution to Vietnam. His signature foreign 
policy achievement— rapprochement with China— also had Vietnam in mind.
Positive diplomatic relations with both communist powers would take 
time to develop, and so more immediate and direct solutions in the Vietnam 
War  were necessary.  After all, when Nixon became president, the military 
situation facing the United States appeared futile. The attritional warfare 
produced high casualties for both sides of the conflict. Partly  because the mili-
tary relied on conscription to support the campaign, members of the Amer-
ican public became increasingly critical of their country’s involvement in 
the war. Taking advantage of  these sentiments, Nixon pledged to end the 
Vietnam War. This promise became a signature aspect of his successful 
presidential election campaign in 1968. Nevertheless, the war could not end 
at any cost. Nixon believed that American withdrawal from Vietnam could 
be achieved only if a workable arrangement would guarantee South Viet-
nam’s security.75 Amid faltering negotiations with North Vietnam and do-
mestic demands for pulling out of Vietnam, Nixon initiated a strategy of 
phased troop withdrawals and greater reliance on Viet nam ese troops.76
This policy, known as  either “Vietnamization” or the Nixon Doctrine, was 
the cornerstone of a general theme of Nixon’s first term of office. In a speech 
delivered at Guam on July 25, 1969, Nixon announced that although the 
United States would maintain its treaty commitments and continue to pro-
vide nuclear umbrellas, it would ask its allies to contribute more to satisfy 
their own security needs.77 On November 3 that year, he clarified that “we 
 shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance 
with our treaty commitments. But we  shall look to the nation directly threat-
ened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defense.”78 Transferring military responsibilities to South Viet nam ese forces 
was one aspect of this policy, but the Nixon administration also sought to im-
plement similar changes in East Asia. Indeed, the Nixon Doctrine articulated 
explic itly the princi ple that allies must bear more of the conventional defense 
burden while the United States would rely more on its nuclear deterrent.
As if détente and the Nixon Doctrine did not signify the retraction of 
American alliance commitments enough, strains on the American economy 
intensified. Spending on the Vietnam War and the  Great Society— Johnson’s 
program to eliminate poverty and racial injustice— drove up inflation. Do-
mestic unemployment was increasing. The Bretton Woods system teetered 
as gold outflows from the American economy persisted. It fi nally collapsed 
in August 1971 when Nixon signed an executive order that unilaterally made 
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the dollar no longer directly convertible to gold outside of the open market. 
Indeed, the negative balance- of- payments crisis and growing public debt 
had fi nally overwhelmed the American ability to manage the international 
monetary regime. The most significant consequence of the “Nixon Shock”—
as Nixon’s decision came to be called— was that many fixed currencies be-
came free- floating in world markets, thereby eliminating a key pillar of the 
Bretton Woods system and rendering obsolete (at the time) the International 
Monetary Fund. For many observers, the United States seemed no longer 
able to manage the global economy. That Nixon issued his executive order 
without consulting  either his own government officials or allied decision 
makers also signified that American leaders had no qualms with upending 
international arrangements for their own benefit.79
This display of executive power notwithstanding, Congress was assert-
ing its power over foreign policy. Most famously, it passed the War Powers 
Act in 1973, whereby the White House could not commit to an armed con-
flict without the consent of Congress.80 From an alliance perspective, a more 
relevant piece of legislation was the failed Mansfield Amendment. Intro-
duced by Demo cratic senator Mike Mansfield in 1971, this amendment 
called for the number of American troops in Eu rope to be halved. Although 
the Senate defeated this motion 61–36 within months of its appearance, the 
amendment fueled concerns that the United States was declining and con-
templating a global retreat.81
Amid  these dismal developments, the United States was embracing nu-
clear arms control.  Under Nixon’s leadership, the United States negotiated 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I, the Anti- Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention. His successors Gerald Ford 
and Jimmy Car ter negotiated SALT II and canceled the neutron bomb, re-
spectively.  Because the rival superpowers  were at roughly nuclear parity, 
fears of accidental nuclear war and relaxed tensions seem to have driven the 
pursuit of arms control. Yet the documentary rec ord reveals that Nixon was 
dismissive of  these treaties. He admitted, “I  don’t give a damn about [SALT]; 
I just  couldn’t care less about it.” Nixon construed the Biological Weapons 
Convention as “the silly biological warfare  thing, which  doesn’t mean any-
thing.”82 Indeed, Nixon began his presidency by stirring public debate on the 
development of a ballistic missile defense system intended to neutralize the 
Soviet SS-9, a liquid- fueled ICBM capable of carry ing multiple warheads.83 
He privately lamented nuclear parity with the Soviet Union,  because he 
thought that nuclear weapons would not only deter but also compel adver-
saries. Moreover, he and Kissinger believed nuclear superiority was what 
made American security guarantees believable. For Nixon, the “nuclear um-
brella in NATO was a load of crap,” whereas Kissinger observed how “Eu ro-
pe ans  don’t realize American nuclear umbrella depended on first strike.”84
Unfortunately for Nixon, breaking out of MAD was not a  viable proposi-
tion due to the associated costs and technical barriers. When Nixon became 
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president, multiple in de pen dently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) tech-
nology was available. This technology was attractive  because it allowed a 
ballistic missile to carry a payload containing several warheads, each of 
which could be aimed at an individual target.85 Yet the Soviets also had MIRV 
capability, and the nuclear stalemate meant that a general nuclear war would 
have been suicide for all involved. Nevertheless, the Nixon administration 
tried to develop limited nuclear options. The result of  these efforts was the 
so- called Schlesinger Doctrine, leaked to the press in 1974. This nuclear strike 
policy consisted of using a set of limited strikes against Soviet military tar-
gets so as not to foreclose a diplomatic solution.  Whether American decision 
makers believed in the practicality of  these ideas remains unclear.86
With time, the United States could increase the deployability of its nuclear 
arsenal, reduce Soviet retaliatory capabilities, and escape MAD. MIRV tech-
nology thus gave the United States a pos si ble first- strike advantage, but it 
was only by the late 1970s that the nuclear balance began tipping in  favor of 
the United States. Despite initial congressional concerns about the vulner-
ability of the system, President Jimmy Car ter reinstated a major land- based 
MIRV missile called the Missile- eXperimental (MX) in 1979. His investment 
in counterforce was especially surprising given Car ter’s stated opposition 
to nuclear weapons on the election campaign and the first half of his presi-
dency.  After some controversy that saw the MX program canceled in the 
early 1980s only to be  later reintroduced as the Peacekeeper, counterforce 
capabilities saw major upgrades  under the Reagan administration. This ad-
ministration also sought to dampen MAD with a ballistic missile defense 
proj ect popularly known as Star Wars.
Why the United States would invest heavi ly in expensive counterforce ca-
pabilities is a puzzle for another book. One possibility is that American 
leaders believed that counterforce gave them po liti cal leverage over the So-
viet Union. That is, nuclear superiority would inspire confidence among 
American allies that the United States possessed a power ful deterrent.87 Cer-
tainly, Nixon felt this way. Giving credence to this claim is the controversy 
that arose among Eu ro pean allies over Soviet intermediate range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs) in the late 1970s. Their deployment suggested to some 
Western Eu ro pean leaders that their countries became vulnerable to the mil-
itary buildup in the Warsaw Pact, since SALT I and SALT II circumscribed 
American nuclear capabilities.  Because the Soviet Union could hold the 
United States hostage with ICBMs, the United States could become less 
willing to defend Eu rope in the event of a localized nuclear attack. Security 
interests between both sides of the Atlantic became decoupled, in other 
words. The Car ter administration and NATO resolved this controversy 
by implementing the “dual- track” decision, whereby the United States in-
troduced more IRBMs in Eu rope but would promise (threaten) to withdraw 




The dual- track decision concluded a de cade in which American power 
was in general crisis. Military defeat in Vietnam fostered doubts in the abil-
ity of the United States to win wars. The collapse of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem and two oil shocks made global markets volatile. The United States 
also loosened its alliance commitments first by withdrawing troops from 
East Asia, then by allowing the dissolution of SEATO and terminating the 
alliance with Taiwan, and fi nally by advocating  human rights at the behest 
of authoritarian allies like South  Korea. The domestic po liti cal situation in 
the United States also appeared dismal. Nixon’s presidency ended ignomin-
iously  after the Watergate scandal. Car ter seemed to offer a decisive break 
from the policies of Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford. However, eco-
nomic malaise and the Car ter administration’s mishandling of the Iran hos-
tage crisis limited Car ter to a single- term presidency.
The American experience in the first three de cades of the Cold War follows 
an arc. At the beginning, the United States expanded its alliance commit-
ments around the world. NATO preceded the Korean War, but it became 
more institutionalized and saw massive military investments  after that con-
flict. Elsewhere the United States established several bilateral and multilat-
eral alliances, backing them with major troop deployments, a large and 
growing nuclear arsenal, and vague threats against the conventionally su-
perior Soviet Union.89 Over time, however,  these commitments came  under 
duress. The balance- of- payments crisis made large overseas deployments 
and defense outlays untenable  unless allies would spend their American dol-
lars so as to offset the costs. American participation in the Vietnam War 
initially served to convey American resolve, but it seemed to engender Amer-
ican decline instead. By the late 1970s, the United States was undoing some 
of the alliance commitments it had made  after the Korean War.
This trajectory notwithstanding, two desires  were common among Amer-
ican decision makers during this part of the Cold War. One was to depend 
more on the nuclear deterrent of the United States than on conventional mil-
itary deployments to thwart communist aggression. This preference was 
most pronounced during the Eisenhower and Nixon years, but Kennedy and 
Johnson at times indicated their frustration with maintaining troops in Eu-
rope. The other related to nuclear superiority. Eisenhower’s strategy required 
a favorable nuclear balance. By the late 1960s, the nuclear balance entered a 
phase of rough parity— something that Nixon resented  because he felt that 
it deprived him of leverage.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 show how the nuclear interest of allies depended on 
 whether and how the United States was able to retract its conventional 
military commitments in light of the nuclear balance. As such, this chapter 
has several implications for what we can expect from the following three 
cases of West Germany, Japan, and South  Korea. One is that credibility 
prob lems  will become more salient in Eu rope much sooner than in East 
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Asia. For one, deterrence was easier in the latter region owing to geography 
and the threat environment. For another, economic constraints had greater 
ramifications for American ground power— a form of military power that 
West Germany valued as a deterrent force more than Japan, at least. An-
other implication is that credibility concerns  will be per sis tent in Eu rope 
despite declared changes in American foreign policy doctrine and military 
strategy. American reassurances to allies should have had limited effective-
ness in addressing their abandonment concerns, thereby hampering efforts 




A major American ally on the front lines, West Germany was the focal point 
of major power tensions during the first half of the Cold War. It benefited 
from extensive military commitments from the United States, ranging from 
NATO membership to large numbers of American nuclear weapons and 
foreign troops stationed on its own territory to deter Soviet aggression. In-
deed, given the large- scale military presence that the United States has main-
tained in Germany to this day, some international relations scholars assert 
that this country has had limited foreign policy autonomy, especially dur-
ing the Cold War.1 According to such assessments, alliance coercion should 
have been most effective in curbing any West German nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior.
Yet the rec ord suggests a dif fer ent story. West Germany joined a trilateral 
partnership with France and Italy in 1956 so as to develop a Eu ro pean nu-
clear weapons arsenal. Prompting this action was the anticipated withdrawal 
of American troops from West Germany and the rest of Eu rope. Despite 
prob lems with its credibility, the New Look did not alarm decision makers 
in the West German capital of Bonn enough to make them to desire nuclear 
weapons. Rather, what intensified abandonment fears among West German 
leaders  were (unsubstantiated) newspaper reports of imminent cuts to the 
American military and its manpower. The New Look mattered insofar as 
nuclear vulnerability made West Germany sensitive to any indication that 
the United States would loosen its “trip wire” and weaken local deterrence-
by-denial. Although France unilaterally deci ded to terminate this trilateral 
initiative, West Germany still avoided making clear commitments renounc-
ing nuclear weapons  until signing the nonproliferation treaty in 1969 and 
ratifying it in 1975. By this time, West Germany had extracted treaty conces-
sions from the Soviet Union and the United States while acquiring repro-
cessing and enrichment capabilities. Contrary to some American accounts 
of this nonproliferation episode, West Germany did not actually intend to 
acquire nuclear weapons, but it caused sufficient doubt— intentionally or 
not— about its motives among Soviet and American decision makers.
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The propositions drawn from my framework apply in this case. First, the 
alliance with the United States was less useful for curbing West German nu-
clear ambitions than was commonly presumed. Second, in- theater conven-
tional forces mattered for bolstering American extended nuclear guarantees 
to West Germany. Third, American coercion of West Germany was impor tant, 
but it played a much less direct role than assumed. And fourth, economics 
provided the United States some leverage over a defeated West Germany 
that was still recovering from World War II, but American decision makers 
had difficulty applying such pressure effectively to obtain offsets, to say 
nothing of nonproliferation commitments. Other  factors— especially do-
mestic politics— drove West Germany’s final choices. That is not to say that 
the alliance had no effect whatsoever: without NATO at all, West Germany’s 
security environment would have been dramatically worse such that it might 
actually have had a full- fledged nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, the 
alliance did break down and provided American decision makers with few 
effective means for extracting nonproliferation commitments.
Before examining the case, I outline West Germany’s strategic and do-
mestic po liti cal environment. The analy sis proceeds in two parts. The first 
investigates West Germany’s decision to embark on nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior in the mid-1950s. The second examines why West Germany 
ultimately made nonproliferation commitments in the late 1960s. Each part 
assesses the validity of alternative arguments.
The Strategic Context
West Germany emerged as the product of allied decisions taken between 
1946 and 1949 to amalgamate the British, French, and American zones of oc-
cupation. It was largely land locked, with its eastern borders abutting two 
communist states (East Germany and Czecho slo va kia) and,  after 1955, neu-
tral Austria. Its position in Central Eu rope thus exposed it to the Soviet 
Union. Despite lacking a significant air and naval capability during the 1950s, 
the Soviet Union was a land power that concentrated much of its armed 
forces in Central and Eastern Eu rope.  These conventional forces outmatched 
 those aggregated by NATO. Although it first detonated a nuclear device in 
1949, the Soviet Union did not develop an ICBM capability  until the late 
1950s. West Germany on its own faced a severely unfavorable conventional 
balance of power with the Soviet Union that an allied military presence could 
significantly (but not fully) redress.
Implemented by the Eisenhower administration, the New Look was 
impor tant for West Germany, since it emphasized substituting nuclear weap-
ons for conventional military power. This substitution was a mixed bless-
ing. Nuclear weapons compensated for the conventional superiority of the 
Soviet bloc  because they  were the deterrent that the United States could best 
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provide. Still, as Soviet nuclear capabilities improved  toward the end of the 
1950s, West Germany risked being the battleground on which the major 
powers could wage nuclear war if deterrence failed. Notwithstanding  these 
existential stakes, West Germany had  little to no input in NATO or Ameri-
can nuclear decision- making. As long as the United States retained a troop 
presence on West German soil, West German leaders could be assured that 
the United States very likely would be involved in any localized aggression 
in Central Eu rope.
My theory understands the Soviet threat as a necessary condition for West 
German nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior.  Whether rooted in real or an-
ticipated changes in American force posture, abandonment fears should be 
the key driver of any movement  toward nuclear weapons. In contrast, the 
adversary thesis stresses the Soviet threat, irrespective of American actions, 
as the principal influence on West Germany’s nuclear interest.
The Domestic Context
The domestic politics thesis sees outward- looking regimes as favorable to 
nonproliferation norms and agreements and inward- looking regimes as in-
clined to embark on nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior. Of course, only 
one regime— the Bundesrepublik— ruled West Germany, yet what  were the 
preferences of the major distinct po liti cal groups in West German politics? 
Thomas Berger describes three: the Atlanticists, the West Eu ro pe anists (some-
times called the Gaullists), and the Central Eu ro pe anists. The Atlanticists 
 were ambivalent about the formation and rearmament of the Bundeswehr 
(the West German armed forces), backed the United States, and doubted 
the early prospects of German reunification. They valued NATO over other 
Eu ro pean collective security arrangements, seeing the alliance as the best 
provider of deterrence despite endorsing Eu ro pean integration. The West 
Eu ro pe anists, too, supported an alliance with the West and rearmament, 
but they doubted that the United States would fulfill its commitments. They 
believed that Eu ro pean collective security arrangements would better serve 
West German strategic interests over the long term. Radicals even preferred 
the Eu ro pean Defense Community (EDC) and the Western Eu ro pean Union 
to NATO.2 Fi nally, the Central Eu ro pe anists disliked the United States, re-
jected nuclear deterrence altogether, embraced geopo liti cal neutralization, 
espoused socialist princi ples, and opposed Eu ro pean integration.3 Simply 
put, the Atlanticists and West Eu ro pe anists  were outward looking, whereas 
the Central Eu ro pe anists  were inward-looking even if they  were not nation-
alists.
Applying  these three categories to ascribe prestrategic preferences to indi-
vidual leaders and their parties is challenging. The po liti cal parties them-
selves straddled major po liti cal cleavages. Consider the main po liti cal parties 
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in West German politics during the 1950s and 1960s. The Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU), steeped in socially conservative values informed by 
interconfessionalism, contained both Atlanticist and West Eu ro pe anist fac-
tions. Co ali tion governments pres ent another complication. The CDU often 
partnered with its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU). 
This party espoused values similar to  those of the CDU but was more nation-
alist and socially conservative. Though this ideological overlap made  these 
parties co ali tion partners, their main po liti cal leaders— Konrad Adenauer 
(CDU) and Franz Josef Strauss (CSU)— still disagreed over West German for-
eign policy. Moreover, geopo liti cal developments could empower certain 
ideas while discrediting  others. The CDU and CSU  were dominant in West 
Germany partly  because the Cold War made socialism po liti cally undesir-
able both at home and with anticommunist allies. Accordingly,  after suffering 
successive electoral defeats, the Social Demo cratic Party (SDP)  adopted in 
1959 the Godesberg Program, renouncing Marxism so as to broaden its 
appeal among members of the  middle and professional classes. It even 
embraced a pro- Western policy supportive of the United States.4 Party 
identification notwithstanding, however, individuals are purposive. Though 
influenced by the discursive practices in which they are embedded, leaders 
may still adjust and manipulate ideas to suit their agenda, sometimes even 
moving between po liti cal categories. Konrad Adenauer was one such leader. 
Berger regards him and Strauss as being both West Eu ro pe anists, but 
Adenauer was the more Atlanticist of the two.5 Strauss should make West 
Germany more likely to engage in proliferation- related be hav ior when he 
has a greater share of decision- making authority vis- à- vis Atlanticist chan-
cellors like Adenauer and his successor Ludwig Erhard.
The prestige thesis emphasizes the degree to which leaders believe that 
nuclear weapons have intrinsic value. In a society where antimilitarist norms 
 were only beginning to take root in the 1950s, this thesis may not seem ap-
plicable to West Germany.6 Nevertheless, West German leaders might have 
seen nuclear weapons as status markers within NATO in light of the capa-
bilities possessed by the United States,  Great Britain, and France. Norma-
tive inhibitions on nuclear weapons could have intensified as antimilitarist 
norms grew more pervasive in West German society  toward the late 1960s. 
The prestige thesis would thus look to normative considerations as  drivers 
of West German nuclear weapons interest.
Nuclear Proliferation– Related Be hav ior:  
The F- I- G Initiative Followed by Hedging
The West German government, in exchange for po liti cal sovereignty, re-
nounced domestic nuclear weapons production at the Paris and London 
Conferences in 1954. Still, West Germany partnered with Italy and France in 
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1956 to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal. By the time this trilateral initia-
tive came into being, Chancellor Adenauer was already countenancing some 
form of a nuclear program during the second half of 1956. He sought to pass 
legislation in the Bundestag— the West German federal parliament—to re-
move domestic  legal strictures against having a nuclear weapons program. 
In October 1956, Adenauer promoted his minister of atomic affairs, Franz 
Josef Strauss, to become the minister of defense, indicating his personal un-
derstanding regarding the connection between nuclear policy and defense.
West Germany was not entirely discreet in its conduct. At a February 1957 
press conference, Adenauer referred “to the possibility of organ izing a 
Franco- German co- production of nuclear weapons on French territory.”7 By 
December 1957 West Germany quietly began its collaborative proj ect with 
France and Italy, called the F- I- G (French- Italian- German) initiative.8 Al-
though American decision makers knew that  these three governments  were 
engaged in some joint initiative, they  were uncertain of the extent to which 
it involved nuclear weapons. And yet even with this secrecy, the three gov-
ernments did not intend their proj ect to work at cross- purposes with NATO.9 
For Adenauer, the protection that Washington could offer remained desir-
able despite its flaws. And so shortly  after this proj ect started, Adenauer 
made private and coded requests to the United States for “the most modern 
and effective weapons” while denying to the Soviets any interest in such 
weapons.10 In January 1958 Adenauer successfully oversaw legislation pass 
in the Bundestag to permit the acquisition of delivery vehicles, which mem-
bers of the opposition suspected was a reflection of a desire to seek nuclear 
weapons.
Bonn’s pursuit of the bomb was brief. Upon returning to power, French 
president Charles de Gaulle unilaterally terminated the F- I- G initiative in 
June 1958.11 West Germany did not reattempt a nuclear weapons program 
 after de Gaulle’s abrupt cancellation of the trilateral initiative. Indeed, de 
Gaulle’s actions imposed a new constraint on any new nuclear weapons proj-
ect that West Germany could pursue. Another initiative with its Eu ro pean 
neighbors was unlikely, whereas a unilateral West German program risked 
international detection and censure. Notwithstanding this constraint, West 
Germany hedged diplomatically so as to improve its status within the bur-
geoning nuclear order, even if it did not intend on acquiring its own nuclear 
weapons.12 For one, it criticized and resisted early international drafts of a 
treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. Some West German politi-
cians even understood a nonproliferation treaty as being designed against 
them. For another, Bonn strongly backed the nuclear- sharing arrangements 
that Washington was considering in the early 1960s. One reason why Amer-
ican leaders contemplated such concepts as MLF as long as they did was 
their concern for how West Germany would behave in the absence of  these 
initiatives. West German leaders sometimes exploited  these fears that their 
successors might want nuclear weapons.13 Often forgotten, however, is that 
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West Germany still proceeded to acquire nuclear technologies amid  these 
diplomatic efforts. George Quester estimated in 1970 that within several 
years West Germany “ will have enough installed nuclear electrical power 
facilities to produce plutonium for 200 atomic bombs a year.”14
Con temporary international observers and decision makers themselves 
 were uncertain of West Germany’s nuclear intentions. Take, for example, a 
correspondence between Kennedy and British prime minister Harold Mac-
millan. Kennedy wrote Macmillan that “the Chancellor made very clear his 
conviction that German unilateral owner ship or control over nuclear weap-
ons is undesirable, and [Minister of Defense Franz Josef] Strauss expressed 
the same view; they agreed that their needs could be met within a multilat-
eral framework.”15 The basis of  these impressions was a conversation that 
Kennedy had just the previous day with Adenauer. During this meeting Ken-
nedy asked the chancellor directly  whether he would continue to abide by 
the terms of the 1954 renunciation of the experimentation of nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical weapons. Adenauer reaffirmed  these commitments but 
added that the obligation had  legal validity as long as “circumstances remain 
unchanged.”16 According to Adenauer, former secretary of state Dulles him-
self endorsed this application of the  legal princi ple of rebus sic stantibus 
( things thus standing).
And so despite the confidence he conveyed to Macmillan, Kennedy was 
privately unsure. In a 1964 interview, Kennedy adviser Charles E. Bohlen 
recalled: “I think that [Kennedy] had a certain reservation as to the German 
 future and the danger of German militarism. I think he was very conscious of 
the possibility that given a few turns or twists of events, you could be headed 
back into another situation where Germany could again become a menace.”17 
 These fears encouraged vari ous probes into West German nuclear interest. 
One American government study explored the meaning of Adenauer’s state-
ment to Kennedy and its significance for West German policy. This 1962 
report failed to confirm  whether Dulles had enunciated the princi ple of 
rebus sic stantibus and noted that its status in international law was dubi-
ous.18 While this report was being drafted during the summer of 1962, 
American government officials investigated  whether Paris and Bonn  were 
cooperating in nuclear weapons development. A December 1961 tele gram 
had already cautioned that “if continued integration of scientific and tech-
nical resources of France and Germany goes on at its pres ent rate, and the 
economic cooperation of both countries continues in EEC [the Eu ro pean Eco-
nomic Community], surely US must realize it is very likely that France  will 
provide technical nuclear information to Germans.”19 With British collabo-
ration, however, the State Department found “no concrete evidence now 
exists confirming any such cooperation.” Nevertheless, the American am-
bassador in Bonn observed that the British found it “prudent to assume 
that, even in absence of direct collaboration in weapons field, probability is 
 great that French and German scientists do in fact cooperate at theoretical 
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level on  matters of nuclear physicals which cld [sic] be related to nuclear 
weapons technology.”20 Investigations into pos si ble Franco- German nu-
clear cooperation continued  until at least December 1962.21
Other statements by American government officials highlight a shared 
sense of unease over West Germany’s nuclear policy. A tele gram from the 
American embassy in Bonn for Secretary of State Dean Rusk captures the 
prevailing attitude at the time: “At pres ent  there does not exist deliberate in-
tention in [West] Germany to embark on nuclear weapons program,  either 
alone or with French, but caution requires us assume [sic] that latent inten-
tion exists that any responsible German leader must keep possibility in back 
of mind as pos si ble answer to  future contingencies for which no concrete 
anticipation now required.”22 One such contingency was the successful ac-
quisition of a nuclear arsenal by the French government. In a memorandum 
to Kennedy, Rusk explained that the United States opposed French nuclear 
efforts  because of the risk it created for West German nuclear proliferation.23 
Furthermore, Washington understood the domestic influences on West Ger-
many’s foreign policy. State Department officials in May 1961 commented 
that “we can best  settle the German issue in Adenauer’s, not Strauss’, time” 
since Strauss was thirty- nine years younger than Adenauer.24 A State Depart-
ment study group warned that a  future West German government might 
have to demonstrate to its electorate that it  faces no international discrimi-
nation in nuclear policy.25
Fears of a nuclear West Germany persisted into the Johnson administra-
tion and became salient  after October 1964 when China detonated its first 
nuclear weapon. Indeed, two months  later Johnson indicated to British prime 
minister Harold Wilson that failure to resolve West Germany’s status would 
have significant implications for continental security, warning that “if we 
cannot solve this prob lem . . .  there was [sic] some 17- year- old right now in 
Germany who would be a 20- year- old  little Hitler in another three years.”26 
 Others in his administration  were less dramatic but still apprehensive. A 1966 
State Department report listed West Germany as a pos si ble proliferator. 
Though this report argued that West Germany had  little reason to proliferate 
thanks to domestic politics and existing collective security arrangements, 
ensuring that Bonn would credibly commit to nuclear nonproliferation was 
a major preoccupation of the Johnson administration.27
West Germany’s nuclear ambiguity also made the Soviet bloc ner vous, es-
pecially East Germany and Poland. In 1957, the Polish foreign minister 
Adam Rapacki proposed a nuclear weapons– free zone in Central Eu rope 
that would comprise Poland, Czecho slo va kia, and the two Germanies.28 Dur-
ing early negotiations for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, some Warsaw 
Pact leaders expressed concerns regarding the apparent Soviet inclination 
to accommodate NATO nuclear- sharing arrangements.29 Consequently, Mos-
cow  adopted a tougher stance by advocating for an agreement that would 
explic itly forbid the possession or transfer of nuclear weapons to Bonn.30
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To be sure, West Germany did acquire key nuclear technologies during this 
time. By 1976, West Germany was operating seven nuclear power reactors, 
with twelve more  under construction and another eight ordered.31 It even 
possessed repro cessing and enrichment capabilities, having also made in-
vestments in gas centrifuge technology. As such, West Germany was able to 
sell sensitive nuclear technology to Brazil in the mid-1970s, much to the 
dismay of the United States.32 West Germany’s nuclear hedging amounted 
to more than just deflecting calls to sign international agreements. It also 
encompassed the development of a robust nuclear industry.
Explaining West Germany’s Be hav ior: Initiation and Per sis tence
By signing onto the Trilateral Initiative in 1956 with France and Italy, West 
Germany did not violate the letter of the London and Paris Conferences. 
 After all, the Final Act of London only prohibited West Germany from build-
ing nuclear weapons on its own territory. Still, although this program lasted 
briefly, Bonn’s stance  toward nuclear weapons became internationally sus-
pect. Only in 1969 did West Germany publicly renounce nuclear weapons 
by signing onto the NPT. Before analyzing this decision, I address why West 
German began, and continued, to engage in nuclear proliferation– related be-
hav ior. In this section, I demonstrate how the West German case indicates 
the limits to the ability of alliances to restrain nuclear interest on the part of 
its members as well as the importance of in- theater conventional deployments 
for the credibility of extended nuclear guarantees. Since the military infra-
structure buttressing alliance commitments should affect West Germany’s 
nuclear weapons interest, I first discuss the New Look before addressing 
flexible response.
the new look and the american security  
guarantee to west germany
With its emphasis on Massive Retaliation, the New Look concerned West 
German decision makers. Yet this apprehension pulled in opposite direc-
tions. On the one hand, the retaliatory threat of overwhelming nuclear 
weapons use lacked believability. Uncertainty abounded over what forms 
of communist aggression—if any— would incite a dramatic nuclear response 
from the United States. West German leaders  were not unique in expressing 
unease over this doctrine; American strategic thinkers had their own reser-
vations.33 Eisenhower himself admitted that “in the defense of the United 
States itself we  will certainly use nuclear weapons, but to use them in other 
situations  will prove very difficult.”34 On the other hand, concern existed 
over  whether the United States would pursue a reckless foreign policy at the 
expense of Western Eu ro pean security. Accordingly, West German anxiety 
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was unique insofar as its leaders felt that in the event of Soviet aggression 
West Germany would be the site of  either foreign occupation or nuclear dev-
astation. Nor did they want the West German military to provide merely 
“foot soldiers marching in the  middle of (tactical) nuclear units.”35  These anx-
i eties  were justified. A 1955 NATO military exercise, code- named Carte 
Blanche, simulated a nuclear conflict over NATO territory that resulted in 
over five million West German casualties. The publication of  these results 
sparked popu lar furor over NATO nuclear strategy in West Germany.36
The New Look served to deter the Soviet Union, but it reinforced the im-
pression that the allies  were becoming unwilling or unable to maintain troop 
deployments in West Germany. In the mid-1950s, American decision makers 
saw high defense expenditures and balance- of- payments issues as increas-
ingly problematic. British decision makers  were already struggling with 
fulfilling military commitments in West Germany while crafting monetary 
policy.  Great Britain’s high debt, incurred during World War II and the sub-
sequent recovery, made the sterling— the second reserve currency of the 
Bretton Woods system— susceptible to crises of confidence, devaluations, 
and exchange rushes. Though  Great Britain agreed to maintain four divi-
sions and the Second Tactical Air Force in the West Eu ro pean Union Treaty 
of 1954, it began demanding the next year that West Germany cover seventy 
million pounds in troops’ foreign exchange costs.37 Bonn resisted such de-
mands, arguing that they reinforced West Germany’s “second- class status” 
within the alliance. Furthermore, British troop redeployments would have 
weakened Western Eu ro pean defense, perhaps even precipitating an Amer-
ican withdrawal. Both nuclear- armed allies,  after all,  were exploring how to 
substitute relatively cheap nuclear weapons for expensive conventional mil-
itary assets in Eu rope.38
Mindful of  these issues, American decision makers did not naively believe 
that Bonn would unquestioningly embrace the New Look. They recognized 
that West German— and other European— leaders might see the strategy as 
a symbol of declining commitment. In a 1953 National Security Council 
(NSC) meeting, Eisenhower noted: “The presence of our troops  there is the 
greatest single morale  factor in Eu rope. You cannot therefore make a radical 
change so quickly. Besides, the physical cost of bringing back  these troops 
 will be so high as to effect very  little savings in the course of next year, even 
if considerable numbers  were to be redeployed.”39 He had also noted in a 
separate memorandum that “while it is true that the semi- permanent pres-
ence of United States Forces (of any kind) in foreign lands is an irritant, any 
withdrawal that seemed to imply a change in basic intent would cause real 
turmoil abroad.”40 An “educational campaign” and a “new general program 
for Eu ro pean defense”  were necessary before such withdrawals could occur. 
In the meantime, Dulles averred, “no impression should be allowed to get 
about that we may be thinking of pulling troops out of Eu rope.”41 Never-
theless, Eisenhower personally recorded Dulles’s view that the United 
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States should avoid “ground deployments in Asia” and that the United States 
“should begin to withdraw ground troops from  Korea.” Air and naval power 
 were sufficient to deter  future communist aggression. Eisenhower agreed in 
princi ple that “some reduction in conventional forces” was justifiable thanks 
to nuclear weapons.42
The rhe toric of the New Look seemed to suggest American withdrawal, 
but Washington refrained from taking active steps to make the proposed 
change in American force posture real ity. Absent such concrete mea sures, 
Adenauer may have felt that he lacked sufficient cause to fear abandonment 
truly. However, when news reports appeared during the summer of 1956 that 
Washington planned to downsize the military, the New Look seemed fi nally 
to be coming into fruition. The Eisenhower administration found itself hav-
ing to dispel a rumor put forward by an unsubstantiated New York Times re-
port on July 13, 1956 that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to 
reduce the size of the US Army by a third. The so- called Radford Plan suf-
ficiently disturbed Adenauer that he responded by launching a “major dip-
lomatic effort” to curb  these reductions.43 West German diplomats wanted 
reassurances from their American counter parts over the status of American 
troop deployments in West Germany, since the news reports constituted the 
“greatest concern to the German Government.”44 Adenauer personally wrote 
to Dulles, warning that “Eu rope including Germany is losing confidence in 
the reliability of the United States,” since such plans as the Radford Plan “are 
regarded as clear proof of the fact that the United States does not feel strong 
enough to keep at least on a par with the Soviet Union.”45 As Hubert Zim-
mermann writes, “for [Adenauer]  these troops  were the fundamental sym-
bol of the American commitment to Eu rope.”46
To be sure, the Eisenhower administration recognized that the geopo liti-
cal situation was too dangerous to permit large- scale troop reductions. Just 
weeks before the Hungarian Revolution broke out in October 1956, Eisen-
hower asserted that “he felt very definitely that we cannot take divisions out 
of Eu rope at this time. The effect on Adenauer would be unacceptably dam-
aging. He could not agree with a Defense position contemplating such reduc-
tions.”47 American diplomats reported the widespread unease regarding 
the international threat environment at a NATO conference held in Decem-
ber 1956.48 With its  handling of the Hungarian Revolution, the Soviet Union 
demonstrated its willingness to use force to suppress liberalizing movements 
within the Soviet bloc. Cold War tensions soon intensified. In November 1958, 
Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the West, decree-
ing that Berlin should be a  free, demilitarized city from which all non- Soviet 
forces had six months to evacuate. Indeed, during this phase of the Cold 
War, Khrushchev often used inflammatory rhe toric to emphasize the Soviet 
Union’s military and po liti cal advantages over NATO.49 Circumstances fore-
stalled any major troop redeployment. Thus, Eisenhower stated that “noth-
ing could be more fatal than to withdraw our troops from Eu rope or to say 
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we are about to withdraw them” despite how “it was high time that the 
population of Eu rope did its part with re spect to ground forces.”50
Adenauer’s alarm over the New Look and the Radford Plan gives context 
to his decisions, first, to promote his minister of atomic affairs to be the min-
ister of defense and, second, to enter a tripartite initiative with France and 
Italy to research and develop nuclear weapons.51 That abandonment fears 
 were manifest in West German decision makers’ repeated requests for as-
surances demonstrates that Adenauer became increasingly worried by Wash-
ington’s policies and how they related to the safeguarding of West German 
interests.52 Concerns over American commitments persisted throughout the 
remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency.
flexible response and the american security  
guarantee to west germany
Talk of flexible response by the Kennedy administration did not allay West 
German worries. As defense minister, Strauss found flexible response objec-
tionable for several reasons. First, flexible response risked emboldening the 
Soviet Union into taking limited conventional actions against West Germany. 
 Because the Berlin crisis was still unfolding in 1961, West German leaders 
felt that enhancing the alliance’s conventional capabilities risked signaling 
that the United States was not willing to engage in a nuclear confrontation 
with the Soviet Union.53 Second, Strauss opposed flexible response  because it 
contradicted his goal to arm the Bundeswehr with dual capable weapons— 
that is, platforms that can execute both conventional and nuclear missions.54 
Third, recognizing that not  every communist aggression should provoke a 
nuclear response, Strauss nevertheless felt that the notion of a firebreak— a 
neat division between conventional hostilities and nuclear war— was inap-
plicable to the Central Front, the main area of the Soviet threat in Central 
Eu rope.55 A war would not stay conventional for long before tactical nu-
clear weapons would be needed to frustrate Soviet offensive operations.
This last point reflected a fundamental disagreement between American 
and West German decision makers about how a war with the Soviet Union 
would be fought and the circumstances  under which NATO would use nu-
clear weapons. Consider this extract from a West German Ministry of De-
fense memorandum drafted in September 1966: “Deterrence must on the one 
hand be comprehensive, on the other hand differentiated, in order to be cred-
ible and effective in peace, [in] times of tension and even  after the outbreak 
of hostilities. Presupposition: modern armed, conventional and nuclear 
forces. The strategic means is thus the credible deterrence of escalation by 
the defender. The question of risk plays a decisive role. The real purpose of 
deterrence is therefore, to create uncertainty [in the mind of] the adversary. 
Fear of escalation and po liti cal concerns (e.g., mutual interests with the 
USSR) appear to create on the part of the USA a hesitating and uncommitted 
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attitude.”56 For West German observers, war- fighting in Central Eu rope had 
to involve nuclear weapons. Yet flexible response implied that American de-
fense planners now accepted that the Soviet Union could use its conven-
tional superiority against West German interests without eliciting a nuclear 
response  under certain circumstances.
To be sure, the West German position had its weaknesses, not least  because 
its leaders knew that nuclear conflict would have terrible consequences for 
West German society. An irony exists  here. On the one hand, the New Look 
reflected a willingness to turn Eu rope into a nuclear wasteland should war 
occur. Caught in the crossfire, West German decision makers valued Amer-
ican conventional military deployments on the continent for their trip- wire 
effect, reacting negatively to signs that  those forces would be withdrawn. 
On the other hand, flexible response might have lowered the likelihood of 
Eu rope becoming a nuclear wasteland, but it undercut the credibility of 
American nuclear security guarantees. This observation raises an impor tant 
question: if the New Look undermined conventional deterrence and flexi-
ble response undermined nuclear deterrence, then  were West German lead-
ers irredeemably doubtful of American assurances? How could the United 
States signal credible commitment if seemingly opposite strategies provoked 
similar abandonment fears?
The answer is that American be hav ior undercut the believability of flexi-
ble response. For one, some West German decision makers  were unimpressed 
with the American  handling of the Berlin crisis in 1961. West Berlin mayor 
Willy Brandt was incensed at the delays characterizing the American mili-
tary response to the Soviet blockade. When American military patrols ar-
rived in Berlin twenty- four hours  after the Soviets began erecting the Berlin 
Wall, he exclaimed: “ Those shitheads are at least fi nally sending some pa-
trols to the sector borders so that the Berliners  won’t think they are totally 
alone.”57 Indeed, Brandt’s indignation points to the perception that the 
United States seemed unable to assure even with conventional forces, let 
alone nuclear forces. For another, despite increases in American conventional 
forces in Western Eu rope during the Berlin crisis, American decision makers 
by 1962 reverted back to the notion that allies should bear the conventional 
defense burden within NATO. Flexible response was largely a rhetorical ploy 
to elicit higher alliance defense spending while leaving basic war plans un-
changed.  Later in 1965, McNamara admitted to the West German defense 
minister that “ there exists no rational plan for the use of nuclear weapons 
located in Eu rope.”58 Hence the fear of allies like West Germany regarding 
an unfavorable military division in which the United States would be re-
sponsible for the management and deployment of nuclear weapons (i.e., the 
sword), whereas the Eu ro pe ans would supply conventional military power 
(i.e., the shield). If conventional forces  were so impor tant for deterrence, the 
thinking went, then why was Washington emphasizing nuclear weapons 
instead?59 This division became more intolerable as Moscow was developing 
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capabilities that could threaten North Amer i ca and thus make Washington 
unwilling to use its nuclear sword lest it suffer nuclear strikes as well. The 
United States did not help to allay abandonment fears when it staged a ma-
jor airlift exercise intending to demonstrate its ability to dispatch an armored 
division to Eu rope quickly.60
West German leaders had yet another reason to fear the military division 
of  labor that Washington was apparently trying to establish. If the British 
and the French  were to retain their nuclear capabilities, and continental Eu-
ro pean allies  were to provide the conventional military defense, then West 
Germany would occupy a subordinate status within the alliance. The Ken-
nedy administration anticipated this concern. During internal deliberations 
over Adenauer’s allusion to rebus sic stantibus to Kennedy, a State Depart-
ment report noted that “ unless  there is a satisfactory multilateral arrange-
ment,  there  will be increasing pressures within Germany for the development 
of a national nuclear deterrent, a development the Chancellor hopes can be 
forestalled.”61 In equality might breed West German resentment, but it could 
still be acceptable if the allied defense of West German security interests was 
assured. Nevertheless, with uncertainty over the received security guarantee, 
submitting to an unequal arrangement like the one endorsed by the United 
States was an unattractive policy option.
Summary and Alternative Arguments
The evidence so far shows that West Germany’s defensive alliance was in-
sufficient for keeping the country from desiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, 
West German politicians linked the credibility of the American extended 
nuclear guarantee not only to nuclear weapons but also to in- theater con-
ventional military deployments in a manner that appears to have driven 
West Germany’s nuclear decision- making. Even American decision makers 
understood the value of  those deployments for security assurances. But 
what about the alternative arguments?
The adversary thesis posits that Adenauer would have found the Soviet 
threat so alarming that he would have wanted nuclear weapons regardless 
of American actions. West German nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior 
was thus a function of West German decision makers’ assessments of Soviet 
intentions. Yet two prob lems confront the adversary thesis. Most signifi-
cantly, relations between Bonn and Moscow  were improving in the years 
before 1958. The two countries restored diplomatic relations in 1955, and Ad-
enauer even obtained a modest agreement with Khrushchev to return the 
remaining German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union.62 During the 
so- called Khrushchev Thaw, the Soviet leader partially demobilized the Red 
Army and reduced troops in Central- Eastern Eu rope. He tried to signal his 
interest in demilitarizing the region to his American counter parts.63 Never-
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theless, diplomatic tensions did flare up in 1958, when Khrushchev is-
sued his first ultimatum regarding the status of Berlin. In November, 
Khrushchev declared that the Western powers withdraw from Berlin within 
six months so as to make the city  free and demilitarized. He also announced 
that East Germany would acquire control over all lines of communication 
with West Berlin, requiring the Western powers to negotiate with a state they 
refused to recognize. Khrushchev eventually canceled the deadline, but the 
controversy over the occupational status of Berlin lingered. However, 
Marc Trachtenberg argues persuasively that Khrushchev began the crisis 
not to bolster a weakening East Germany but in response to his fear that 
Bonn would gain access to nuclear weapons.64 Soviet hostility was an effect, 
not a cause, of West Germany’s be hav ior.
Adenauer acutely sensed the Soviet threat, but this threat mattered  little 
to him as long as the United States deterred it. In a March 1953 meeting with 
his po liti cal party’s national executive, he noted that “all our hopes and our 
salvation itself rest in American policies maintaining a constant course, and 
that Soviet Rus sia is aware that if it did anything, it would have the full force 
of American power at its throat.”65 According to official Adenauer biogra-
pher Hans- Peter Schwarz, the chancellor “staked every thing on the United 
States.”66 Soviet actions in the Korean War and East Germany did not shake 
 these beliefs. Indeed, the chancellor saw the Soviet Union as weakened by 
low living standards. Accentuating this vulnerability was its encirclement 
by the United States, American allies, and even China.67 Adenauer contin-
ued holding  these views despite other Soviet assertions of force in the East-
ern Bloc, even seeing the Soviets as weak  because they resorted to vio lence 
in quashing the Hungarian Revolution.68 Thanks to American protection 
against Soviet aggression, West Germany was safe from harm.
Adenauer’s threat perceptions heightened when American credibility 
became questionable. Adenauer began believing that his allies lacked 
resolve— a necessary condition for “encircling” the Soviet Union. The French 
and British appeared too keen on improving diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union, promoting disarmament in Eu rope, and alleviating the bur-
den of their defense spending.  These initiatives dismayed Adenauer. The 
United States, too, seemed to waver between containment and rapproche-
ment.69 Despite the Soviet Union’s growing inability to expand westward, 
American abandonment worried Adenauer. In a fall 1956 letter, he wrote that 
“ there can hardly be any doubt that in three, at the latest four years, American 
troops  will have left Germany, even the  whole of Eu rope. All good observ-
ers of US policies share this opinion.”70
Of the domestic politics and prestige  theses, the latter has the most sup-
port during this phase. Adenauer was outward looking insofar as he looked 
to the United States for support and the elevation of Strauss’s role in West 
German defense policy reflected strategic considerations. Nevertheless, Ad-
enauer and other West German decision makers like Strauss did perceive 
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the status value of nuclear weapons. Invocations of rebus sic stantibus re-
flected a concern that West Germany was at risk of having a subordinate 
status within NATO, especially if three fellow allies had nuclear weapons 
of their own. Consider a 1962 State Department report on what animated 
Adenauer:
The consensus in the Department of State is that the Chancellor’s citing of the 
rebus sic stantibus doctrine reflects a deep- seated German concern about the 
implications of national British and French nuclear deterrents. The Germans 
are anxious to assure for themselves a leading position in Eu ro pean arrange-
ments and at this juncture tend to view the nuclear diffusion prob lem more 
in po liti cal than [in] strategic terms. The immediate prob lem for the Ger-
mans, of course, is the discussion of the non- diffusion prob lem in the contexts 
of the Geneva disarmament talks and the Berlin proposals. In both cases, 
they have made it clear they would not subscribe to proposals which [sic] 
they felt discriminated against them. In the Department’s view,  there is an 
even more impor tant long- range prob lem for the Germans— that is, the 
establishment of acceptable multilateral nuclear arrangements. The Chan-
cellor, they believe, feels that  unless  there is a satisfactory multilateral 
arrangement,  there  will be increasing pressures within Germany for the de-
velopment of a national nuclear deterrent, a development the Chancellor 
hopes can be forestalled. . . .  Bonn  will not acquiesce in an arrangement 
which subordinates it to Britain and France, or to Britain and France in a 
tripartite directorate with the U.S.71
At least from the American perspective, West German leaders saw status as 
contingent on nuclear weapons possession. However, this point should not 
be overstated: in equality might have been tolerable had security guarantees 
been more credible.
Alliance Coercion and West Germany
Curbing West Germany’s nuclear be hav ior reflected a strong strategic ratio-
nale for neighboring states and the rival major powers. Moreover, a West 
German nuclear arsenal was objectionable for many decision makers due to 
their collective historical experience of the interwar period. A revisionist and 
remilitarizing West Germany conjured unpleasant memories, thereby be-
hooving the United States to use its levers to ensure its nonproliferation 
status. Indeed, standard accounts of West Germany’s nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior—at least  those put forward by American scholars— agree 
that alliance coercion was decisive.72
I argue against this view and claim that alliance considerations at best 
had an indirect influence on West Germany’s decision not to seek nuclear 
weapons. For one, hamstringing American coercive diplomacy  were the 
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crosscutting pressures to retain a military presence in Eu rope and to assure 
Bonn credibly. The security environment was such that an American with-
drawal would have undermined deterrence and, by extension, promises of 
support to regional allies. Nevertheless, the United States faced mounting 
economic pressures to reduce its troop presence and their associated ef-
fects on the balance- of- payments crisis. The alliance itself was becoming an 
obstacle to any active counterproliferation effort. For another, West Ger-
many was quickly becoming an economic power house on the Eu ro pean 
continent, thereby lowering its sensitivity to pos si ble American sanctions. 
In the next section I offer evidence that the United States experienced severe 
challenges in addressing West German nuclear interest. Its initial propos-
als for an alliance- based solution created a backlash despite (or perhaps 
due to) the support received from West Germany. Nonmilitary coercion 
also enjoyed limited effectiveness. Accordingly, West Germany fi nally 
agreed to renounce nuclear weapons when such a gesture served other 
interests, in de pen dent of American preferences.
the alliance as an obstacle
An alliance like NATO can be hard for a guarantor to manage. Aside from 
having to consider a wider spectrum of interests, establishing such an alli-
ance can require the guarantor to sacrifice some of its foreign policy auton-
omy so as to gain the consent of its weaker allies.73 It thus cannot change 
the institutional par ameters of the alliance at  will. When the guarantor tries 
to adjust the alliance with the goal of shaping the be hav ior of a par tic u lar 
member, it must generate consensus first. However, this endeavor risks 
backlash if fellow allies dislike it. Such dynamics unfolded when American 
decision makers first sought an alliance solution to resolve West German 
nuclear ambiguity.
To begin with, the United States identified a pos si ble solution in the MLF, 
an institutional upgrade to NATO that would take seriously allies’ prefer-
ences. This arrangement was to improve the participation of NATO members 
like West Germany in the alliance’s nuclear decision- making and to reduce 
the incentives for nuclear proliferation. Although the MLF served to accom-
modate the interests of allies, its reception was lukewarm. London was some-
what willing to consider membership in the MLF, but it demanded clarifica-
tion on its operational details following the Nassau Agreement (which gave 
 Great Britain a supply of nuclear- capable Polaris missiles).74 Italy expressed 
an early interest in participating in the MLF.75 Turkey and Greece also sup-
ported the MLF, while Belgium and the Netherlands indicated their desire 
to follow the British approach.76 Despite indicating that France was un-
likely to join, even de Gaulle “thought it good for the Germans to do so as a 
way of preventing them from developing their own force.”77 The tepid sup-
port that greeted the MLF was unsurprising, and Kennedy acknowledged 
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that “it was his impression that the British  were not for it; the French  were 
clearly against it; and the Italians did not have a deep- seated interest in it. 
The Germans reportedly  were interested, but once they realized how  little 
they  were getting for their money, they might look at it differently.” Ken-
nedy advised that the United States should not “stick to the MLF too long if 
it seemed to be a losing proposition.”78 Still, that the MLF would fail was not 
inevitable. NATO members did not greet the initiative with hostility.
And yet the MLF failed spectacularly, almost tearing the alliance apart 
during its consideration. The Johnson administration— having inherited the 
initiative from Kennedy— had to abandon the proposal. Why did the MLF 
fail?
At least three  factors produced the MLF’s demise. The first  factor was that 
the United States could not obtain British or French support. British deci-
sion makers resented their treatment by the United States during the Sky-
bolt affair and the negotiations for the Nassau Agreement. The Skybolt 
affair erupted when the United States canceled the provision of a weapons 
system that the British needed to maintain their in de pen dent nuclear deter-
rent. Several weeks  after Nassau, when British decision makers  were still 
interpreting the significance of the MLF for their nuclear policy, de Gaulle 
announced his intention to veto British entry into the EEC.
As much as relations between all three nuclear NATO allies  were acrimo-
nious, London and Paris had their own reasons to find the MLF objection-
able. For the British, the Nassau Agreement did not assure them of access to 
the much- wanted Polaris missiles. Instead, it aggravated their suspicions re-
garding American reliability. Moreover, their desire to preserve an in de pen-
dent nuclear deterrent was inconsistent with the mixed- manned operational 
form of the MLF.79 For de Gaulle, the MLF was inimical to his grandiose con-
ception of France’s role in international affairs. It also would have further 
tethered Western Eu rope to the United States— a distasteful idea for Gaul-
lism.80 Distinguishing  Great Britain from France was that the need to maintain 
at minimum the fiction of an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent had impor tant 
electoral consequences for British prime minister Harold Macmillan.81 By con-
trast, de Gaulle wanted the  actual substance of in de pen dence. Given the 
importance that the British and the French attached to their positions, 
Washington could not elicit their approval.
The second  factor was the propagandistic effort by communist states to 
link the MLF with West German nuclearization. Poland and East Germany 
feared that nuclear- sharing arrangements offered Bonn unfettered access to 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, Polish leader Władysław Gomułka opposed early 
Soviet draft proposals for a nonproliferation treaty that accepted NATO’s use 
of nuclear- sharing arrangements.82 For him, “the creation of multilateral 
nuclear forces would greatly increase the role of West Germany in NATO, 
[and] enable it to apply more forceful pressure . . .  upon the policy of the USA 
and the entire NATO bloc  towards the adoption of uncompromising and 
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more aggressive positions with regard to the socialist states.”83 The Soviet 
politburo agreed and,  after ousting Khrushchev from power, emphasized 
nuclear- sharing arrangements in subsequent treaty negotiations. Over time 
the Soviet Union’s anti- MLF position hardened, rejecting any nonprolifera-
tion treaty that allowed any nuclear- sharing arrangement. The Soviet anti- 
MLF campaign might have even influenced popu lar attitudes  toward the 
American- led initiative, as indicated in British public opinion polls.84 Con-
sequently, the United States could not have both the MLF and the NPT.85
The third  factor was that other American allies simply came to dislike the 
MLF. Canada withdrew its support, while Greece and Turkey  were luke-
warm to the initiative.86 The Benelux countries worried over the implica-
tions of the MLF for Eu ro pean integration. Domestic considerations made 
Italian politicians disinclined to endorse the MLF. De Gaulle began to argue 
intensely against the proj ect and West Germany’s participation in it.87 An in-
ternal State Department memorandum observed that Eu ro pean govern-
ments interpreted the MLF as “a direct American challenge to de Gaulle’s 
ambition to use a Franco- German entente as the basis for France’s predomi-
nance in Eu rope,” since the “launching of the MLF could provoke [de Gaulle] 
to lash out in some destructive act aimed at NATO and/or Eu ro pean Com-
munities.” Moreover, Eu ro pean governments believed that the financial bur-
den associated with the MLF failed to justify the marginal improvement to 
the deterrent that the alliance already possessed.88
West Germany was the lone supporter for the MLF. Its commitment to the 
proj ect is unsurprising, since it saw “the MLF as an instrument for keeping 
US nuclear power inextricably tied to the defense of Eu rope.”89 Failing to 
endorse the MLF also risked signaling that West Germany was contemplat-
ing an in de pen dent nuclear arsenal. Supporting the MLF might have still 
produced  these fears, but such was the corner in which Bonn found itself. 
Moreover, it could not renounce nuclear weapons altogether, lest this action 
invite Soviet blackmail or consign West Germany to second- tier status within 
the alliance. Privately, West German leaders assured their American counter-
parts of their lack of intent to seek nuclear weapons.90 Their public stance 
remained ambiguous, however. West German foreign and defense ministers 
claimed that the MLF would “strengthen moderate leadership in Germany, 
and by acting forehandedly  will help prevent nationalistic adventures.” 
Leading West German politicians echoed  these sentiments, insinuating that 
the MLF’s failure could galvanize nationalism in West Germany.91 But if a 
multilateral solution like the MLF was infeasible, then neither was a bilat-
eral one. Indeed, adding to the prob lem for Washington was that it could 
not strike a bilateral deal with Bonn. The United States was contemplating 
making cooperative arrangements with  Great Britain and France by 1964, 
but  these countries already had a nuclear weapons capability. Extending 
similar treatment to West Germany risked alienating allies like France and 
further antagonizing the Soviet Union.92 Thus, between late 1964 and early 
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1965, the United States quietly abandoned the idea that nuclear- sharing ar-
rangements  were a  viable solution for West Germany.93 As described in 
the next section, so- called software solutions emerged to take their place 
in 1966.94
the limits of nonmilitary coercion against  
west germany
 Because a NATO solution proved so hard to develop, could the United 
States not have applied unilateral nonmilitary pressure on West Germany 
so as to coerce a desirable outcome? At this time, the United States occupied 
a privileged status in the global economy due to its market size and the role 
of the greenback as the international reserve currency. Washington should 
have been able to use this clout to force Bonn into adopting credible pledges 
not to acquire nuclear weapons. However, with a deepening balance- of- 
payments crisis, the United States experienced difficulties in using such lever-
age to force West Germany into behaving more congruently with American 
interests.
The United States incurred large balance- of- payments deficits throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s. Resolving this issue became urgent for the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations.  Because six American divisions  were stationed on 
its territory, West Germany received large amounts of American dollars and 
became the focus of efforts to reduce the deficit. According to one briefing 
document, by 1963 “expenditures in Germany by the US forces entering the 
international balance of payments [sic] run to about $675 million a year 
at current rates.”95 Moreover, American troops would use dollars to buy 
deutschmarks in order to purchase local goods and ser vices. The foreign ex-
change costs of American troops grew from $345 million in 1956 to $749 
million in 1962. During this period, West German gold reserves expanded 
by about 135  percent.96
Two options  were available to American decision makers for addressing 
West Germany and the balance- of- payments prob lem. One involved reduc-
ing defense expenditures overseas unilaterally. Like its pre de ces sor, the Ken-
nedy administration felt the economic strain of large defense outlays spent 
abroad. Consequently, the Defense Department tried to cut spending  under 
Robert McNamara’s leadership.97 Yet the State Department pleaded caution 
so as not to alarm allies or to show weakness to the Soviet Union. Indeed, 
the Berlin crisis forestalled any austere bud getary mea sures in the early 
1960s.98 Another option involved Bonn and Washington negotiating the 
extent to which the former would cover the American military presence. 
 These types of agreements began in the early 1950s when West Germany 
paid so- called occupation costs in the amount of six hundred million deutsch-
marks a month alongside support- cost agreements with the United States, 
 Great Britain, and other NATO members.99 By the 1960s, negotiations tackled 
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the issue of “offsets,” the princi ple by which “ every dollar spent in Ger-
many defending Eu rope should be used by the Federal Republic to purchase 
American military equipment.” This policy provoked resentment in West 
Germany,  because it at once stoked abandonment fears and encouraged West 
German de pen dency on the American arms industry to develop conven-
tional capabilities exclusively.100
Despite having concluded a series of support cost agreements in the 1950s, 
negotiating a new offset agreement with West Germany in 1960 and 1961 
proved difficult. The United States wanted West Germany to purchase Amer-
ican weapons, but West Germany resisted on the grounds that American 
weapon systems  were technologically outdated. Moreover, Adenauer and 
Minister of Defense Strauss expressed concern over Kennedy’s views favor-
ing flexible response and nuclear nonproliferation. As Zimmermann notes, 
gaining a “more direct influence over the use of nuclear weapons on its 
territory . . .  became one of Strauss’s conditions for agreeing to the gigantic 
amount of military purchases that the Americans demanded.”101 An agree-
ment did emerge, but largely  because the newly built Berlin Wall prompted 
West Germany to increase its own defense bud get and buy American weap-
ons. Still, in a subsequent letter exchange between the two governments, 
Bonn asserted that it could not promise certain bud getary decisions beyond 
the US fiscal year 1962. It also sought assurances of American support should 
the agreement upset relations with other NATO allies.102
The resulting Strauss- Gilpatric agreement eventually unraveled. Gold 
losses in the American economy continued, and the balance- of- payments 
deficit worsened. The first six months of 1962 saw gold losses of $420 mil-
lion.103 The American gold stock had fallen by almost a third between 1958 
and 1962 with losses increasing in volume each year.104 Meanwhile, the West 
German economy slowed. Though negotiations for a second offset agree-
ment in early 1962 proved straightforward, West Germany sought addi-
tional conditions so that offset payments be made “subject to the availability 
of funds” in light of economic circumstances.105 Washington initially suc-
ceeded in quashing early West German efforts to cut the defense bud get 
and military procurement. Yet this sort of acquiescence by Bonn was brief. 
Bud getary constraints grew, and the West German Defense Ministry empha-
sized that it could not offer more than $1 billion of payments despite the 
second offset agreement. American pressure could elicit agreements, but not 
the bud getary decisions that satisfied American interests.106
American leaders thus reconsidered the first strategy described above— 
that of reducing troop levels in West Germany and Eu rope. Kennedy saw 
American troops in Eu rope as an indispensable tool for reassuring allies 
and preventing Soviet aggression.107 However, the balance- of- payments cri-
sis made him frustrated with West Germany’s uncooperativeness. As one 
NSC meeting in January 1963 recorded, “The President said that we must 
not permit a situation to develop in which we should have to seek economic 
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 favors from Eu rope. . . .  He thought we should be prepared to reduce 
quickly, if we so deci ded, our military forces in Germany.”108 This consider-
ation of undertaking troop withdrawals was momentary. News that Wash-
ington was exploring the issue was leaked to the media, prompting outcry 
from Bonn. Eventually, Rusk publicly assured Bonn in October 1963 that 
the United States would maintain its six divisions in West Germany “as 
long as  there is need for them— and  under pres ent circumstances,  there is no 
doubt that they  will continue to be needed.”109 Just one day before issuing 
this statement, however, Rusk privately stipulated to the West German 
minister of defense that West Germany had to meet the offset payments to 
maintain the American military presence.110
The United States did succeed in extracting the West German signature 
to the partial test ban treaty in 1963. Banning aboveground test detonations 
of nuclear weapons, the United States, the Soviet Union, and  Great Britain 
first negotiated this treaty before the United States opened it to agreement 
by all states. Due to alliance considerations, West Germany accepted, but its 
leaders  were dismayed, since one motivation  behind this treaty was to pre-
vent West German and Chinese proliferation.111 For West Germany, though, 
the true cost of the treaty was not that it had to renounce testing nuclear 
weapons that it did not have. Rather, what alarmed West German decision 
makers was the concern that  because the treaty was now open to all states, 
the United States and other participating states would have to recognize East 
Germany diplomatically should it sign the treaty. The treaty threatened to 
undo West Germany’s efforts to deny East Germany the diplomatic recog-
nition it had long coveted.112
In October 1963, Ludwig Erhard replaced Adenauer as chancellor, thereby 
creating new opportunities for the United States to negotiate favorable off-
set arrangements. Unlike Adenauer, Erhard wished to deepen American– 
West German relations.113 Accordingly, the United States secured pledges 
from him to provide a full offset during his visit to Texas in December 1963. 
Yet obtaining such pledges did not translate to action. Tepid economic growth 
made West Germany unwilling to spend more on defense. Bud get plans 
belied Erhard’s private assurances that “[West Germany] would do every-
thing that is pos si ble to fulfill  these offset commitments which have been 
approved by the Cabinet.” Erhard’s cabinet even agreed to freeze defense 
spending in  favor of increasing public wages.114
The Johnson administration needed additional sources of leverage. To aug-
ment its bargaining position, it emphasized the link between offsets and 
troop levels. In meeting with his West German counterpart, “[McNamara] 
wished to make clear that he was making no threats, but it would be abso-
lutely impossible for the United States to accept the gold drain caused by 
the US forces in Germany if Germany did not assist through continuation 
of the Offset Agreements.”115 Such exchanges might have pushed the Erhard 
government to agree to maintain its commitments, but their practical effects 
west germAny, 1954–1970
69
of  these discussions on bud getary policy  were still limited. Offset payments 
remained  behind schedule. Rather than spending more on defense, the Er-
hard government lowered taxes and expanded social welfare programs in 
1965 and 1966.116 And yet West German officials highlighted bud get diffi-
culties to their American interlocutors, even invoking the Weimar Republic’s 
experience of hyperinflation to suggest that increases in defense spending 
would be destabilizing.117 Erhard himself suggested that the “stability of 
Germany was at stake.” The gap between  actual and promised payments 
widened over time with culminating effects. With re spect to the 1964 offset 
agreement, the West German government paid only $267 million of $1.14 bil-
lion during the first year the agreement was in effect (with the expectation 
that $687 million would be paid by December).118 The implicit threat  behind 
the offset- troop linkage had  little success. Some American officials found the 
strategy counterproductive amid Erhard’s growing unpopularity at home 
and the emerging “German malaise over growing difference with the U.S. 
on offset and NATO issues.”119
Eventually, the United States reached an agreement with West Germany 
(and  Great Britain) over offsets through the 1967 Trilateral Negotiations. This 
initiative arose out of concern that  because  Great Britain could not maintain 
the value of the sterling, it would have to withdraw militarily from West Ger-
many.120 Although this action would save  Great Britain from further foreign 
exchange losses, American leaders feared that it would jeopardize the West-
ern alliance and rekindle abandonment fears in West Germany. The Trilateral 
Negotiations  were acrimonious— even their organ ization proved difficult.121 
To avert a diplomatic breakdown, the three countries reached an agreement 
out of “mutual interest in the preservation of the Eu ro pean security structure 
and a series of concessions by all sides.”122 The agreement enabled the United 
States and  Great Britain to withdraw thirty- five thousand and five thousand 
military personnel, respectively. West Germany agreed to additional offsets 
when the United States offered greater flexibility over the purchase of Ameri-
can Trea sury bonds. Still, the American economy continued to hemorrhage 
gold and suffer inflation  because of the Vietnam War and the  Great Society 
program.123 The agreement notwithstanding, maintaining the peg of thirty- five 
American dollars to an ounce of gold became more challenging. Embarrass-
ingly for Erhard, his government collapsed one week into the negotiations. 
A disastrous visit that year to the United States to meet with Johnson further 
damaged Erhard’s po liti cal prospects. Consequently, German Gaullists gained 
po liti cally, further complicating the offset negotiations that still needed to 
occur. The sourness of this experience for all involved led  future decision mak-
ers Nixon and Kissinger to abandon such an aggressive strategy and adopt a 
more congenial attitude  toward West Germany.124
 Because it received major inflows of American dollars and gold, West Ger-
many was eco nom ically dependent on the United States and so should have 
been more compliant in meeting offset demands. However, West Germany’s 
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status as a frontline state in Cold War Eu rope partly inoculated American 
leverage. As Jonathan Kirshner writes of this period in transatlantic rela-
tions, “the reform of the [international monetary system] would not be 
dictated by the United States to grateful dependents, but negotiated with 
increasingly assertive allies.”125 American decision makers might have 
threatened to pull out of West Germany (and Eu rope), but they risked stok-
ing abandonment fears in so  doing. Concerns over German neutralism and 
nuclearization in the face of a significant land- based Soviet threat also meant 
that withdrawal would have been po liti cally difficult to achieve. Its unique 
circumstances freed Bonn from being at the complete economic mercy of 
Washington.
other channels of american coercion?
American scholars have put forward two other mechanisms through 
which coercion compelled West Germany to abandon its nuclear interest. 
Aside from obliging West Germany to sign the partial test ban treaty—an 
interpretation questioned above— Trachtenberg argues that the United States 
exerted strong pressure on Adenauer to make way for Erhard to become 
chancellor, especially  after Adenauer had made overtures to de Gaulle in 
 going about the January 1963 Franco- German Élysée Treaty. In Trachten-
berg’s words, “the new tough line led to a major American intervention in 
internal German politics” to ensure a pro- American direction such that “the 
issue [of the Élysée treaty] became tied up with the question of how long 
Adenauer would continue in office and who would succeed him.”126 This 
reading misunderstands West German domestic politics. The CDU had al-
ready agreed  after the autumn 1961 election that the octogenarian Adenauer 
would step down in exchange for the co ali tion participation of the  Free 
Demo cratic Party (FDP).127  After all, he had drawn criticism for his authori-
tarian leadership style and the Spiegel affair— a controversy regarding the 
publication of sensitive defense documents in the West German weekly mag-
azine that resulted in Strauss’s resignation as defense minister.128 Erhard 
was a much more appealing politician thanks to his management of West 
Germany’s economic recovery (Wirtschaftswunder) as economics minister 
since 1949. Erhard’s accession might have suited American interests, but it 
did not result from American meddling.129
Gene Gerzhoy proposes another way in which the United States coerced 
West Germany into making strong nonproliferation pledges. He argues that 
threats of military abandonment  were decisive in getting West German lead-
ers to sign the NPT. His argument hinges on a February 1968 meeting be-
tween National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow and Chancellor Kurt 
Kiesinger’s envoy and chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, 
Rainer Barzel. The American transcript of this conversation rec ords Rostow 
as saying that “the  simple fact is that Germany depends and must depend 
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on collective security. If you would not sign [the NPT] and deci ded to de-
fend yourself with your own nuclear weapons, you would a) tear apart the 
Alliance; b) face a very difficult period during which you might well be de-
stroyed.”130 Thereafter, according to Gerzhoy, West German leaders faced 
“unsustainable pressure . . .  to sign the treaty.”131 Leaving aside how Kiesinger 
did not sign the NPT, this interpretation has several weaknesses. First, West 
German decision makers had already deci ded against acquiring an in de-
pen dent nuclear capability, thus making a key condition of Rostow’s warn-
ing moot. Second, as Jonas Schneider and Makreeta Lahti point out, 
the Johnson administration deci ded against a ruthless approach to West Ger-
many in  favor of “patience, explanation and friendly persuasion.”132 Third, 
Barzel evidently did not inform Kiesinger of Rostow’s threat in a memoran-
dum summarizing their conversation, opting instead to discuss how he 
communicated Bonn’s demands regarding the NPT.133 To be sure, Gerzhoy 
notes that Kiesinger changed his rhe toric on the NPT over the course of 1967, 
from being a seemingly hostile critic to someone who privately reassured 
his American interlocutors that the West Germany would not stand in the 
way.134 Gerzhoy attributes this change to “heavy US pressure,” but another 
possibility is that such out spoken language was a bargaining tool in nego-
tiations over the treaty itself.135 To  these negotiations we now turn.
Committing West Germany to Nonproliferation
Absent favorable circumstances for the guarantor, the decision to renounce 
nuclear weapons would reflect other  factors, including the ally’s own secu-
rity interests that are in de pen dent of the guarantor’s preferences. In the 
following section I argue that Washington (and Moscow) made vari ous 
concessions to Bonn so as to gain West Germany’s signature on the NPT. Yet 
 these concessions still  were insufficient. Ultimately, West Germany’s signa-
ture on the NPT emerged from domestic po liti cal changes.
soviet-  american agreement on a  
counterproliferation strategy
Ensuring West German nuclear abstention gained urgency with China’s 
first nuclear detonation in October 1964. Johnson reacted to this development 
by forming a panel to identify potential proliferators and reconsider Ameri-
can counterproliferation strategy. This panel, called the Gilpatric Committee, 
released its report in January 1965.136 Among its policy recommendations, 
the report asserted that nonproliferation should receive top priority in John-
son’s foreign policy, adding that the United States “must acknowledge the 
importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop prolifera-
tion.”137  Because the report emphasized the need for a global nondiffusion 
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agreement, it advised that any nuclear- sharing arrangement should require 
nonnuclear participants to pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. Johnson 
did not immediately adopt the Gilpaltric Committee’s suggestions, partly 
to avoid giving West Germany the impression that a Soviet- American agree-
ment would be made at West Germany’s expense.138 Nevertheless, by late 
1965 and early 1966, the administration  adopted a nonproliferation strategy 
that resembled what the Gilpatric Committee prescribed. The Soviet Union 
enabled this policy change.139 Similarly alarmed by the prospects of wider 
nuclear proliferation in East Asia, the Soviet Union eased its rhe toric re-
garding nuclear- sharing arrangements. The softening of the Soviet position 
allowed the United States to disavow MLF fi nally. With this quid pro quo, 
the two adversaries converged in their positions regarding the NPT and 
West Germany.
Johnson still did not want the United States to appear willing to sacrifice 
West Germany’s security interests in order to obtain Soviet agreement. Such 
an action would not only reignite abandonment fears but also stoke German 
nationalism. Accordingly, Bonn continued to seek new security assurances. 
As “hardware” solutions (i.e., nuclear- sharing arrangements) fell out of  favor 
with Washington, a “software” solution that would address West German 
concerns became appealing. London had already been insisting on a soft-
ware arrangement that centered on military consultations and nuclear plan-
ning involving allies.140 In 1966, McNamara recommended that consideration 
of a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) be given priority in order to meet West 
German demands for a greater role in nuclear decision- making in NATO.141
The formation of the NPG was nevertheless the death knell for nuclear- 
sharing arrangements within NATO, thereby representing a defeat for Bonn. 
The NPG was only a consultative body in which nonnuclear powers like 
West Germany could gain access to nuclear information and discuss issues 
relating to nuclear security. It was not a decision- making body.142 That West 
Germany agreed to this outcome was admittedly a reflection of its limited 
influence within the alliance. France had by this time withdrawn militarily 
from NATO,  Great Britain disliked nuclear- sharing arrangements of any sort, 
and the United States repudiated the MLF so as to pursue superpower 
cooperation.
Participation in the NPG thus did not eliminate West German insecu-
rity, especially since uncertainty remained over how the NPT might affect 
West Germany’s participation in the NPG.143 The unease was palpable. At a 
January 1968 meeting of the West German National Defense Council, the 
“atmosphere . . .  was heavy and despondent.” With his top cabinet offi-
cials in attendance, Chancellor Kiesinger complained that the “inflexibility” 
that characterized existing drafts of the NPT “represented a real danger for 
[West Germany]’s security interests in the long term.”144 As Brandt explained 
in a letter to Rusk, greater flexibility would have entailed changes to the 
“procedural provisions on duration and extension, withdrawal, amendments, 
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and review of the operation of the treaty.”145 If the treaty  were to be even 
more flexible, Kiesinger asserted, then West Germany might be among the 
first to sign it.146 One reason for this specific demand was that West German 
decision makers did not know the treaty’s significance for West Germany’s 
civilian nuclear industry. By this time, it was among the most advanced in 
the world. Participating in the treaty risked jeopardizing its success, espe-
cially if international monitoring would facilitate industrial espionage and 
the Soviets could use the treaty to curtail access to key nuclear materials for 
countries like West Germany. Accordingly, West German officials of vari ous 
partisan stripes disagreed with international negotiators on what sort of 
safeguards should apply to their nuclear facilities. They preferred EURA-
TOM safeguards, partly  because IAEA safeguards would have enabled So-
viet inspectors to collect sensitive information on West German facilities.147
Geopolitics was another consideration for Bonn. As one American em-
bassy tele gram noted, “ there  were impor tant additional concerns, for in-
stance as regards nuclear blackmail: for  there was a growing number in the 
[West German Foreign Office] deeply worried that further Western troop 
withdrawals  were inevitable and that pos si ble safeguards against Soviet 
pressures should be obtained.”148 Recognizing  these concerns, the superpow-
ers accommodated West Germany by allowing EURATOM inspectors to 
enforce IAEA controls. They also agreed that the NPT would be in force for 
a fixed term of twenty- five years rather than lasting in defi nitely. Washing-
ton addressed other, lesser demands made by Bonn. For instance, the United 
States also accepted (unilaterally) that a federal Eu ro pean force, should one 
ever appear, would be permitted to have a nuclear arsenal  under the NPT, 
provided that Britain or France was a member.149 Yet all  these additional 
compromises did not determine West Germany’s NPT signature. What 
brought about West Germany’s signature, and what made it credible?
A major obstacle for West Germany’s signature was rooted in domestic 
politics. The NPT was controversial and faced opposition from Gaullists in 
both the CDU and the CSU— the two po liti cal parties that formed the  Grand 
Co ali tion (a governing co ali tion that contains the two biggest parties in the 
Bundestag) alongside the SDP between 1966 and 1969. Though Gaullism 
was ideologically flexible, it meant in West Germany closer alignment with 
France rather than with the United States. By proposing to institutionalize a 
global division of nuclear haves and have- nots, the NPT privileged a small 
coterie of states at the expense of emerging powers like West Germany. The 
rhe toric  adopted by the Gaullist opponents of the NPT was impassioned. 
Adenauer, Strauss, and Kiesinger publicly decried the NPT as a “superpower 
diktat,” “worse than the Morgenthau Plan,” “a Versailles of cosmic dimen-
sion,” and “another Yalta.”150 Politicians and government officials alike 
echoed earlier statements by Erhard and  others that nuclear discrimination 
would fuel West German militarism, sometimes alleging that the NPT would 
mean electoral gains for the neo- Nazi National Demo cratic Party.151 Moreover, 
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the treaty exacerbated internal discord within the  Grand Co ali tion. CSU 
leader Strauss had threatened to resign from his post as finance minister and 
cause the governing co ali tion to collapse if West Germany agreed to it. 
Kiesinger thus had a domestic incentive to forestall pro gress on the treaty.152 
Simply put, as long as this array of po liti cal interests within West Germany 
existed, Bonn’s position  toward the NPT would remain dubious.
making ostpolitik credible
Yet another cleavage within the governing co ali tion had implications for 
West German foreign policy– making. Though the chancellor was the Chris-
tian Demo crat Kiesinger, the vice chancellor and foreign minister in the 
 Grand Co ali tion was former West Berlin mayor and SDP leader Brandt.
Both Brandt and Kiesinger believed that West Germany’s diplomacy 
 toward Eastern Eu rope was unsustainable. Since the mid-1950s, the Hallstein 
Doctrine was the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The doctrine stipulated that 
 because West Germany held an exclusive right to govern the German nation, 
it would not pursue diplomatic relations with countries that recognized East 
Germany. Brandt had for some time believed that the Hallstein Doctrine 
needed to be abandoned. Having developed the intellectual basis of the pol-
icy as mayor of West Berlin, Brandt saw Neue Ostpolitik (New Eastern Pol-
icy) as a means to encourage the Cold War blocs to coexist peacefully as well 
as to deepen cooperation between Eastern Eu rope and the West.153 Eliciting 
such cooperation meant using “economic, technical, scientific, cultural, 
and— wherever pos si ble— political contacts with the  peoples and states of 
Eastern Eu rope.”154  Under Kiesinger’s leadership, Ostpolitik slowly emerged 
as a guiding princi ple of West German foreign policy. This early application 
of Ostpolitik enjoyed some diplomatic success, but it faced limits  under 
Kiesinger.  After all, it contradicted long- standing West German policy, thus 
drawing skepticism from the CDU and CSU members of the  Grand Co ali-
tion as well as the members of the Soviet bloc.
For the Soviet bloc, Ostpolitik would gain credibility if West Germany un-
dertook three actions: recognize the Oder- Neisse line as the border between 
East Germany and Poland, agree to the NPT, and renounce the Hallstein 
Doctrine.155 However, such mea sures  were risky. The East German govern-
ment had just imposed new travel restrictions on, and denied access rights 
to, West Berlin citizens. Soviet leaders reiterated their right to intervene in 
German affairs by appealing to Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.156 Most 
alarmingly, the Soviets mobilized the Warsaw Pact so as to quash the reform- 
oriented Prague Spring in neighboring Czecho slo va kia in October 1968. In 
this context, members of the CDU and CSU hardened their opposition to 
Ostpolitik.157
Breaking this logjam was the accession to power of a new co ali tion gov-
ernment forged between the SDP and the FDP following national elections 
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in late October 1969. Now Brandt was chancellor, and one of his first post-
election pledges was for West Germany to sign the NPT. On November 28, 
1969, West Germany fi nally did so. The Nixon administration generally stood 
aloof at this juncture. Indeed, one document argues that pro gress was fi nally 
achieved  because an “absence of pressure . . .  has substantially decreased 
emotional re sis tance in Germany.”158 Brandt also opened negotiations with 
the Soviet Union and Poland over the recognition of the Oder- Neisse Line 
shortly thereafter.159 To be sure, this change in how Bonn approached  these 
issues was not abrupt. Kiesinger had made pro gress  toward defining West 
Germany’s position on the NPT throughout 1969, with Brandt and his So-
viet interlocutors addressing such outstanding issues as the nonuse of force 
in Central Eu rope and Soviet rhe toric over Articles 53 and 107.160 Still, 
Kiesinger could achieve only so much, admitting to Nixon that “the NPT 
situation is still difficult;  there is division in my country and in my party, but 
we now should be discussing it on a higher level.”161 Without having to con-
tend with CDU and CSU dissent, Brandt could now implement his vision 
of Ostpolitik. He did, and the resulting improvement in East- West relations 
solidified détente in Eu rope.
The benefits of Ostpolitik  were not automatic in 1969. Many con temporary 
decision makers  were unsure of how to interpret Brandt’s foreign policy, and 
Soviet leaders remained skeptical of West German intentions as of Decem-
ber 1969.162 Some NATO allies had their own reservations.163 Nixon and Kiss-
inger  were wary of Brandt. Kissinger feared two possibilities: one in which 
German reunification would be made impossible and another in which Ger-
man reunification would be pos si ble but with the result being an in de pen-
dent Germany behaving much like it did during the interwar period.164 The 
French  were worried  because they preferred to see Germany divided rather 
than re united. French president Georges Pompidou even feared that intra- 
German reconciliation would lead to American troop withdrawals from Eu-
rope and a German- Soviet accord.165 Still, despite harboring doubts about 
American security guarantees in a time of nuclear parity, Brandt did not be-
lieve Ostpolitik was anti- NATO. He instead felt that strong alliance ties 
 were necessary for Ostpolitik and détente to flourish.166  These observations 
suggest that when West Germany did fi nally renounce nuclear weapons, it 
did so in a way of its own choosing that departed from the interests of its 
allies.
Some critical readers might claim that my analy sis overemphasizes Ost-
politik.  After all, the Bundestag fi nally ratified the NPT in 1975, something 
that some scholars see as driven by attitudinal changes among CDU politi-
cians  toward their country’s international status.167 In the meantime, West 
Germany still undertook centrifuge research amid other efforts to develop 
its civilian nuclear industry. Nevertheless, I argue that the international po-
liti cal dimension of West Germany’s nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior 
had largely run its course by 1970 thanks to Brandt’s foreign policy.168 Still, 
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the fact that Bonn persisted so long in deflecting international calls to clar-
ify its intentions only reinforces my broader point: West Germany was not 
so beholden to American pressure as to have a counterproliferation settle-
ment imposed on it.
That said, the alliance with the United States did in fact pose limits on how 
far West Germany can resist calls to sign the NPT. Brandt recognized that 
Bonn risked international isolation by not signing the treaty: “No one  will 
be prepared to show solidarity with us and defend us. We remain alone.” 
His main po liti cal adviser, Egon Bahr, agreed. In an undated memorandum, 
Bahr recorded in mid-1968, “The question is, can the German government 
[resist] the combined pressure from East and West . . .  and afford  going it 
alone not just without, but against the allies? Only one answer should be 
pos si ble  here if one gauges the Federal Republic’s po liti cal weight realisti-
cally.” He added that “straining our relationship with our protector, the 
United States, is much more serious,” while “at the same time, we  will be-
come isolated from our other allies once they sign the treaty.” Even Kiesinger 
admitted as early as 1966, “We cannot reject a Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty,” acknowledging three years  later that “in the end,  there is of course 
nothing you can do against a superpower and you  will have to sign [the 
NPT].”169 Simply put, alliance politics did inhibit what West Germany 
could achieve in its nuclear policy, but this pressure was much more diffuse 
and cannot be mea sured in terms of concrete coercive actions undertaken 
by the United States, be they interventions in West German domestic politics 
or specific threats designed to coerce treaty agreements.
Summary and Alternative Arguments
Throughout the 1960s, the United States sought to avert the possibility of a 
nuclear- armed West Germany by getting it to make credible nonprolifera-
tion commitments. This effort faced major challenges. First, alliance dynam-
ics with NATO thwarted attempts to advance an institutional solution, such 
as a nuclear- sharing arrangement similar to MLF. Second, American strug-
gles with obtaining West German offset payments highlighted the limits of 
economic leverage. Bonn eventually signed the NPT, but only  after extracting 
treaty concessions from the two superpowers and key changes in domestic 
politics that made a new foreign policy vision, Ostpolitik, practical. Never-
theless, signing the NPT largely served to make Ostpolitik a bona fide policy 
to placate Moscow rather than to gain relief from active American pressure. 
That is not to say that the alliance had no role in shaping West Germany’s 
nuclear trajectory; key decision makers recognized that international isola-
tion from the United States and other partners was so intolerable that sign-
ing the treaty was necessary. Still, the bottom line is that forcing West Ger-
many to accept strong nonproliferation commitments was im mensely 
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difficult for the United States to undertake, much more so than suggested 
by some scholars.
The alternative arguments have mixed success in accounting for West 
Germany’s choices. According to the adversary thesis, Bonn had no reason 
to renounce nuclear weapons credibly  because the Soviet threat persisted 
throughout the 1960s. Khrushchev issued another ultimatum in June 1961 at the 
Vienna Summit when he indicated that he would sign a separate peace treaty 
with East Germany  unless Western armed forces left Berlin. The Berlin Wall 
ended this crisis, but Khrushchev continued to practice nuclear brinkman-
ship when he placed nuclear- armed missiles in Cuba and sparked the Cuban 
missile crisis. This onslaught of crisis be hav ior eventually ceased, and the 
Soviet politburo replaced Khrushchev with Leonid Brezhnev. However, 
Brezhnev’s emergence as the Soviet leader did not immediately produce 
détente with the United States. Though calmer than his pre de ces sor, Brezhnev 
reversed some of Khrushchev’s liberalizing reforms and sharply criticized 
the United States on such issues as Vietnam and the MLF. He undertook sev-
eral provocative actions that directly affected West Germany’s security, such 
as asserting the right to intervene directly in West German politics and de-
ploying the Warsaw Pact to quash the Prague Spring in Czecho slo va kia.
 These two actions occurred when the  Grand Co ali tion,  under Kiesinger 
and Brandt, was attempting to implement Ostpolitik. Brandt’s becoming 
chancellor and implementing Ostpolitik more consistently than before 
helped improve East- West relations in Eu rope. As William Glenn Gray con-
cludes, “détente in the 1960s had skirted the German Question; détente in 
the 1970s was achieved precisely  because of agreements on Germany.”170 
Similarly, Trachtenberg observes that Ostpolitik was a response to the Soviet 
military buildup at a time when American security guarantees remained sus-
pect. Brandt realized that Bonn had to accommodate Moscow somewhat.171 
Tensions with the Soviet Union  were more a function of West Germany’s 
stance  toward nuclear weapons, not vice versa as the adversary thesis sug-
gests.
The domestic politics thesis provides crucial insights into the timing, if not 
the substance, of West Germany’s decisions. Kiesinger may have come to the 
view that signing the NPT was unavoidable, but hamstringing his leader-
ship was the need for the CDU, the CSU and the SDP to work together in 
the  Grand Co ali tion. Intraparty cleavages and co ali tion politics undermined 
the coherence of West German foreign policy. As such, the increasing power 
of Brandt and the left- of- center SDP within West German politics and soci-
ety made at least the signing of the NPT pos si ble. As long as  there  were po-
liti cally influential CDU and CSU politicians suspicious of Ostpolitik, Soviet 
intentions, and American credibility, West Germany’s signature would have 
had to occur  under dif fer ent circumstances. Accordingly, the domestic poli-
tics thesis may have greater applicability than what Etel Solingen realizes in 
light of her decision to restrict her argument to the post-1968 period.172 Such 
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an analytical move may have been unnecessary on her part: Kiesinger and 
Brandt believed that abstaining from the NPT would mean international iso-
lation and lost opportunities in East- West cooperation. Simply put, West 
Germany became more outward looking than not with Ostpolitik.
The prestige thesis also receives empirical support. Discussions of nuclear 
weapons and the NPT  were imbued with emotional language that reflected 
status anxiety. As indicated earlier in this chapter, West German leaders 
seemed to worry that they would be consigned to an inferior status within 
NATO if they had no nuclear weapons when the United States,  Great Brit-
ain, and France had them. CDU and CSU politicians decried the NPT as a 
“superpower diktat.”173 Even when Kiesinger privately conceded that West 
Germany had no choice but to sign the treaty, he bemoaned his own country 
as “a virtual protectorate of the USA.” Much as what would be expected ac-
cording to the prestige thesis, Kiesinger still refrained from ceasing West 
Germany’s nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior. Nevertheless, his reasons 
for being per sis tent owed more to domestic politics than to his ability to 
pursue what he wanted. The prestige thesis also can partly illuminate the 
timing of the NPT signature. Thomas Berger contends that a culture of anti-
militarism was decisive in inhibiting West Germany’s nuclear interest.  After 
all, the forces associated with antimilitarism might have helped elevate 
Brandt to the chancellorship. Although “ there was a general consensus that 
development of an in de pen dent national nuclear force would needlessly 
provoke the Soviet Union and alienate Germany’s Western allies,” Berger 
writes that “the presence of large, virulently antimilitary co ali tions of social 
and po liti cal forces, supported by widespread public antipathy  toward the 
new military [establishment] . . .  arguably tipped the balance.”174 Still, as a 
policy of partial accommodation, Brandt’s Ostpolitik served as a rationale 
that can be understood in its international context without reference to 
West German domestic politics.
Mostly landlocked and vulnerable to massive Soviet conventional military 
power, West Germany had much at stake in the protection offered by the 
United States. Distrust in the American security guarantee prompted West 
Germany’s nuclear interest amid rumors that the United States was cutting 
its conventional forces. Yet the decision to adopt a clear nonproliferation 
stance through the NPT resulted from a confluence of multiple  factors. Spe-
cifically, Bonn obtained treaty concessions from the two superpowers and 
evinced significant domestic po liti cal changes against an international con-
text, whereby the Soviet Union and the United States  were at rough nuclear 
parity. To the degree that alliance coercion took place, it was more psychic 
than  actual: West German leaders feared international isolation given their 
geopo liti cal position. Even so, West Germany managed to develop impressive 




Postwar Japan had less room to maneuver than West Germany in determin-
ing its foreign policy. Article 9 of the Japa nese Constitution and the so- called 
Yoshida Doctrine explic itly disavow the threat and the use of force to resolve 
international disputes. Hiroshima and Nagasaki  were the only cities ever to 
experience nuclear devastation when the United States bombed them in Au-
gust 1945. Following the 1954 Daigo Fukuryu Maru incident, in which the 
crew of a Japa nese fishing trawler was exposed to radiation fallout from 
American nuclear weapons tests, an antinuclear movement emerged as a 
major force in Japa nese domestic politics. This movement protested what it 
saw to be the overbearing presence of the United States in Japa nese affairs. 
The military alliance was robust thanks to a formal security guarantee as well 
as the local presence of many American troops and nuclear weapons. Japan 
thus constitutes a most-likely case where the alliance should not only help 
deter a nuclear weapons program but also curb any nuclear interest in the 
unlikely event that such interest arises.
Yet closer investigation of this case reveals that as much as the alliance with 
the United States did obviate a Japa nese nuclear weapons program, concern 
over redeployments of American conventional forces in East Asia and the 
direction of American foreign policy seems to have spurred some nuclear 
interest. Despite the limited nature of this interest, the United States still 
experienced difficulties in getting Japan to make firm nonproliferation 
commitments throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. Specifically, China’s 1964 
nuclear weapon detonation disturbed Japan’s sense of security, leading Ja-
pan’s decision makers to scrutinize more closely the quality of the Ameri-
can security guarantee. Abandonment fears intensified  toward the late 1960s 
when the United States sought to lessen its involvement in the Vietnam War 
and East Asia. In response, Japan  adopted a policy of nuclear hedging— 
buying time so as to develop a latent nuclear capability even if its leaders 
had no desire for nuclear weapons at the time. American decision makers 
 were aware of  these developments, but they felt unable to act fully on their 
concerns. Though Japan needed its alliance with the United States, domestic 
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politics and its growing economic power inoculated it against American co-
ercion. Largely on its own initiative, Japan ratified the nonproliferation 
treaty (NPT) in 1976. Still, some doubts over Japa nese nuclear intentions lin-
gered thereafter in light of the repro cessing activities at a nuclear fa cil i ty in 
Tokai. Japan has since become “the most salient example of nuclear hedg-
ing” that “illustrates how a state signatory to the NPT and a champion of 
nonproliferation and disarmament can legitimately maintain a nuclear fuel- 
cycle capability and possess huge quantities of weapons- grade fissile mate-
rial.”1 To be sure, Japan’s nuclear activities very likely had in mind energy 
security as well, but the geostrategic dimension cannot be discounted alto-
gether.
My framework illuminates how Japan went about its nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior. First, the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit 
Japan’s nuclear ambitions, since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment 
and repro cessing technologies in the late 1960s. Second, Japan paid attention 
to in- theater conventional forces and doctrine in evaluating the strength of 
its received commitments. As such, American disengagement from Viet-
nam and the Nixon Doctrine helped intensify abandonment fears. Third, 
although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weap-
ons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. 
Fourth, and fi nally, although the United States  shaped Japan’s nuclear 
choices through vari ous nuclear agreements during the 1950s and the 1960s, 
Japan was not very susceptible to American economic pressure. American 
decision makers recognized that pushing Japan too much would be coun-
terproductive. Though  these alternative explanations have their own short-
comings in accounting for this case, domestic politics and, to a lesser extent, 
prestige considerations  were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear 
decision- making in the 1970s than alliance- related ones.
Before analyzing the case, I review the strategic and domestic circum-
stances that Japa nese decision makers faced, thereby identifying what the 
alternative arguments would predict from this case.
The Strategic Context
The bilateral alliance between the United States and Japan had its roots in 
the American postwar occupation of Japan. The 1952 Treaty of San Fran-
cisco formalized the po liti cal commitment of Washington to Tokyo and was 
 later amended in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security be-
tween the United States and Japan. Unlike landlocked West Germany, Japan 
is an archipelago state with islands located in close proximity to eastern fron-
tiers of the former Soviet Union and China. However, Soviet naval forces 
became capable of projecting military power against Japa nese territory only 
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in the 1970s, whereas China would have still experienced difficulties in 
launching offensive operations against Taiwan by then.  Because Japan had 
thus less use for American land power than did West Germany, the New 
Look should have had  little practical significance for Tokyo. Indeed, by em-
phasizing air power and missile capabilities, the New Look was better 
aligned with Japan’s strategic needs.
The po liti cal threat confronting Tokyo was still real. Communist China 
fought the Korean War on the side of the North and initiated multiple crises 
over the status of Taiwan, an island ruled by anticommunist nationalists who 
fled the Chinese mainland following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War. 
China also began constructing uranium- enrichment plants in 1958. Although 
American decision makers knew of Chinese nuclear efforts in 1960 and 
1961, what Japa nese decision makers knew exactly before 1964 remains 
unclear. The mystery ended when China first detonated a nuclear device 
on October 16, 1964. Taking place about one week into the Summer Olym-
pic Games in Tokyo, the timing of this event was likely deliberate. This 
Olympiad was the first ever held in Asia and symbolized Japan’s rehabili-
tated status in international politics. Moreover, Beijing was developing bal-
listic missile capabilities, making it even less likely to submit to American 
nuclear threats than in the past.2 Japa nese decision makers subsequently had 
greater reason to scrutinize their received security guarantees.
China showcased its nuclear capabilities when the Johnson administra-
tion was deliberating over  whether to escalate the military involvement of 
the United States in Vietnam. American decision makers— including John-
son himself— believed that this decision would shape perceptions of Amer-
ican credibility to security partners around the world, especially  those in 
Asia. Deploying manpower and resources in supporting the anticommunist 
regime in South Vietnam should attenuate abandonment fears but generate 
entrapment fears, though much less so with anticommunists. Of course, the 
Vietnam War did not widen into a major power conflict, becoming instead 
a military debacle for the United States. Given its geopo liti cal position, Japa-
nese abandonment fears should intensify amid American efforts to disen-
gage from East Asia upon losing a war in Vietnam.
The adversary thesis differs from my theory by arguing that sensitivity to 
Chinese and Soviet military threats alone would drive Japa nese nuclear in-
terests. American efforts to reassure Japan should not  matter, since security 
guarantees are inherently unbelievable.
The Domestic Context
For much of the period  under review, the Liberal Demo cratic Party (LDP) 
ruled Japan. This party emerged as the dominant po liti cal force following 
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the 1955 merger of Shigeru Yoshida’s Liberal Party and Ichiro Hatoyama’s 
Japan Demo cratic Party. Yoshida is famous for being the namesake of the 
Yoshida Doctrine— the notion that Japan should focus primarily on economic 
growth while depending on American security guarantees. Hatoyama was 
a nationalist who sought to advance Japan’s foreign policy autonomy. The 
LDP’s main electoral competition was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Though 
the JSP usually held half of the seats as the LDP  under the 1955 system, the 
JSP’s popularity still generated concerns over Japan’s internal order and po-
tential neutralism among Japa nese and American officials.3
Its dominance in Japa nese politics notwithstanding, the LDP was inter-
nally divided, with factions that influenced candidate recruitment and per-
sonnel decisions. One conservative faction of the LDP was Kochikai and 
comprised followers of Yoshida such as Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (1960–
1964). Another faction, led by the self- made and entrepreneurial Kakuei 
Tanaka, became known as Heisei Kenkyukai; it generally favored interna-
tional cooperation with China and South  Korea. Prime ministers associated 
with this faction included the anticommunist Eisaku Sato (1964–1972) and 
Tanaka himself (1972–1974).  Career bureaucrat Takeo Fukuda led another 
faction that originally bore the name of Tofu Sasshin Renmei before becom-
ing known as Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai. It was more nationalist and eco-
nom ically liberal than the Tanaka- led faction but did not produce prime 
ministers during the period examined  later in this chapter. Nevertheless, 
Nobusuke Kishi had already been prime minister (1957–1960) by the time 
Fukuda formed this faction in 1962.
Given  these differences in the ruling co ali tions that governed Japan, what 
would the predictions of the domestic politics and prestige  theses be for this 
case? The domestic politics thesis predicts no nuclear weapons– related be-
hav ior since the Yoshida Doctrine postulated that the po liti cal survival of 
the new postwar regime hinged on Japan’s ability to deliver growth through 
global economic integration. Etel Solingen notes in her rich, multicausal ac-
count of Japan’s nuclear choices that the Yoshida Doctrine required “a strong 
economic infrastructure, manufacturing capabilities . . .  and swimming with 
(not against) the  great tide of market forces.”4 The Yoshida Doctrine, “as the 
heart of Japan’s favored model of po liti cal survival, provided the glue that 
kept the anti- nuclear package together.”5 The prestige thesis offers a slightly 
dif fer ent hypothesis, highlighting how antimilitarist and antinuclear atti-
tudes in Japa nese society became more salient over time and should dis-
courage politicians of all stripes from considering nuclear weapons. Even 
Solingen admits that “the nuclear allergy appears to have grown stronger 
in more recent times than it was during the first two de cades of the postwar 
era.”6 Indeed, some analysts claim that “having experienced Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki . . .  Japan’s po liti cal structures and national psyche have en-




Nuclear Proliferation– Related Be hav ior: Hedging  after  
a Period of Disinterest
The documentary rec ord suggests that Japa nese leaders exhibited  little 
interest, if any, in nuclear weapons throughout the 1950s. As in West Ger-
many, rearmament dominated Japanese- American security relations during 
this de cade. For many Japa nese politicians, the constitutionality of rear-
mament was a major subject of debate since article 9 of the Japa nese 
Constitution renounced war, forbade the use or threat of force to resolve 
international disputes, and abjured the development of an armed force that 
had “war potential.”  Whether such arrangements could accommodate nu-
clear weapons was also unclear. Akira Kodaki, the director of the National 
Defense Agency, suggested that the Japa nese military possess “nuclear 
weapons to [a] minimum extent necessary for sake of defense.”8 At a Diet 
committee meeting on May 7, 1957, Japa nese prime minister Nobusuke 
Kishi interjected: “I do not think so- called nuclear weapons are prohibited 
entirely by constitution. In view of pro gress of science, we must have effec-
tive power to carry out modern warfare within scope self- defense [sic].”9 
Kishi  later added that he did not intend to arm the Self- Defense Forces with 
nuclear weapons or to accept the placement of American nuclear units in 
Japan. Some American officials took note of  these statements. A background 
paper on Japan’s military observed that “the Japa nese Government appears 
to be interested in acquiring eventually tactical nuclear weapons for its 
own forces.” The paper argued that Kishi’s evolving stance on nuclear 
weapons “represent[ed] a major modification in previous Japa nese Govern-
ment opposition to any form of nuclear weapons, offensive or defensive.” 
The psychological impact of Hiroshima and Nagasaki mattered insofar as it 
fueled domestic opposition to any positioning of American nuclear weap-
ons in Japan.10 Nevertheless, American decision makers neither accorded 
much significance to  these statements nor inferred that Japan wanted nuclear 
weapons.
Following China’s first detonation of a nuclear device in October 1964, 
Japan began reconsidering its stance  toward nuclear weapons. The Japa-
nese government commissioned a report by the Cabinet Research Office 
entitled “Security of Japan and the Nuclear Test of the CCP” in Decem-
ber 1964. Written by Kei Wakaizumi and presented to the intelligence office 
of the cabinet, this report called for the development of a latent nuclear ca-
pacity by way of investing in satellite and missile technology and nuclear 
power plants.11 As Toshimitsu Kishi concludes in analyzing how Tokyo re-
acted to the Chinese nuclear test, “many reports expressed the opinion that 
Japan should not be armed with nuclear weapons, but should develop its 
nuclear capabilities.”12 Thereafter, Tokyo  adopted an ambivalent position 
 toward the NPT just as it was still being negotiated. It endorsed universal 
nuclear disarmament but decried the po liti cal in equality that the treaty 
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threatened to enshrine.13 In January 1968, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made 
a speech to the Japa nese Diet that, according to Yuri Kase, sought to “chal-
lenge the prevalence of ‘nuclear taboo’ that existed among the population at 
the time . . .  especially among the idealist left.”14 Though Japan signed the 
treaty in 1970, its leaders argued that its ratification would be conditional 
on the promotion of international nuclear disarmament by the  great powers, 
the provision of security guarantees for nonnuclear weapons states, and as-
surances that nonnuclear weapons states would have equal access to atomic 
energy for peaceful use.
Accompanying this  legal equivocation was the technological pro gress that 
Japan was striving to make in the nuclear domain. Its nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior was discreet: the Japa nese government bolstered its centri-
fuge program in 1969 and intensified its civilian nuclear activities in the early 
1970s, presumably to develop a virtual capability. According to Matthew 
Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, Japan had its enrichment and repro cessing 
plants operational in 1968.15 In 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission Expert 
Committee determined that the development of a centrifuge program was 
a national priority. It allocated a billion yen ($12 million in 2008 dollars) to 
an underfunded group of nuclear scientists who  were already attempting 
to manufacture their own designs. Following some success, their bud get saw 
a tenfold increase, allowing them to produce quickly several machine cas-
cades.16 In 1973, a new centrifuge program entered into existence.17  These 
increases in both spending and activity in the nuclear sector mostly preceded 
the global energy crisis that began in 1973.18
A report commissioned by Sato also reflected Japan’s nuclear ambivalence. 
Written by four nongovernmental university scholars, this two- volume re-
port was not an official government report. The first volume appeared in 
1968 and assessed the costs and benefits of a Japa nese nuclear weapons 
program on technical, economic, and orga nizational grounds. It withheld 
judgment as to  whether Japan should pursue a nuclear weapons program. 
However, it did aver that for the “time being” Japan should “keep the eco-
nomic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, 
while seeing to it that Japan not be interfered with in this regard.”19 Pub-
lished in 1970, the second volume evaluated the strategic, po liti cal, and 
diplomatic implications of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. It advised 
against an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent  because of the lack of strategic 
depth as well as the costs associated with provoking communist adver-
saries and Washington. This two- volume report saw very limited circula-
tion within the Japa nese government bureaucracy, making its impact on 
 actual decision- making unclear. This report may have helped Tokyo iden-
tify arguments to use in allaying international concerns over its nuclear 
intentions. Nevertheless, the production of this report indicates that Japan 
was at least weighing the merits of having nuclear weapons.20
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And so ambiguity characterized their public stance even if Japa nese lead-
ers might have found nuclear weapons unnecessary or distasteful. For ex-
ample, Tokyo partly objected to ratifying the NPT  because the recommended 
safeguards  were inadequate for preventing industrial espionage. However, 
as American diplomatic officials argued, the Japa nese government itself 
could have themselves implemented the appropriate safeguards through 
domestic legislation rather than through international agreements.21 Amer-
ican officials saw ulterior motives at play. As one embassy official wrote, 
“Reading between the lines, with liberal application of imagination, I would 
surmise that  there is a po liti cal prob lem for the GOJ [Government of Japan] 
concerning the NPT which is more basic than their objection to the safe-
guards article, and which is related to the attitudes of a small but influential 
minority who wish at least to keep Japan’s nuclear options open. I would 
guess that the Foreign Ministry and the LDP leadership, while aware of the 
broad consensus of feeling against nuclear armaments, nevertheless do not 
wish to antagonize this small influential minority by appearing to move too 
fast.”22 A conservative nationalist faction certainly delayed treaty ratifica-
tion when legislation for it appeared in 1974. Yet Tokyo had its own reasons 
for desiring flexibility in international negotiations.
Consider Sato’s three nonnuclear princi ples. In 1969, he vowed not to man-
ufacture, possess, or even allow the introduction of nuclear weapons in 
Japan— the latter of which would impair Washington’s ability to extend nu-
clear deterrence.  These princi ples might have expressed a policy of nuclear 
denial, but Sato  really wanted them to “stimulate debate on how Japan 
should defend itself in the nuclear era, rather than to express his support 
for the princi ples.”23 Unfortunately for him, it constrained  later negotiations 
over the reversion of the island of Okinawa. The United States wanted to 
retain basing access and rights to deploy conventional forces to  Korea, Tai-
wan, and Vietnam, as well as to keep nuclear weapons on the island. How-
ever, the JSP proposed a “nonnuclear” resolution in the Diet. Caught in this 
dilemma, Sato decried his rhetorical pledge as “unnecessary”  because it 
complicated his efforts to strike a balance between American demands and 
the sensibilities of Japa nese society.24 He agreed to violate the third princi-
ple by granting Washington the ability to place and to install nuclear weap-
ons in Japan.25
Two episodes from the 1970s further illustrate Japan’s nuclear ambiguity. 
The first is a March 1973 interpellation between Prime Minister Tanaka and 
members of the Diet. On March 13, Tanaka asserted that “nuclear weapons 
are offensive weapons and against the Constitution.” But on the next day 
the Japa nese government issued a statement claiming that tactical nuclear 
weapons  were constitutional. Asked to clarify his original statement several 
days  later, Tanaka noted that “(1) if within the scope of self- defense, nuclear 
weapons  will not run  counter to the Constitution, (2) however, since nuclear 
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weapons are considered to be offensive weapons, generally, they run  counter 
to the Constitution, and (3) the Government  will firmly maintain the Three 
Non- Nuclear Princi ples and  will not carry out nuclear weapons.” However, 
on March 20, Tanaka noted, “We  will firmly maintain the policy based on 
the three non- nuclear princi ples. . . .  We  will not be able to hold offensive 
nuclear weapons, but it does not mean that we  will not hold nuclear 
weapons at all.”26 Several months  later, Tanaka told Nixon twice that “Japan 
would not possess nuclear or military power  because of its constitutional 
restrictions.”27
The second is an exchange between Nixon and Japa nese foreign minister 
Masayoshi Ohira. Following India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974, 
Nixon inquired as to how Japan would react.  After Ohira assured him that 
“Japan is in no way thinking of  going nuclear,” Nixon responded vaguely, 
“I would not indicate what Japan should do, but I would just point out the 
increasing likelihood of nuclear war as more states acquire  these devices. Of 
course, the answer is to look to working even harder to strengthen a struc-
ture of peace . . .  so that states  will reject the option of force, nuclear or 
other wise. It sounds idealistic but  there is no other way to approach the 
prob lem.”28 At a minimum, he was signaling that the United States did not 
tolerate nuclear proliferation. Yet he did not request Japa nese reassurances 
not to acquire an in de pen dent nuclear capability. To be sure, National Secu-
rity Decision Memorandum 13 did not register as a goal of American for-
eign policy the clarification and credible renunciation of nuclear weapons 
by Japan.29 Still, his coded language suggests that the ambiguity of Japan’s 
nuclear policy bothered him. Several months  later, Kissinger told Soviet for-
eign minister Andrei Gromyko, “The line between weapons and peaceful 
uses is vague. . . .  The Japa nese have a big nuclear program but have not 
done any explosion yet. If they moved this way, they would go like India 
and could be a big power very quickly.”30
Japan’s nuclear ambiguity disturbed other states. In his meeting with Kiss-
inger ahead of Nixon’s visit to China, Zhou Enlai opined that “the only 
 thing lacking [for Japan] is the nuclear warhead” and that Japan was “bound 
to demand outward expansion.”31 For him, Japan’s “feathers have grown on 
its wings and it is about to take off,” meaning that it would soon convert its 
economic power into military power. Nixon tried to assuage Zhou’s con-
cerns, remarking that “we oppose a nuclear rearmed Japan no  matter what 
some officials might suggest to the contrary.”32 American decision makers 
 were even aware of Japa nese nuclear blackmail against Moscow. Prime Min-
ister Tanaka informed Nixon that he “told Brezhnev that he should not give 
the Japa nese too rough a time  because they  were quite capable of nuclear 
weapons.”33
This per sis tent ambiguity bought the Japa nese government enough time 
to develop a latent nuclear capability. The success of the centrifuge program in 
the late 1970s gave Japan access to fissile materials— a necessary component 
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for a nuclear bomb.34 Nevertheless, po liti cal challenges aside, this so- called 
latent nuclear capability faced serious technical constraints that included 
an insufficient stockpile of weapons- grade plutonium, no ballistic missile 
deployment capability, and the need to divert nuclear power activity 
 toward military purposes despite IAEA regulations.35
Explaining Japan’s Be hav ior: Disinterest and Nuclear Hedging
What explains Japan’s nuclear hedging  after 1964? To what extent did con-
cerns regarding American extended deterrence drive Japa nese nuclear in-
terest? According to my theoretical framework, Japa nese decision makers 
should have attended to their received security guarantees in formulating 
their nuclear choices, with special reference to in- theater deployments and 
American doctrine. As such, Japa nese decision makers should be satisfied 
with the military alliance  until military defeats in the Vietnam War began 
straining American alliance commitments to East Asia. Such is what we see.
Throughout the 1950s, Japan benefited from being an archipelago state 
that faced no direct military threat. Its leaders  were thus unfazed by the di-
minished role of conventional military power that the New Look embod-
ied. Indeed, Japa nese leaders wanted to reduce the American army presence 
in their efforts to revise the 1951 Security Treaty.36 They sought a more equi-
table mutual defense treaty that contained provisions for limiting American 
use rights of bases located in Japan and stipulating the withdrawal of Amer-
ican ground forces.37  After all, members of Japa nese society regarded the 
US Army as an occupying force that had  little deterrent value against po-
tential adversaries, since Japan required a military presence based primar-
ily on air and naval power.38 Accordingly, the Radford Plan was desirable 
from the perspective of Japa nese decision makers. The secretary general of 
the LDP, and  later prime minister, Nobusuke Kishi, noted that a “major 
source of friction” between the two countries “[arose] from the existence of 
numerous United States bases and the presence of large numbers of Ameri-
can troops in Japan.”39 Still, Japa nese leaders valued the presence of Ameri-
can naval and air forces. Reflecting this view, the Japa nese proposal for a 
mutual defense treaty requested that the removal of such forces would take 
place “at the latest six years  after completion of the withdrawal of the ground 
forces.”40
Other  factors  shaped Japa nese perceptions of American regional credibil-
ity. To begin with, American diplomatic exchanges included many expres-
sions of commitment to containing local communist ambitions partly  because 
American decision makers found East Asia more volatile, so as to require a 
more assertive presence. Whereas one communist state— the Soviet Union— 
threatened American allies in Eu rope, three threatened— the Soviet Union, 
China, and North  Korea— American allies in East Asia. Consequently, 
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American- led containment efforts faced a greater challenge in this region.41 
Yet the challenges of deterring multiple communist adversaries also created 
opportunities to reassure local allies. When China bombarded offshore is-
lands in the Taiwan Straits in 1955, for example, the United States signaled 
its resolve in defending Taiwan by threatening nuclear weapons use to force 
China to back down.42
Another  factor was the unique care invested by American decision makers 
in fostering a strong Japan. In their view, what rendered the security envi-
ronment more precarious was that Japan was po liti cally and eco nom ically 
isolated from potential allies in the region. The American ambassador in 
Tokyo saw the country in a “semi- isolated” position within its region. It 
“had neither the leavening influence of close association with dependable 
 free world neighbors which Germany has had nor Germany’s first hand 
exposure to Soviet brutality.”43 What ever Japan’s own threat perceptions, 
American decision makers viewed the security environment in East Asia as 
volatile enough to require a robust American response and an indefinite re-
gional presence. Even NSC 162/2 (which formulated the New Look) pro-
jected dif fer ent levels of American military assistance to Western Eu rope and 
East Asia. It asserted that in Western Eu rope “the United States must con-
tinue to assist in creating and maintaining mutually agreed Eu ro pean 
forces, but should reduce such assistance as rapidly as United States inter-
ests permit.” By contrast, it “should maintain the security of the offshore 
island chain and continue to develop the defensive capacity of  Korea and 
Southeast Asia in accordance with existing commitments.”44 Moreover, 
 because East Asia was not as eco nom ically developed as Western Eu rope, 
American leaders recognized that a military presence in the former region 
might have to last longer. Since Japan’s economy exhibited uneven growth 
during the 1950s, American leaders  were cautious about pressuring Japan 
into boosting defense spending. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles admit-
ted that they “had tended to push the Japa nese too hard” on such issues.45 
Fi nally, for Japa nese leaders, the Korean War indicated that the United 
States was committed to curbing communism in the region. The American- 
led co ali tion not only repelled the North’s bid to reunify the peninsula 
 under communist control but also prevented communist forces from using 
the South to proj ect military power against Japan.46
That the United States was tightening its alliances in East Asia should have 
inspired fears of entrapment and not abandonment. Indeed, Eisenhower’s 
use of nuclear threats unsettled local actors. A March 1955 National Intelli-
gence Estimate (NIE) surmised that in response to nuclear use, the “general 
reaction of non- Communist Asians would be emotional and would be ex-
tremely critical of the US. . . .  The [Japa nese] Government would prob ably 
attempt to steer a more neutral course.” The NIE added that the United States 
should contain communist China without war or nuclear weapons so that 
“US prestige and the confidence of the non- Communist world in US leader-
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ship would be enhanced.”47 A dilemma for Eisenhower thus arose. He rec-
ognized that “if [a ‘small war’] grew to anything like  Korea proportions, the 
action would become one for atomic weapons.”48 Nevertheless, he noted that 
with re spect to South  Korea and Taiwan, “this business of arguing that you 
are  going to defend  these countries through recourse to nuclear weapons 
 isn’t very convincing. In point of fact,  these countries do not wish to be de-
fended by nuclear weapons. They all regard  these weapons as essentially 
offensive in character, and our allies are absolutely scared to death that we 
 will use such weapons.”49
This sensitivity to nuclear strategy in East Asia indicates that the United 
States— and not Japan— feared abandonment. American decision makers 
doubted  whether Tokyo was committed to the bilateral security partnership 
and  whether it was able or willing to respond to regional communist threats 
over the long term. The so- called Yoshida Doctrine and its stated emphasis 
on American protection mattered  little.  After all, impassioned debate un-
folded in Japan over the extent to which it should align itself with the United 
States and which American military assets could be stationed on Japa nese 
territory. Indeed, ground forces notwithstanding, American decision makers 
wanted to maintain a general military presence in Japan “in defi nitely.”50 
For them, the security of Japan and that of the entire region  were at stake. 
Dulles told British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan that “with Rus sia and 
China allied and Japan inert and lacking power, the United States had to 
maintain more military power in the Pacific area than it would other wise 
choose.  Were we to withdraw, one could look for a substantial expansion of 
Communist power throughout the Far East.”51 And so Washington beseeched 
Tokyo to accept a major military presence. One American official advised 
that the Japa nese government should recognize that the “United States must 
retain air, naval, and ground- logistical bases in Japan on a long- term basis.”52
Two unfavorable features of Japa nese politics worried American decision 
makers. First, two factions  were advocating policies that  were inimical to 
American security objectives. The conservatives  were pro- American but in-
ternally divided and anxious for foreign policy autonomy. Worse  were the 
Socialists. They  were “essentially neutralist and to an extent anti- American.”53 
American influence over Japa nese politics seemed to be rapidly diminish-
ing. Second, American decision makers believed that Japa nese lawmakers 
 were naively optimistic regarding the communist threat and that Japa nese 
trade with China would “substantially increase China’s war potential” 
 because of such Japa nese exports as machine tools and electronic equip-
ment.54 Moreover, in advocating for American military withdrawal, Kishi 
dismissed the severity of the Soviet threat.55 Although American leaders ap-
proved of Kishi, they  were unsure that he would be a reliable ally should 
he become prime minister. One presidential adviser recommended that 
Kishi be disabused of the “ ‘Alice- in- Wonderland Dream World’ frame of 
mind” by having the Chair of the Joint Chiefs “[impress] Mr. Kishi with the 
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exposed position which Japan would occupy if United States forces  were to 
be entirely withdrawn at this time.”56
Divergent threat perceptions and domestic controversies over the partner-
ship  shaped the context in which the two allies renegotiated their security 
treaty in the late 1950s.57 Unlike West German leaders, who demanded from 
the United States a continuing military presence in Eu rope and greater say 
in military arrangements, Japa nese leaders wanted American ground troops 
to withdraw. Hawkish and nationalist leaders like Hatoyama and Kishi 
needed convincing that the presence of American air and naval forces was 
necessary.  These leaders desired a more equitable security treaty. Whereas 
the 1951 treaty did not specify the terms  under which the United States 
could maintain its military presence and bases, the 1960 revision obliged the 
United States to consult with Japan over their use and nuclear storage. The 
treaty revision also gave the Japa nese government’s consent to the Ameri-
can use of Okinawa for military basing.58 But  these negotiations rattled both 
sides: Prime Minister Kishi resigned  after violent demonstrations rocked 
Tokyo, and Eisenhower had to cancel a state visit to Japan. The experience 
demonstrated how intensely the Japa nese left opposed the alliance.59
 These controversies soon subsided. Tranquility characterized the alliance 
during Kennedy’s presidency. Michael Schaller describes the first three years 
of the 1960s as “unusually convivial.”60 Roger Buckley characterizes this 
de cade as the “quiet est de cade of the postwar relationship,” observing that 
memoirs written by American government officials hardly mention Japan 
during this time.61 Following the spectacular crisis that erupted over the treaty 
revisions, neither ally wanted controversy. For the LDP, the 1960 protests re-
vealed the divisive and dangerous character that public debates over the alli-
ance could take. As Buckley writes, “memories of 1960 acted as a power ful 
constraint from pressing  matters too hard and too far.”62 For Washington, 
the protests exposed the risks of alliance adjustment. And so both sides 
managed any intermittent disagreements over such issues as Okinawa and 
trade with China with  little fanfare. However, this tranquil period was pos-
si ble  because Japan still enjoyed a favorable geopo liti cal position. Without a 
direct military threat, Japa nese leaders could avoid asking difficult questions 
regarding their defense policy.
This situation soon changed when China detonated a nuclear weapon on 
October 16, 1964, shattering Japa nese insouciance regarding the communist 
threat. The Japa nese government’s public reaction appeared muted  because 
it did not want the event to overshadow the 1964 Summer Olympic Games 
that had just started in Tokyo.63 Privately, it was alarmed. Upon becoming 
prime minister, Sato held closed cabinet- level discussions to determine the 
desirability of starting a nuclear weapons program. Consideration of nuclear 
weapons did not yet pro gress beyond  these discussions.64
Sato began seeking assurances from Washington. Just as the United States 
was increasing its military involvement in Vietnam, he was probing American 
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resolve to defend anticommunist interests in East Asia. On January 12, 1965, 
he met with President Johnson, expressed his support for American actions 
in Vietnam, and advised that “the United States must hold out and be 
patient.”  After Johnson described his intent to fight in Vietnam, Sato “ap-
plauded the United States’ determination to maintain a firm stand in Viet- 
Nam and reiterated his desire that [the United States] hold out.” When 
 later asked how the United States should proceed in Vietnam, Sato argued 
that “utmost patience and forbearance  were required. Neither an advance 
north nor American withdrawal was desirable. The latter would provoke a 
‘falling domino’ situation. The United States should hold on.” Sato returned 
the  favor with his own reassurances: when asked by Rusk for his thoughts 
on China’s nuclear test, Sato reiterated his country’s antinuclear stance.65 
However, Sato remarked to Johnson that “if the [Chinese communists] 
had nuclear weapons, the Japa nese should have them.”66 This murkiness 
aside, Johnson and Sato issued a communiqué emphasizing commitment 
of each country to the other’s security.67 Japa nese pledges of support con-
tinued as the United States increased its military involvement in Vietnam. 
Still, Japan was not entirely satisfied with its received assurances. In 1967, 
Sato beseeched Johnson to reiterate his pledge to defend Japan “against any 
form of attack.”68
The Japa nese government  under Sato privately and cautiously supported 
the Vietnam War, a reasonable interpretation considering how it would re-
act to  later American military failures.69 On March 31, 1968, following poor 
results in the New Hampshire Demo cratic primary, Johnson made two re-
lated announcements. First, he vowed to unilaterally de- escalate hostilities 
 toward North Vietnam. Second, he declared that he would not run for re-
election as president.70 American ambassador to Japan Alexis Johnson noted 
that Johnson’s speech “has been widely misinterpreted  here as admission 
of defeat and reversal of US policy on Vietnam, foreshadowing US with-
drawal from Asia,” “as pulling the rug out from Sato,” and portending 
closer alignment with China. Consequently, even the most pro- American 
members of the Japa nese government began recommending that Japan 
“loosen its ties with [the] US including security relationship and adopt a 
more in de pen dent foreign policy.”71 He  later reported that President John-
son’s speech had po liti cal repercussions for Sato, since Sato was now “ under 
heavy attack not only by opposition but within his own party for having tied 
himself too closely to us and then allegedly being left out on a limb by ‘re-
versal’ of our policy in Vietnam.”72
President Johnson’s speech made some Japa nese government officials sus-
picious of the United States. In April 1968, a member of the Foreign Office 
noted that Japan now had to increase its defense expenditures,  because “in 
view of worldwide US commitments it is ‘dangerous’ to place excessive re-
liance on US assistance in the conventional area.”73 An embassy tele gram 
from Tokyo observed that the “Tet offensive and what was interpreted as an 
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abrupt shift into de- escalation and negotiations with Hanoi have thrown 
doubt on US firmness and invincibility.” It also noted how the “Arab- Israeli 
war, balance- of- payments difficulties, ‘protectionism’ scare,  etc.”  were also 
fueling doubt among Japa nese po liti cal elites.74 Notwithstanding the addi-
tional indicators that appear to signify declining commitment, this document 
expressly linked the unilateral de- escalation of hostilities with American 
resolve and credibility. Other concerns had already started to animate Japa-
nese politicians. The year before, Sato fretted over the Soviet- American 
détente. Specifically, “they are concerned that relations between the two 
‘super powers,’ the US and the U.S.S.R., not ‘improve’ to the extent that we 
and the Soviets face Japan with fait accompli in  matters concerning Japa-
nese interests.”75 Though Japa nese leaders regarded the Soviet Union as the 
primary threat, Alexis Johnson claimed that they held similar fears about 
the United States aligning itself too closely with China.76
 These concerns intensified when Nixon became president. The Nixon 
Doctrine and the subsequent troop withdrawals in East Asia amplified the 
unease. Furthermore, North Korean provocations against the South— 
which predated Nixon— and China’s antagonism  toward Japan over its pro- 
Taiwan policy added significance to this announced redirection in American 
foreign policy.77 How Japan, with its constitutional constraints and domes-
tic politics, could adjust to the changing security environment was unclear. 
Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi wrote in a 1969 Foreign Affairs article that “it is 
reasonable to assume that for some time to come  there  will be no substitute 
for the continuing presence of American deterrent power to  counter effec-
tively any designs for large- scale military adventures in the area.”78 The 
conservative columnist Takeshi Muramatsu highlighted vari ous actions 
and statements made by American leaders as signifying declining credibil-
ity.79 For example, the former commander of the Strategic Air Command 
said that Washington might not always aid Western Eu rope militarily. This 
statement served as an omen for the American alliance support that Japan 
could expect.80 In the early 1970s, public opinion polls found that respon-
dents  were reporting increasingly unfavorable—if not mixed— feelings 
 toward the United States.81 By the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, survey 
respondents reported  little confidence in American security guarantees de-
spite expressing support for the Security Treaty.82
Such was the context when Sato’s government commissioned studies re-
garding the feasibility and desirability of nuclear weapons before making a 
centrifuge program a national priority in 1969.83 Abandonment fears  were 
pronounced. Defense Agency director- general Yasuhiro Nakasone advised 
his American interlocutors not to engage in troop withdrawals that  were 
“undertaken drastically and in an all- out fashion without coordination with 
the Japa nese side.”84 Policy statements emanating from Tokyo declared the 
need to reconsider Japa nese foreign policy. The Japan Defense Agency, for 
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example, released a Defense White Paper in October 1970 announcing the 
need for a reconsideration of Japan’s security relationship with the United 
States. Bud getary decisions accompanied such rhe toric: the 1970 bud get 
included a 17.7  percent increase in defense spending. The reversion of 
Okinawa— partly intended to remove the last vestiges of American postwar 
occupation— was dealt in a manner to ensure that the United States would 
not be limited in its regional ability to provide extended deterrence.85 Indeed, 
Japan signed the NPT as part of a negotiating ploy over Okinawa. As Ayako 
Kusunoki conjectures, Sato “might have timed ac cep tance of the NPT so as 
to help gain Washington’s ac cep tance of a nuclear- free Okinawa  after its re-
version to Japa nese control.”86
Summary and Alternative Arguments
The evidence presented earlier in this chapter indicates that Japan was rela-
tively  free of abandonment fears  until the mid- to- late 1960s. When  those very 
fears intensified following signs that the United States was seeking to exit 
Vietnam and possibly East Asia, the Japa nese government began undertak-
ing nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior. The alliance was insufficient in 
curbing this interest. And  until then Tokyo saw in- theater conventional de-
ployments more as symbols of occupation that had  little military value for 
an archipelago state. But as the United States was looking to reduce its pres-
ence in East Asia, they became symbols of commitment.
The alternative arguments partially illuminate the case so far. Consider 
first the adversary thesis. Neither the Soviet Union nor China had the mari-
time or aerial capability to pose a direct military threat to Japan during the 
first half of the Cold War. Rocking Japan’s relatively comfortable geostrate-
gic position was China’s 1964 detonation. Whereas Japan’s sense of security 
in the late 1950s might have created a permissive environment that promoted 
the intense controversies surrounding the treaty negotiation, the loss of that 
security led Tokyo to scrutinize the quality of its received security guaran-
tees. Still, my explanation for how unfavorable alliance adjustments— real 
or anticipated— prompted nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior assumes 
that a salient external threat exists. Indeed, a nationally prioritized centri-
fuge program came several years  after 1964 when American military failures 
in East Asia  were becoming much more apparent.
The domestic politics and prestige  theses have some validity, but their 
empirical value should not be overstated. With its emphasis on the Yoshida 
Doctrine as the dominant po liti cal strategy, the domestic politics thesis can-
not account for why Japa nese leaders did not fully reject nuclear weapons 
proliferation– related be hav ior. At best it explains the level of discretion and 
secrecy that surrounded Japan’s nuclear activities.  After all, the backlash 
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surrounding the 1960 Security Treaty negotiations exposed the limits to 
which Japa nese governments could even convey distrust for the United 
States. That experience discouraged any effort by both governments to fo-
ment overt diplomatic discord and stir controversy. In the late 1960s,  these 
constraints grew as the Vietnam War provoked large student protests in 
Japan. For LDP politicians to criticize the United States  under such circum-
stances, through  either diplomatic exchanges or foreign policy actions, the 
grievances of opposition groups like the JSP and the Japa nese Communist 
Party would gain credibility. As Victor Cha writes, “If Tokyo fervently ex-
pressed concerns about the Nixon Doctrine, this would focus the public 
and po liti cal agenda on the defense buildup issues as a means of coping 
with this fear. This, in turn, would fuel antirearmament [sic] forces in Japan 
and reignite popu lar support for Japa nese neutralism, resulting in an envi-
ronment hardly conducive to easy renewal of the [American- Japanese secu-
rity] treaty.”87 The circumspection and discretion practiced by Japa nese 
leaders during this period highlight the importance of domestic po liti cal 
considerations. Nevertheless, regardless of its domestic politics, an ally has 
strategic incentives not to be open about its nuclear activities lest its adver-
saries attack it.
What of the prestige thesis? The so- called nuclear allergy was starting to 
develop thanks to a burgeoning social movement that opposed nuclear 
weapons and American nuclear weapons policy. Partly  because of censor-
ship during the American occupation, the experience of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki atomic bombings provided  little impetus for the emergence of this 
antinuclear movement. Rather, the real catalyst was the exposure of several 
Japa nese fishermen to radiation fallout from an American nuclear weapons 
test near Bikini Atoll in 1954. The Daigo Fukuryu Maru incident, and the 
initial American efforts to cover it up, stoked fears regarding food con-
tamination and provoked backlash against American nuclear tests in the 
Pacific Ocean.  These growing anx i eties found artistic expression that same 
year with Godzilla— a film that featured a prehistoric dinosaur that had mu-
tated  because of nuclear radiation, likely caused by a weapons test. In the 
film, the eponymous creature emerges from Tokyo Bay and launches a dev-
astating attack on the capital city before descending back into the bay. That 
the monster’s main weapon is its atomic breath and that both its appear-
ance and disappearance take place in Tokyo are po liti cally significant.  After 
all,  these tropes referred symbolically to American nuclear policy and 
its influence on Japa nese security as well as on public health and safety. 
Though the impact of this film should not be overstated, Godzilla’s popular-
ity may have reflected emerging norms and attitudes  toward the alliance 
and American nuclear policy. Indeed,  after 1954, the antinuclear movement 
started to or ga nize large protests whenever an American nuclear- powered 
submarine or aircraft would dock at a Japa nese port.88
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Yet the prestige thesis ultimately emphasizes the beliefs of leaders instead 
of domestic society. Although Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein correctly 
regard the 1950s as the time when antimilitarist values  were starting to per-
colate in Japa nese society, the extent to which popu lar sentiments influenced 
Japa nese decision makers during the 1950s is unclear. For one  thing, Kishi 
and other se nior officials did not refrain from openly discussing the consti-
tutionality of Japa nese nuclear weapons in the late 1950s. For another, the 
prestige thesis can explain Sato’s nuclear ruminations and decision to 
develop a centrifuge program only by taking the view that he was an op-
positional nationalist. However, categorizing Sato in this way encounters 
several prob lems. To begin with, evidence exists that Sato drew, and acted 
on, advice from realist scholars who argued against acquiring tactical nuclear 
weapons on military and alliance grounds.89 Despite having a reputation for 
being hawkish, he hardly fit the profile of a leader with an exaggerated sense 
of threat or of a national capacity in dealing with adversaries— that is, of a 
leader who was an oppositional nationalist. In part  because of how he man-
aged diplomacy  toward both the United States and China, he gathered a 
reputation for being an “overcautious” politician who “quite deliberately 
and successfully chose the  middle road.”90
Alliance Coercion and Japan
Despite the growing domestic unpopularity of nuclear weapons, Japan 
commissioned several studies exploring the nuclear weapons option before 
making a centrifuge program a national priority.  These covert actions not-
withstanding, allies and adversaries alike became concerned about Japan’s 
nuclear status. Even if Japan had no intention to acquire nuclear weapons, 
clarifying its ambiguous stance on nuclear weapons was impor tant for the 
nascent nonproliferation regime and thus for the United States. But what 
role, if any, did Washington have in Tokyo’s ultimate decision to abide by the 
NPT fully?
Some would argue that the United States played a significant role in Japan’s 
nuclear decision- making simply  because Tokyo had  little autonomy in craft-
ing its defense policy. I argue against this view. Japan ratified the NPT mostly 
for domestic po liti cal reasons. The alliance with the United States was an 
impor tant  factor in terms of providing a disincentive for full- blown nuclear 
proliferation, but this case is notable for the absence of coercion. Indeed, do-
mestic politics in Japan was one reason why Washington felt like it could not 
push Tokyo too hard. Moreover, American decision makers did not believe 
they could impose a clear nonproliferation status on Japan without sacrificing 
other foreign policy goals. A combination of propitious domestic and inter-
national circumstances allowed Tokyo to develop a latent nuclear capability.
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the alliance as a pos si  ble  
nonproliferation mechanism
One alliance solution for nuclear proliferation that was attempted in West-
ern Eu rope saw very limited consideration with re spect to East Asia. That 
is, no nuclear- sharing arrangement was proposed to American allies in East 
Asia. Nevertheless, documents reveal that while the United States began to 
abandon the MLF in Western Eu rope, some American decision makers con-
templated  whether a similar nuclear- sharing arrangement would be appro-
priate in East Asia. Rusk even “asked a committee” to “[give] consideration 
to a US- supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile.”91 In a 1965 memorandum, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that to curb nuclear proliferation, the United 
States “should not rule out the possibility of increased nuclear support in-
cluding some form of nuclear sharing with our allies in Asia when such is 
required in the US national interests.”92 And yet, despite some interest in the 
State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this policy idea did not see 
further development. The absence of documents regarding this issue sug-
gests that American decision makers gave this idea  little consideration.
Several reasons illuminate why no Asian MLF emerged. First, the hub- 
and- spoke system that characterized the regional American- led security 
order itself likely made such an initiative impractical. Japan’s potential al-
lies in the region remained eco nom ically underdeveloped and po liti cally 
unstable. Japan and South  Korea might have overcome their historical griev-
ances by normalizing their relations in 1965, but lingering disagreements 
between them might have made an Asian MLF unworkable. Second, the fail-
ures attending the MLF in Western Eu rope likely dissuaded policy makers 
from considering something similar in East Asia, even in the absence of stub-
born nuclear- armed allies like France and  Great Britain. Third, American 
leaders might have regarded non- European  peoples as unworthy of nuclear- 
sharing arrangements. According to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Kat-
zenstein, American decision makers held highly racialized views of Asian 
 peoples.93 Whereas they considered their Eu ro pean counter parts as equals, 
Asians  were “inferior” so as to necessitate a paternalistic approach in East 
Asia. However, a more compelling explanation is that popu lar attitudes 
 toward nuclear weapons  were more hostile in East Asia due to their exclusive 
use in the Pacific Front. A nuclear- sharing arrangement might have rebut-
ted criticisms that Anglo- Saxons would use nuclear weapons at the expense 
of Asian populations. Nevertheless, public aversion would have compli-
cated the development of a po liti cal foundation for a nuclear- sharing ar-
rangement that NATO seemed to provide. Indeed, this same  factor helps 
illuminate why the United States relied on secret bilateral agreements for 
the transit and storage of its nuclear weapons in Japan.
Besides nuclear- sharing arrangements receiving barely any consideration, 
American decision makers  were much less severe with Japan than with West 
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Germany despite their dislike for the former’s nuclear ambiguity. During 
NPT negotiations, Rusk advised that Japan express its “adherence” to the 
treaty.94 When Sato visited Washington, DC, in January 1965, Rusk sought 
Japa nese reassurances regarding its commitment to abstain from nuclear 
weapons development. Nixon and Kissinger barely registered the same level 
of concern and refrained from demanding that Japan not pursue nuclear 
weapons development. Members of the intelligence community validated 
this nonchalance. One Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report indicated 
that “Japan’s capability to develop and produce nuclear weapons and mod-
est delivery systems is not questioned. The industrial and technological 
backup is available. But  going nuclear would be a po liti cal decision; it would 
not be made on the basis of technological capability but on an assessment of 
overriding national interests.” Only in the event of breakdown in global sta-
bility or a major crisis in American- Japanese relations might Japan get nu-
clear weapons.95 Yet other American foreign policy observers did not share 
such attitudes. In the early 1970s, amid widespread speculation in the Amer-
ican media regarding Japan’s nuclear intentions, Senator Hubert Hum-
phrey petitioned the Nixon administration to get clarification on Japan’s 
nuclear policy.96 One concerned member of an American study group on a 
safeguards agreement mentioned that when it came to the NPT and the 
IAEA, the United States should “not permit the Japa nese to outwait us by 
using stalling tactics.”97
One should not overstate American insouciance. Nixon asked Japa nese 
foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira about his government’s reaction to India’s 
“peaceful nuclear explosion.” Ohira assured Nixon that Japan would not 
acquire nuclear weapons. This exchange was where Nixon ambiguously 
responded that more nuclear weapons states would make nuclear war 
likelier.98 With  those cryptic remarks, he was at minimum signaling that 
Washington would not tolerate nuclear proliferation. The Ford administra-
tion had similar concerns. As one briefing memorandum prepared for Pres-
ident Ford notes, “Militarily, Japan possesses enormous potential power, but 
remains content to maintain only a modest defense establishment. The ab-
sence of immediate and palpable military threats and a host of po liti cal and 
diplomatic  factors continue to inhibit the Japa nese from developing long- 
range conventional capabilities, deploying forces overseas, extending mili-
tary assistance, and exercising a ‘nuclear option.’ ” Nevertheless, the same 
memorandum  later added, “The Indian nuclear test has been profoundly un-
settling to the Japa nese, and if expanded international efforts to deal with 
the proliferation issues are not undertaken, events in time could propel the 
Japa nese  toward a serious reassessment of their own non- nuclear status. 
 There are two issues for us. (1) What steps can we take to enhance the pros-
pects of early Japa nese ratification of [the] Non- Proliferation Treaty? (2) How 
can we engage the Japa nese in a broader multilateral non- proliferation strat-
egy, including the prospective conference of nuclear industrial states?”99 
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Furthermore, Kissinger recognized that “the Japa nese [ were] preoccupied 
with reconsidering their security policy in the fluid international environ-
ment of post- Vietnam.”100 Fi nally, another memorandum prepared for Ford 
ahead of his meeting with Prime Minister Takeo Miki notes, “We privately 
told the Miki Government last spring that we hoped Japan would ratify the 
NPT at an early date.”101 Aversion to Japa nese nuclear proliferation was pri-
vate and tacit.
Yet a puzzle emerges from this discussion: if Washington was able to ob-
tain Tokyo’s support for secret transit and storage arrangements, then why 
 were American decision makers so shy about using the alliance as a conduit 
for pressuring Japan into credibly renouncing nuclear weapons? I take up 
this issue in the following section.
the limits of nonmilitary coercion against japan
Japan’s economic growth empowered it to obtain greater economic and 
technological in de pen dence from the United States by the late 1960s. Con-
sider the following attributes of Japan’s economy. Like West Germany, 
Japan had a balance- of- payments surplus with the United States of approx-
imately $300 million in 1966, benefiting from an additional $300 million to 
$350 million of American military expenditures in its territory.102 Its accu-
mulated growth also created dislocations within the American economy. For 
example, the American textiles industry lost significant market share to Japa-
nese imports. Already in 1961, when Japa nese penetration of the American 
clothing market was negligible and American merchandise trade with Japan 
had a $782 million surplus,  unions demanded stronger trade restrictions 
against Japa nese firms.103 Partly due to the liberalization of American trade 
policy following the Dillon Round and Japan’s export- oriented indus-
trial policy, deficits began characterizing American merchandise trade 
with Japan in 1965.104 Japan also benefited from the Vietnam War thanks to 
both direct and indirect procurement by the United States and other Asian 
countries during the late 1960s.105 The volume of Japa nese exports grew 
from $2.4 billion in 1965 to over $9 billion in 1972.106
In contrast, the American economy suffered stagflation in the 1970s. In-
flation and the unemployment rate both  rose amid sluggish growth. Tight 
monetary policies  were in effec tive at curbing inflation, whereas foreign com-
petition posed a new but significant threat to the automobile, steel, and 
electronics industries. That Japan’s economy relied on exports mattered  little 
for fixing this issue. A member of the NSC observed that “in bilateral nego-
tiations with Japan, Japan is clearly vulnerable to the United States, as it ex-
ports eight times as much of its production to us as we export to it.” Yet he 
cautioned, “We should not conclude from it that our interests are served by 
bludgeoning the Japa nese with a threat to restrict their imports to the United 
States.” Since American total exports  were the largest in the world, any trade 
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conflict with Japan would have “severe implications for us as well.”107 
Simply put, the American and Japa nese economies had become so inter-
dependent as to preclude any meaningful economic sanctions against 
Tokyo,  whether to extract concessions on nuclear policy or other related 
issues.
Japan’s growing economic power partly explains why the United States 
was reluctant to apply pressure through economic and technological chan-
nels. American sensitivity  toward domestic backlash in Japan was another 
 factor. As early as February 1963, American officials discussed the likelihood 
of Japan implementing mea sures that could attenuate the American balance- 
of- payments deficit. As with West Germany, one solution available to Japan 
was to increase its defense expenditures and thus to buy more American 
military hardware. However, two prob lems arose. First, “the increase in the 
Japa nese defense bud get to a level which would permit any large- scale pur-
chasing of US equipment  will take a period of years  because of the necessity 
for creating po liti cal support by the Japa nese  people for a sharp acceleration 
of its defense buildup.” Second, “Even  were the necessary funds available 
to the Japa nese defense authorities,  there may not be a sufficient amount of 
US military hardware that the Japa nese are likely to purchase to offset our 
total expenditures. Much of the materiel they need can be supplied out of 
indigenous production.”108 The alternative mea sures put forward by the 
deputy secretary of defense would have, by his own admission,  either in-
creased the American military bud get or required undesirable changes in 
the American regional force posture.109  These discussions found no resolu-
tion. Negotiating Japa nese offsets also proved challenging, since American 
decision makers felt that too much pressure on Japan to increase military 
expenditures (as one means to redress the balance- of- payments prob lem) 
would be counterproductive.110 And so gold losses and expanding balance- 
of- payments deficits ensured ongoing discussions within the American gov-
ernment over its military expenditures and commitments overseas. Still, such 
deliberations  were never as intense with regard to Japan as they  were with 
West Germany.
Nixon was frustrated with Japa nese intransigence on economic issues. 
Washington did successfully extract trade concessions from Tokyo over tex-
tiles, but only  after acrimonious negotiations.111 In 1969, the United States 
demanded that Japan curb its exports of cheap textiles. Within two years 
Japan fi nally relented and imposed export controls in 1971. Secret accords to 
 settle the dispute early went ignored or  were con ve niently forgotten.112 
Japa nese trade liberalization proceeded slowly in spite of American pressure 
to hasten it.113 Annoyed, in a February 1973 cabinet meeting, Nixon opined 
that Japan was not “being a good partner” and Prime Minister Tanaka was 
not “a good ally.”114 Nixon found him less congenial than his pre de ces sor 
Sato, noting to a colleague that “Tanaka’s a very cocky, jingoistic type, and 
Sato is the old- line, friendly guy, helping the US like Kishi.”115 Kissinger 
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acknowledged that the trade deficit posed a “perennial prob lem.”116 Rela-
tions between the two allies became strained.
Though economic leverage was lacking, Washington had technological le-
verage over Tokyo. Japan wanted American cooperation on civilian nuclear 
technologies and enriched uranium.117 About 90  percent of its imports of ura-
nium and enrichment ser vices came from the United Sates. This coopera-
tion dated back to the Atoms for Peace program, thanks to which the United 
States and Japan negotiated an agreement in 1955 for the supply of enrich-
ment uranium from the United States to Japan as long as Japan returned all 
the spent fuel.118 At the time, the United States recognized that such agree-
ments could create proliferation risks but deci ded that diplomatic consid-
erations had priority. Japan was able to extract plutonium once the Atomic 
Energy Commission permitted the research of small quantities of nuclear 
waste in 1957. The 1955 agreement was amended in 1958 to allow for repro-
cessing in Japan. Ten years  later Japan secured an agreement from the United 
States to exchange information regarding fast breeder technology, which 
would have enabled Japan to generate fissile material more efficiently.119 In 
1972, yet another amendment of the 1955 agreement was negotiated, allow-
ing a new repro cessing fa cil i ty on the provision that the United States could 
legally intervene in that proj ect.120 And so, according to one observer, “a 
[Japa nese] nuclear weapons program could not be attempted by Japan with-
out  either (1) abrogation of existing US- Japanese Atomic Cooperation trea-
ties or (2) full cooperation of the United States.”121 Still, having this leverage 
did not eliminate fears that Japan could divert nuclear energy  toward mili-
tary purposes. For one, as Motoya Kitamura writes, “the United States could 
not forcefully or directly stop Japan if it  were to obtain nuclear bombs, since 
such an attitude would disgust Tokyo and poison the bilateral partner-
ship.”122 For another, India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 alarmed 
Washington precisely  because the device used plutonium gleaned from a Ca-
nadian research reactor.123 To be sure, one major study acknowledges that 
“ there is no evidence that Japa nese plutonium programs  were developed to 
enhance the ability of Japan to build nuclear weapons.”124 Nevertheless, as 
even Japan decision makers had not yet precluded the nuclear option or rat-
ified the NPT, their intentions remained suspect.
Committing Japan to Nonproliferation
Japan’s technological dependence on the United States was the best inhibi-
tor of any nuclear ambitions Japan might have. However, doubts over its 
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation remained throughout much of the 
1970s. I argue that Japan signed the NPT in 1970 not to clarify its stance but 
to fulfill other policy objectives. It ultimately ratified the treaty in 1976 for 
domestic po liti cal reasons.
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signing the npt for nonnuclear reasons
As it had done with West Germany, the Johnson administration encour-
aged Japan to support the NPT. Like West Germany, Japan resisted such de-
mands and objected to the treaty. One objection was how the treaty might 
legitimize a new international hierarchy that would consign nonnuclear 
powers to subordinate status despite their eco nom ical superiority. For Japan, 
this hierarchy was unacceptable while it was growing eco nom ically and the 
nuclear- armed  Great Britain and France— “countries which they considered 
no more prestigious than themselves”— were declining.125 Japan also worried 
about  whether the NPT would damage its civilian nuclear industry. Ameri-
can decision makers noticed, and tried to understand, Japan’s opposition to 
the NPT. In a March 1967 tele gram (conveyed to President Johnson), ambas-
sador Alexis Johnson described the “schizo phre nia of Japan on the nuclear 
proliferation treaty.” Aside from “military considerations,” Japan— like West 
Germany— did not want to see a “ ‘super- powers’ club from which Japan 
 will be forever excluded.” He added that relegation to second- class status 
could “ultimately constitute a power ful incentive to go  after an in de pen dent 
nuclear capability,” as in the case of West Germany. Japan would likely sign 
the NPT, but he cautioned against taking its participation “for granted.”126
Japan’s “schizo phre nia” regarding the NPT reflected a dilemma its gov-
ernment faced. The dilemma was as follows. Supporting the NPT meant 
legitimating the ability of a few states to have nuclear weapons and, by 
extension, Japan’s own reliance on American extended nuclear deterrence. 
Japa nese calls for international disarmament would look hypocritical. Still, 
opposing the NPT was costly. It weakened the nascent nonproliferation 
regime by withholding membership of a major industrial democracy that 
possessed a large civilian nuclear industry. It also made Japan’s nuclear in-
tentions suspect. To resolve this dilemma, Japan signed the treaty in 1970, 
but conditioned its  future ratification on the promotion of nuclear disarma-
ment, security guarantees for nonnuclear weapons states, and equality in 
the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. As George Quester observed 
at the time, “The signature in 1970 has instead been accompanied by state-
ments that ratification  will not come quickly at all, and that no decision in-
deed is to be implied in the mere signature of the treaty.”127
The issue of NPT ratification became dormant afterward. In the meantime, 
incentives for nuclear hedging persisted from an alliance perspective. The 
United States withdrew a troop division from South  Korea, stoking aban-
donment fears among that country’s elites. This withdrawal took place as 
the United States sought to remove itself from Vietnam and shift the defense 
burden onto its East Asian allies  under the Nixon Doctrine. Adding to re-
gional anx i eties was Nixon’s 1972 trip to China. When Japa nese leaders first 
learned of his overtures to China, they worried that a deal would be struck 
at their expense. Displeasing Nixon and Kissinger, who hoped to use Japan 
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as a counterweight to China, Japa nese leaders deci ded to regain the initia-
tive by normalizing relations that same year.128  Under such conditions, Ja-
pan expanded its national centrifuge program and deflected international 
calls to ratify the NPT. Yasuhiro Nakasone, a right- wing politician who 
served as director general of the Japa nese Defense Agency and  later became 
prime minister in 1982, oversaw yet another secret government working 
group to explore the desirability and feasibility of an in de pen dent nuclear 
deterrent.129 Nixon himself was reluctant to push Japan too hard on the NPT. 
He had even supported the prospect of Japan arming itself with nuclear 
weapons as part of a larger effort to balance against communist adversaries 
in East Asia. Kissinger cared  little for Japan.130 Both of them  were ambiva-
lent about the treaty and nuclear proliferation.131
India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” resuscitated American interest in 
nonproliferation. A June 1974 review of the American nonproliferation pol-
icy noted that “Japan and [West Germany] are in a special category— they 
have the nuclear capability to build large numbers of weapons, but strong 
po liti cal inhibitions coupled with the U.S. security relationship make them 
unlikely proliferators in the near- time.”132 It went onto argue that “in Japan, 
early NPT ratification has suffered a setback, but po liti cal inhibitions and 
the interest in maintaining close ties with the U.S., as well as the large por-
tion of its electric power industry that is dependent on continued U.S. fuel 
supplies,  will tend to work against a nuclear weapons decision.” Still, it 
took note of “indications of increasing opposition to ratification.”133 For its 
part, the intelligence community produced a special NIE that stated how 
some leading intelligence officials believed that “Japan would not embark 
on a program of nuclear weapons in the absence of a major adverse shift in 
 great power relationships which presented a Japan with a clearcut [sic] 
threat to its security.” Other intelligence officials saw “a strong chance that 
Japan’s leaders  will conclude that they must have nuclear weapons if they 
are to achieve their national objectives in the developing Asian power bal-
ance. Such a decision could come in the early 1980s.”  These more pessimistic 
observers added that proliferation risks could intensify in the short term 
amid “any concurrent deterioration of Japa nese relations with the Communist 
powers or a further decline in the credibility of U.S. defense guarantees.”134
building a domestic co ali tion for npt ratification
NPT ratification entered the Japa nese Diet’s legislative agenda in Decem-
ber 1974 when Miki— having just replaced Tanaka as prime minister— 
announced his intention to introduce a motion for treaty ratification. Nixon’s 
visit to China and the Arab oil embargo presumably encouraged Miki’s 
decision to reopen debate on this issue. NPT ratification might have even 
served the same purpose for Japan as it did for West Germany. Whereas 
Brandt used the NPT partly to demonstrate his commitment to Ostpolitik, 
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Japa nese leaders might have believed that ratifying the treaty would help 
reassure China. Moreover, the oil embargo made Japan suffer energy short-
ages, as three- fourths of its imported oil came from the  Middle East, thus 
threatening Japan’s ability to sustain economic growth.135 This vulnerabil-
ity gave additional impetus for Japan to develop its civilian nuclear indus-
try and become more energy self- sufficient.136
Miki made his announcement at a peculiar moment in Japa nese politics. 
The LDP had a comfortable majority in the Diet’s lower  house and a thin 
majority in the upper  house, but it was  under turmoil in the wake of the 
Lockheed bribery scandal. This scandal broke out following reports that the 
aerospace com pany used yakuza power brokers (that is, major figures in 
Japa nese or ga nized crime syndicates) to bribe LDP politicians and to secure 
contracts for the purchase of its aircraft. It resulted in the arrest of Miki’s 
pre de ces sor, Tanaka.137 In ordinary circumstances, an LDP prime minister 
would still need to overcome the factionalism that characterized the party 
and to build sufficient support in undertaking any major legislative action. 
The scandal made Miki’s position tenuous, something that risked getting 
worse given the elite discord over the NPT that had already existed. As one 
memorandum intended for Kissinger noted six months  later, “Prime Minis-
ter Miki’s position in the LDP cannot be said to be very strong. This explains 
the difficulty Miki has had getting some of his major bills through the Diet.”138 
Pro- ratification forces included his foreign minister Kiichi Miyazawa and 
more dovish ele ments of the LDP. Outside the LDP, the JSP and the centrist 
po liti cal party Komeito favored the treaty’s ratification. The main opposi-
tion was the conservative nationalist faction Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyuaki (Seiwa 
Political- analysis Council), with prominent critics being the LDP vice presi-
dent, the executive board chairman, such Upper House members as the far- 
right Minoru Genda, and the LDP Foreign Affairs Research Council and the 
Security Affairs Research Council.
The story of Japan’s NPT ratification thereby involves building domestic 
consensus in order to overcome such opposition. Pro- ratification forces 
gained momentum at vari ous junctures when they acquired the support of 
the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and concurrent director of 
the Science and Technology Agency, the chairman of the Japa nese Atomic 
Industry Forum, and the civilian energy industry. The signing of the safe-
guards agreement with the IAEA in early 1975 allayed concerns over  whether 
Japan would face undue restrictions on its peaceful use of atomic energy. 
This agreement allowed Japan to enjoy “parity with EURATOM countries 
in safeguard mea sures” such that Japan could partly inspect itself.139 With 
 these negotiations satisfactorily completed and the high- level bureaucratic 
endorsements received, Miki and other leading party officials personally 
took to rallying other Diet members into supporting the treaty. Boosting this 




The NPT was controversial within the LDP  because of its significance for 
Japa nese security. One may go so far as to claim that the issue of NPT ratifi-
cation was  really a referendum on Japan’s alliance with the United States. 
Treaty skeptics argued that Japan should retain a “ free hand on nuclear de-
vices.” Genda was perhaps the most vocal proponent of this view, contending 
that ratification would place Japan at the mercy of American security 
guarantees— a policy that was antithetical to Japa nese national security.141 
Indeed, critics worried that consenting to nuclear forbearance for twenty- 
five years—as the 1975 NPT Review Conference enjoined— was irresponsi-
ble when the United States could terminate its alliance with Japan at one 
year’s notice.142 Miki dismissed such claims, arguing that having a “ free 
hand” contradicted the spirit of the three nonnuclear princi ples.
Although Miki rejected  these right- wing criticisms, his minister of foreign 
affairs Kiichi Miyazawa used his April 1975 trip to Washington, DC, to obtain 
new security pledges from the United States.143 This trip was successful, as a 
three- point statement released in the Japa nese media suggests: “(1) Both Japan 
and the US are of the judgment that the maintenance of the Security Treaty  will 
be in the interests, when viewed from a long- range standpoint; (2) US nuclear 
war potential is an impor tant deterrent power  toward aggression against Japan 
from the outside; (3) the US attaches importance to its treaty obligations that it 
 will take charge of the defense of Japan in the case of its being attacked by 
nuclear or conventional weapons, and Japan  will also continue to carry out its 
obligations based on the Treaty.”144 Such reassurances  were insufficient for 
pro- ratification legislators to overcome the suspicions and reservations of 
their more skeptical counter parts in the Diet. The most hawkish Diet mem-
bers still insisted that Japan should negotiate new mechanisms with Wash-
ington relating to the introduction of nuclear weapons on Japa nese terri-
tory.145 Accordingly, they voted against the treaty’s ratification, forcing debate 
on the issue to continue for about another year. Still,  these reassurances 
helped solidify a general consensus that spurred further pro gress  toward 
ratification. The Japa nese Diet fi nally ratified the treaty on June 8, 1976.
The April 1975 assurances notwithstanding, the Nixon and Ford admin-
istrations generally stood on the sidelines while the debate over ratification 
unfolded in the Japa nese Diet. Neither administration insisted on the NPT 
as forcefully as the Johnson administration had with re spect to West Ger-
many.146 On the contrary, Nixon and Kissinger remained quiet and provided 
reassurances when asked for them. This subdued disposition reflected their 
awareness that nuclear policy in Japan needed to be handled delicately. To 
avoid any misunderstanding over this issue, Japa nese decision makers even 
insisted that their American counter parts be discreet. In a November 1974 
meeting with Ford and Kissinger, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka stated:
The [Government of Japan] firmly supports the [Mutual Security Treaty], 
which is impor tant not just to the peace and security of Japan, but also Asia. 
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 There is one impor tant prob lem, however, nuclear weapons. Japan and the 
United States began their discussions of this question originally in the con-
text of strategic nuclear weapons, but now tactical nuclear weapons have pro-
liferated, and perhaps we should discuss this  matter from this new point of 
view. I can understand that the Americans and the Eu ro pe ans think about 
this  matter in terms of a dif fer ent kind of perception, but the Japa nese  people 
have a special sensitivity to nuclear weapons, which is mobilized by certain 
po liti cal forces for their own po liti cal ends.147
Although Ford responded by saying that he understood the “special sensi-
tivities of the Japa nese  people,” the Japa nese foreign minister reiterated 
Tanaka’s request  later in that same conversation. Kissinger agreed that “we 
 won’t refer to the nuclear question.”148
 Because of Japan’s advanced industry, civilian nuclear capabilities, and 
history, its 1975 ratification of the NPT represented an impor tant moment 
in the development of the emerging nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, 
Japa nese nuclear interest in proliferation- risky technologies continued. A 
controversy between the United States and Japan developed in 1977 when 
Japan failed to receive American concessions on Japa nese plans for the 
repro cessing of spent nuclear fuel.149 Japan began using French technology 
to develop a small, prototype repro cessing plant at Tokai where it wanted to 
conduct hot tests.150 However, the 1972 agreement gave Washington a  legal 
right to intervene in the repro cessing program.151 The sticking point in ne-
gotiations was Japan’s desire to develop fast breeder technology.152 The ends 
 were arguably peaceful: Japan wanted to master the full nuclear cycle as a 
step  toward reducing its dependence on “imported oil and natu ral uranium” 
in an era of per sis tent energy shortages.153 Prime Minister Fukuda even called 
the situation “a life or death issue.”154 Yet acquiring a nuclear repro cessing 
capability required “US consent as almost all its [Japan’s] spent fuel is US- 
enriched.”155 Although the United States found  these activities at Tokai ob-
jectionable, this issue was po liti cally sensitive in Japan. Such capabilities 
seemed consistent with article 4 of the NPT, which declared that countries 
have a right to seek nuclear power for peaceful purposes. However, some 
far- right members of the ruling LDP saw national self- sufficiency at stake.156 
Moreover, Eu ro pean Community members  were not subject to American 
veto rights over the use of fuels that had American origins. Japan did not 
wish to be subject to discrimination.157
The documentary rec ord remains unclear as to what extent American de-
cision makers feared that Japan represented a genuine proliferation risk in 
light of its interests in mastering the full nuclear cycle. One LDP Diet mem-
ber who accompanied Fukuda on his trip to Washington in early 1977 warned 
that “Japan might require nuclear weapons in view of receding US power 
in Asia.”158 Though this politician had limited influence, the international 
context was not so harmless as to render this statement innocuous. The So-
viet military buildup in Northeast Asia and Car ter’s plans for a full troop 
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withdrawal from neighboring South  Korea still made the American commit-
ment to the region seem suspect.159 What is clear is that American decision 
makers and diplomats saw the controversy emerge as the result of key gaps 
in the global nonproliferation regime, particularly with re spect to plutonium 
storage and the use of spent fuels.160 Similar nuclear- related issues vexed 
American relations with Pakistan, India, and other countries.161 For relations 
with Japan, the potential ramifications  were significant. As one memoran-
dum intended for National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski reported, 
“if Japan  were not allowed to proceed with repro cessing  there would be 
 bitter resentment among the Japa nese  people, grave difficulties in Diet ef-
forts to get IAEA safeguards agreement approved, questions regarding the 
value of the NPT adherence and continuing adherence of NPT, and a serious 
prob lem of de facto discrimination against Japan in  favor of Eu ro pean coun-
tries.”162 The issue was eventually resolved. In September 1977, the two al-
lies negotiated a tentative agreement whereby Japan would operate the 
Tokai fa cil i ty so as to repro cess uranium from existing light  water reactors 
for a two- year trial period. As part of this deal, Japan agreed to postpone its 
plutonium breeder program.163 According to one analy sis, Tokyo got what it 
wanted mostly for geopo liti cal reasons: Washington did not wish to alienate 
it when the Soviet Union was building up military power in the region.164 
Another analy sis holds that Car ter was unwilling to risk the alliance with 
Japan over this issue.165
That Japan was able to maneuver between vari ous domestic and inter-
national constraints in  going about its nuclear activities does not mean its 
military alliance had no inhibiting effect whatsoever. To the contrary, the 
alliance with the United States was an impor tant consideration that  shaped 
Japan’s nuclear decision- making even if active coercion was conspicuously 
absent in this case. Although the Yoshida doctrine was “the heart of Japan’s 
favored model of po liti cal survival,” as Solingen writes, it was predicated 
on American security guarantees being sufficiently robust.166 Nevertheless, 
critics of the NPT argued that Japan should restrict its options in view of their 
doubts about American reliability, whereas even supporters of ratification 
sought reassurances from Washington. The United States had technological 
leverage over Japa nese nuclear activities, but it desisted from actively using 
that leverage to reduce the proliferation risks associated with Japan’s being 
able to repro cess plutonium.
Summary and Alternative Arguments
With the American military campaign in Vietnam failing, uncertainty regard-
ing American alliance commitments pushed Japan to hedge on nuclear 
weapons. The resulting ambiguity bothered American decision makers, but 
they could not apply nonmilitary pressure— especially economic sanctions— 
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without inflicting harm on the American economy. Washington did have 
direct leverage over Japan’s nuclear capabilities. However, as much as this 
leverage might have restricted Japan’s freedom of maneuver, the United 
States was reluctant to use it actively in order to extract nonproliferation con-
cessions. Consistent with my theory’s explanations, Japan fi nally renounced 
nuclear weapons by ratifying the NPT when its leaders felt that it served 
Japan’s interest, in de pen dent of American pressure. Simply put, alliance co-
ercion was not a big part of this story, and the United States— whatever its 
leverage— appears to have refrained from using its policy levers for the sake 
of nonproliferation.
The alternative explanations vary in their ability to account for how Ja-
pan developed its nuclear capabilities before ratifying the NPT in 1976. To 
begin with, the adversary thesis fares poorly. Sino- Japanese relations did im-
prove rather quickly in the early 1970s such that the two adversaries nor-
malized their diplomatic ties in 1972.167 Of course, such rapprochement need 
not automatically entail a cessation of nuclear hedging  because, by its na-
ture, the strategy serves to provide some insurance in case of unfavorable 
geopo liti cal events. However, from the perspective of the adversary thesis, 
the irony of the NPT ratification is that the Soviet threat to Japan intensified 
shortly thereafter. Moscow reasserted its claims over the disputed Northern 
Territories— a group of islands that the Soviet Union annexed  after Japan sur-
rendered in World War II— and threatened Japa nese sea- lanes of communi-
cations. Responding to what it saw as an anti- Soviet triumvirate between 
the United States, Japan, and China, the Soviet Union undertook a massive 
military buildup in its far east. This buildup comprised thirty- one troop di-
visions, over two thousand warplanes, and about 750 military vessels, fifty 
of which  were nuclear- powered submarines.168 The buildup continued into 
1978 with the added deployment of supersonic long- range bombers, an air-
craft carrier, and the construction of a new port and a major airstrip. Diplo-
matic provocations accompanied this buildup: border transgressions became 
more frequent, and the Soviet Union garrisoned marines on the Northern 
Territories. The Soviet Union even practiced military maneuvers that in-
cluded a mock island invasion only 125 kilo meters north of the Japa nese 
island of Hokkaido.169
Though Japa nese leaders might not have anticipated  these Soviet provo-
cations before 1976, the adversary thesis might seem to explain why Japan 
sought proliferation- risky technologies with its repro cessing plant. Yet this 
initiative built on existing efforts by Tokyo to improve its nuclear activities. 
The extent to which Soviet be hav ior renewed interest in repro cessing among 
Japa nese decision makers is unclear given the available documentary rec ord. 
What nuclear activities tran spired at this time already had their origins in the 
decisions made, and policies that began, in the late 1960s. The adversary 
thesis makes more sense of how Japan had begun investing in conventional 
military, with special attention to air and naval power, at this time.170
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The domestic politics and prestige  theses might not have as much utility 
as some might believe. To be sure, the former best accounts for the timing of 
the NPT ratification, since Japa nese leaders believed that a domestic co ali tion 
backing the treaty was pos si ble in the Diet. However, members of this would-
be co ali tion needed first to see a special safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
and additional assurances from the United States before they could vote in 
 favor of treaty ratification. Even though members of the Japa nese public be-
came more disapproving of nuclear weapons over time, the Yoshida Doctrine 
was hardly a settled manner among decision makers.  After all, the Yoshida 
Doctrine is practicable only if American security guarantees are strong 
enough for Japan to depend militarily on the United States. For its part, the 
prestige thesis pulls in opposite directions: whereas a nuclear allergy might 
have developed within the Japa nese body politic, Japa nese decision makers 
sometimes did see nuclear technology as having intrinsic value, since they 
complained that the treaty would deny emerging  great powers like Japan ac-
cess to nuclear weapons when declining ones like  Great Britain  were allowed 
to keep theirs. This point should not be overstated: Japa nese leaders have 
occasionally used their stated support for nuclear disarmament as a means to 
reduce the status of nuclear weapons. They also have believed that nuclear 
power would address Japan’s energy needs. Still, Japa nese attitudes  toward 
nuclear weapons even in the 1970s  were not unequivocally antinuclear. Al-
most half of respondents in a 1976 poll expressed discomfort regarding how 
Japan did not have nuclear weapons, prompting one observer to comment 
that Japan’s nuclear allergy is a “flexible phenomenon.”171
The biggest weakness of the domestic politics and prestige  theses is that 
they treat Japan’s latent nuclear capability  either as the result of technologi-
cal determinism or as some sort of deus ex machina. Rather, it was the out-
come of a successful strategy that smacked of nuclear proliferation– related 
be hav ior— one that emphasized the development of enrichment and repro-
cessing capabilities. Unfortunately, analysts who have investigated Japan’s 
nuclear history have underappreciated this key dimension to Japan’s be-
hav ior in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In other wise excellent studies of 
Sato’s nuclear diplomacy, Ayako Kusunoki, Yukinori Komine, and Fintan 
Hoey overlook the nuclear capabilities that Japan was developing during 
that period in their vari ous historiographical writings.172 Similarly, Maria 
Rost Rublee understates Japa nese nuclear capabilities despite reaching con-
clusions that approximate my own about Japan’s complex decision to ratify 
the NPT.173 And so Jennifer Lind’s observation that many analysts have un-
derestimated Japan’s dexterity in the conventional military domain applies 
just as well as to the nuclear domain.174
American credibility in East Asia suffered in the late 1960s and the 1970s, 
thereby undermining Japan’s sense of security. Two additional data points 
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are worth considering: Taiwan and South  Korea. Taiwan also moved  toward 
nuclear weapons acquisition following the Chinese 1964 nuclear detonation. 
South  Korea did not react to events in 1964 in the same way as Japan and 
Taiwan, but its leaders did act on their own assessments of American cred-
ibility during the late 1960s and the 1970s. Chapter 5 explores this case.
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chapter 5
South  Korea, 1968–1980
If Germany and Japan  were highly dependent on the United States during 
the Cold War, as some scholars claim, then South  Korea should have had 
even less  free rein in determining its foreign and defense policies. It relied 
on American- led forces to expel North Korean forces from its territory in 
the Korean War. Thereafter it signed a defense pact with the United States 
and hosted American tactical nuclear weapons as well as over fifty thousand 
American troops during the 1960s. The United States even had command of 
South Korean forces in peacetime and in war time during the Cold War. South 
 Korea was also much poorer than West Germany and Japan. Having endured 
Japa nese colonialism and devastation in the Korean War, South  Korea only 
began to industrialize in the 1960s and so depended on the United States 
for its economic and technological needs.
Notwithstanding  these conditions, South  Korea was able to engage in 
nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior. It undertook feasibility studies to 
explore nuclear weapons development in 1970. Two years  later, it began 
devoting resources  toward their acquisition. This program lasted several 
years before its cancellation in 1975 and the accompanying decision to rat-
ify the NPT. However,  these actions did not mark the end of South  Korea’s 
proliferation- related be hav ior. Suspicions of a nuclear program reemerged 
in the late 1970s when a major domestic debate erupted briefly in South 
 Korea over its defense policy. Even in the early 1980s South  Korea  violated 
safeguard agreements when it conducted plutonium research.
The South Korean case further validates my theoretical framework. First, 
the military alliance with the United States on its own did not deter South 
 Korea from seeking nuclear weapons. Second, American troop deployments 
 were integral in shaping perceptions of American security guarantees in 
South  Korea. Whereas troop numbers fell by a third during the early 1970s, 
the number of American tactical nuclear weapons remained stable. Third, 
American coercion of South  Korea resulted in the dismantling of much of the 
nuclear program, underdeveloped as it might have been, but uncertainty 
abounds as to  whether the United States successfully suppressed all of its 
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activities. Fourth, Washington managed the South Korean proliferation most 
effectively through nonmilitary instruments. Nevertheless, the application 
of such tools did not fully prevent unwanted proliferation- related be hav ior 
 after the mid-1970s.
Before assessing the case evidence, I describe the strategic and domestic 
context that South Korean leaders faced to clarify the predictions of the al-
ternative explanations. The analy sis then proceeds in two parts so as to in-
vestigate separately why and how South  Korea began and ended its nuclear 
activities.
The Strategic Context
Following the July 1953 armistice that ended the active stage of the Korean 
War, the United States signed a new alliance treaty with South  Korea and 
established a large troop presence on its territory. Yet postwar South  Korea 
was in a precarious economic condition. Relative to the North, it was poor 
and lacked industry. Recognizing this disparity, American decision makers 
recognized the need to develop South  Korea eco nom ically and so coupled 
military support with economic aid.1 Nevertheless, South  Korea did not rely 
exclusively on American aid. Shortly  after taking power through a coup in 
1961, Park used his military dictatorship to commit his country to a statist, 
export- oriented program that generated rapid economic growth and indus-
trialization.2 South  Korea’s industrial capacity increased several- fold by the 
end of the 1960s.
Despite the alliance and the armistice, South  Korea’s geopo liti cal environ-
ment remained threatening. North  Korea was conventionally superior and 
enjoyed the patronage of both the Soviet Union and China. A Chinese oc-
cupation force remained in North  Korea  until 1958, during which time North 
 Korea repaired its economy.  After the withdrawal of Chinese forces, Kim 
Il- sung signed mutual defense treaties with both communist powers before 
eventually siding with China in the Sino- Soviet split. This realignment was 
significant: not only did China pursue a confrontational foreign policy to-
ward its neighbors, it also succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons by 1964. 
By the late 1960s, North  Korea resumed an aggressive foreign policy directed 
against American and South Korean interests. Hoping to undermine the an-
ticommunist alliance and incite an insurgency in the South, North  Korea 
initiated irregular warfare in the area around the Korean Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ) in 1968. Aside from a series of border skirmishes that took place over 
three years, the North Korean government attempted to assassinate Park 
in an incident called the Blue House raid on January 17, 1968 whereby 
North Korean forces sneaked  behind the American forces along the DMZ to 
make an attempt on his life in his residence. One week  later, North Korean 
patrol boats captured the USS Pueblo and its American crew in international 
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 waters. Despite the close timing of  these events, the Johnson administration 
believed that Pyongyang did not want war, preferring instead to harass 
American forces and challenge the American military presence in East Asia.3 
However, when North Korean fighter jets shot down an American EC-121 
reconnaissance aircraft, some members of the Nixon administration believed 
that the retaliatory use of force was fi nally necessary.4 Though Washington 
deci ded against a military response, its decision makers noted Seoul’s height-
ened threat perceptions. Nixon observed that the mood in South  Korea was 
“very jittery.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earl Wheeler 
commented that “they are apprehensive we  won’t do anything.”5
 These North Korean provocations took place against the backdrop of the 
Vietnam War. South  Korea provided significant military assistance to the 
United States in that conflict, having at one point about fifty thousand troops 
in Vietnam. Several reasons explain the magnitude of South  Korea’s military 
contributions. First, Johnson wanted South  Korea to share the burden of 
fighting the war.6 Second, for  these contributions, Seoul received considerable 
increases in American economic and military assistance.7 It also received as-
surances regarding its received security commitments.8 Third, Park shared 
American concerns that the fates of East Asian states in the strug gle against 
transnational communism  were linked. American success in Vietnam would, 
 after all, strengthen the anticommunist co ali tion in the region.
 Because the North was still the more power ful of the two  Koreas, the 
American military presence improved the local conventional balance of 
power in the South’s  favor. Reducing that military presence would have 
weakened the South’s position vis- à- vis the North. Still, American tactical 
nuclear weapons  were stationed so as to provide nuclear extended deter-
rence. My framework expects that changes to American conventional mili-
tary deployments would animate Seoul’s nuclear interest. The adversary thesis 
would look to North Korean aggression as being the main driver instead.
The Domestic Context
For the period I examine, Park led a repressive military dictatorship follow-
ing a coup d’état in 1960.  Under his leadership, South  Korea became a “de-
velopmental” state, whereby government forges alliances with  labor and 
industry, protects fledgling export industries, and establishes a large gov-
ernment bureaucracy to oversee the private sector. Though Chal mers 
Johnson describes neighboring Japan as an archetype of the developmental 
state, other observers have extended the label to South  Korea.9 This “Asian 
Tiger” maintained high growth rates between the 1960s and the 1990s largely 
by strengthening  those industries that produced export goods intended for 
rich industrialized states.10 According to the domestic politics thesis, South 
 Korea should not engage in nuclear weapons activities at all so as not to 
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compromise such export- dependent strategies.  Because South  Korea was 
an autocracy in an intense security environment, norms might have been 
permissive enough such that antinuclear or antimilitarist beliefs did not 
resonate among members of South Korean society. Consistent with the 
prestige thesis, Park was likely an oppositional nationalist who might see 
nuclear weapons as being inherently valuable.
Nuclear Proliferation– Related Be hav ior: Proj ect 890
With its newfound nuclear interest, the South Korean government founded 
in the early 1970s two new defense agencies, the Agency for Defense Devel-
opment (ADD) and the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC), to deter-
mine  whether to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. In 1972, a nuclear 
weapons program began in earnest.11
By this time, South  Korea had a nascent civilian nuclear program with very 
limited access to nuclear materials throughout the 1960s. As a beneficiary of 
Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative, Seoul acquired a small nuclear reac-
tor in 1956. This reactor could not generate civilian energy, let alone pro cess 
materials necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. It was  under surveillance 
by the IAEA when South  Korea joined that organ ization in 1956. Instead, 
South  Korea used the reactor for peaceful scientific research and creating ra-
dioisotopes for medical and agricultural purposes. Access to this technology 
also raised hopes for the  future acquisition of civilian nuclear power.12 To 
make further pro gress in nuclear research, South  Korea established the Ko-
rean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and the Office of Atomic 
Energy. With American assistance, South  Korea built a General Dynamics– 
designed 250- kilowatt research reactor. In the late 1960s Seoul began a major 
initiative directed at mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. Its aim was to construct 
a 500- megawatt electric nuclear power plant (the Kori 1) and study nuclear 
fuel fabrication and repro cessing by 1976.13 KAERI already had a twelve- year 
plan for achieving national energy autonomy thanks to a uranium enrich-
ment factory and a repro cessing fa cil i ty that would be operational by 1981. As 
in Japan, such initiatives arguably aimed to address South  Korea’s increas-
ing energy needs to support economic growth. In fact, KAERI sought Amer-
ican support for its nuclear research.14 However, the activities of the newly 
created WEC suggest a dramatic change in Seoul’s nuclear intentions.
By 1972, South  Korea started mobilizing military, academic, and indus-
trial resources  toward the production of nuclear weapons.15 However, the 
program— called Proj ect 890— soon encountered several technical challenges. 
One prob lem was South  Korea’s limited access to the sensitive nuclear ma-
terials needed to produce a weapon. For much of South  Korea’s history of 
nuclear research  until then, the United States was a major source of nuclear 
technology and fuel.  Because of expected American opposition to this new 
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initiative, Seoul had to find alternative suppliers to acquire a repro cessing 
capability. To this end, it directed the minister of science and technology to 
enlist the technical cooperation of France and  Great Britain in building a 
repro cessing fa cil i ty. Furthermore, South  Korea sent representatives to other 
nuclear- capable countries such as Canada and Israel.  These initiatives  were 
successful in procuring foreign assistance. By 1974, South  Korea signed a 
contract with the French com pany Saint Gobain Technique Nouvelle to ac-
quire the design of a repro cessing fa cil i ty and another contract with the Bel-
gian com pany Belgonucléaire for mixed nuclear fuel fabrication facilities.16 
South Korean scientists  were also able to secure the import of the heavy 
 water reactor (the NRX) from Canada. Having this type of reactor would en-
able South  Korea to produce weapon- grade plutonium.17 Still, the nuclear 
program remained largely aspirational in 1974.18
Explaining South  Korea’s Be hav ior: Initiation
Seoul acted on concerns over its received commitments. At this time, the sit-
uation facing the United States in Vietnam appeared increasingly futile. 
The attritional warfare produced high numbers of casualties on both sides 
of the conflict. Partly  because the military relied on conscription to support 
the campaign, members of the American public became increasingly critical 
of their country’s involvement in the war. Taking advantage of  these senti-
ments, a signature aspect of Nixon’s successful presidential election cam-
paign in 1968 was his pledge to end the Vietnam War. As president, Nixon 
believed that an American withdrawal from Vietnam could be achieved only 
if a workable arrangement existed that guaranteed South Vietnam’s secu-
rity.19 Amid faltering negotiations with the North Viet nam ese and increasing 
domestic pressure, Nixon initiated a strategy of phased troop withdrawals 
and increased reliance on Viet nam ese troops.20 Such was the context of 
the Nixon Doctrine, which stated that although the United States would 
maintain its treaty commitments and continue to provide extended nuclear 
deterrence, it would ask its allies to contribute more  toward their own secu-
rity needs. Yet the Nixon Doctrine was arguably the culmination of a deeper 
trend in American defense policy  toward South  Korea.  After all, Johnson had 
already commissioned an internal report to reevaluate the alliance. It sug-
gested reducing the American presence to one division by 1973.21
To clarify the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon communicated with key decision 
makers in East Asia.22 On August 21, 1969, Nixon met with President Park 
in San Francisco to discuss the American– South Korean relationship and 
“elaborate on my new policy  toward Asia.” Nixon told Park that “we  will 
not retreat from the Pacific area and we  will not reduce commitments.” How-
ever, he noted that South Korean “efforts  toward military and economic 
self- reliance are the correct road to take.” Park reminded Nixon that the 
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American troop presence deterred Kim Il- sung from invading the South and 
argued that Kim Il- sung was provoking the United States to reduce its mili-
tary presence. When Park asked about troop withdrawals from  Korea, his 
remarks elicited no direct response from Nixon. Indeed, Nixon knew he was 
vague and imprecise in his conversation with Park. At one point he admitted 
to Park that his comment about American military commitments was a “gen-
eral statement.”23 Still, within several months, Nixon alerted National Secu-
rity Adviser Henry Kissinger that “the time has come to reduce our Korean 
presence” by “half.” Nixon desired this change in policy for some time, but 
he had to wait some time  after the shooting down of the EC-121.24 A National 
Security Decision Memorandum in March 1970 noted the need to remove 
one of the two infantry divisions from South  Korea by the  middle of 1971.25
South  Korea’s insecurity subsequently deepened. It already faced a dan-
gerous threat environment since the conventionally superior North was be-
having provocatively  under Chinese patronage. Hence Seoul was worried 
about the implications of the partial withdrawal.26 Before implementing 
it, the Nixon administration made several consultations with South  Korea. 
When Wheeler mentioned the possibility of  these cuts to Park, the South 
Korean president expressed “concern at the prospect of a pull- out or sub-
stantial reduction in American troops in  Korea” and commented that war 
would be “inevitable” following the withdrawal of American troops. Yet 
Wheeler noted that Park was also “contradictory” in adding that South 
 Korea would have to provide its own deterrent and defense capability.27 
Interestingly, an examination of the discussions between representatives of 
the two governments reveals that South Korean leaders did not expect any 
troop withdrawals. According to Chae- jin Lee, “Park left San Francisco 
with the belief that Nixon, despite his plan for Vietnamization, would not 
withdraw US troops from South  Korea so long as South Korean troops re-
mained in Vietnam and that if he eventually deci ded to do so, it would only 
take place  after full consultation with South  Korea in advance.”28
That Washington sent mixed signals is one pos si ble reason for Seoul’s ap-
parent lack of foresight. That is, South Korean decision makers  were not 
emotionally prepared for the troop withdrawal  because they had received 
some indications that none  were forthcoming. On the one hand, Secretary 
of Defense Melvin Laird noted to his South Korean interlocutors that “pres-
sures for reduction of our forces in  Korea are increasing,” adding that “[South 
Korean] forces should be modernized before we withdraw any of our forces.” 
The domestic pressures to which Laird referred emphasized the magnitude 
of the financial costs associated with maintaining such a large troop pres-
ence. On the other hand, Laird did not say that “decisions [about troop with-
drawals] had been made or that  there would be any immediate US troop 
withdrawals.”29 Moreover, Seoul might have believed that contributing more 
than two infantry divisions to the war in Vietnam would have spared it from 
unfavorable alliance adjustments. Park was already disappointed that he 
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did not receive the military modernization assistance that the United States 
had promised in the so- called Brown Memorandum.30 In the event that ad-
justments would take place, South Korean leaders appeared to believe that 
discussions about troop reductions from South  Korea would take place 
 after the Vietnam War was over.31
South Korean decision makers previously believed that their participation 
in the Vietnam War would ensure a sustained American military presence. As 
one Korean- language secondary source argues, “The government (of South 
 Korea) was aware of the effects of the Nixon Doctrine, and calculated that any 
discussions leading to downsizing of the US troops would happen  after the 
end of the Vietnam War. . . .  The government thought by committing more 
than two infantry divisions to Vietnam (about the same size as the US forces 
in  Korea), withdrawal of the US troops from South  Korea would not occur.”32
Confusing messages and dashed expectations clarify why Seoul reacted 
harshly when Nixon fi nally announced the withdrawal of one combat divi-
sion. With a timetable set for June 1971, the withdrawal would effectively 
cut the number of American troops on the peninsula from sixty- one thou-
sand to forty thousand. Park protested and claimed that this announcement 
came as a “profound shock.”33 To assuage concerns over American security 
guarantees to South  Korea, Nixon wrote a personal letter to Park, promis-
ing to obtain congressional approval for greater military assistance to South 
 Korea and its efforts to modernize its army. However, Park suggested to the 
American ambassador to South  Korea William Porter that without know-
ing the “nature and extent of modernization he cannot agree to any with-
drawals.” Park further added that the uncertainty induced by even a partial 
withdrawal and the lack of a  viable modernization program would weaken 
his domestic position. He then asked for the United States to delay its deci-
sion for another five years.34
Park repeated this argument for several months with other American of-
ficials. Some of  these officials disliked his “hard line re sis tance” and his “lack 
of sensitivity to American domestic prob lems bearing on this  matter.”35 Yet 
 those officials also expressed a lack of understanding of the South Korean po-
sition. During one high- level meeting, Park argued that the troop withdrawal 
appeared inconsistent with earlier American assurances to South  Korea. Am-
bassador Porter responded that “from our point of view [the South Korean 
government] seems to lack confidence in US intentions and our statements, 
and we do not understand why.”36 Even worse, some efforts to allay South 
Korean concerns backfired. In an August 1970 press conference held in Seoul, 
Vice President Spiro Agnew deepened the uncertainty when he declared 
his government’s intention to withdraw all American troops from the pen-
insula within five years.37 Thus, in December 1970, South Korean prime min-
ister Jong Pil Kim told Kissinger that “every one in  Korea understood [the 
withdrawal] meant a detachment of the US commitment to support [South] 
 Korea and in effect the reestablishment of an Asian defense system.”38
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The partial withdrawal was not the only reason why Seoul became ap-
prehensive of American security guarantees. First, Washington was scaling 
down its military presence all across East Asia in light of its military failure 
in Indochina. Second, American efforts at pursuing rapprochement with 
China created further unease over the  future role that the United States 
would play in East Asia. Due to growing cleavages over communist doctrine 
and foreign policy interests, relations between Moscow and Beijing deterio-
rated to the point where Mao saw the United States as a lesser threat than its 
erstwhile ally. The Sino- Soviet split afforded Washington an opportunity to 
tilt the balance of power further against the Soviet Union. Nixon recognized 
the growing need to reach out to the Chinese in a 1967 Foreign Affairs piece that 
he had written as a presidential candidate.39 Shortly  after becoming president, 
Nixon used secure diplomatic channels to advance this initiative.40 Though 
this was a pragmatic policy change for the United States, South Korean lead-
ers felt threatened by the prospect of American rapprochement with China.41 
Specifically, they  were worried that Washington would grant Beijing greater 
leeway in East Asia and accept its request for the American withdrawal from 
 Korea.42 Indeed, the American partial withdrawal likely magnified South Ko-
rean unease over the Sino- American rapprochement.43
In the absence of direct evidence, some readers might be unsatisfied with 
the connection between American partial withdrawals and South Korean 
nuclear activities. Yet other aspects of South  Korea’s be hav ior at this time 
are worth considering, since South  Korea could also respond to its concerns 
over American security guarantees with other actions that might seem re-
taliatory or vindictive.
Consider how Seoul tried to complicate American efforts to change its re-
gional force posture. To begin with, the documentary rec ord is replete with 
examples of South Korean leaders seeking new reassurances from the United 
States.  These requests  were particularly salient when officials representing 
South  Korea and the United States discussed modernization programs for 
the South Korean military. Specifically, they desired greater American sup-
port for the modernization of the South Korean military and stronger assur-
ances regarding American security commitments. Oftentimes  these goals 
 were explic itly linked: Park wanted American deployments to remain un-
changed  until the South Korean military was sufficiently modernized.44 
Yet  these demands elicited a mixed response from the United States. Not-
withstanding the finality of the troop withdrawal plans, American decision 
makers sent mixed signals about expanding military assistance to South 
 Korea. For example, in a letter to Park intended to placate the South Korean 
leader’s concerns about American security commitments, Nixon wrote of 
the significant domestic pressure he faced to reallocate burdens among al-
lies. He noted that “the level of military assistance for  Korea provided by 
the Congress [sic]  under the last military assistance appropriation has been 
less than we considered desirable.” This explanation did not deter Nixon 
cHAPter 5
118
from adding, “Subject to Congressional approval, I propose to provide sub-
stantially higher military assistance over the period 1971–75 for Korean 
modernization. Moreover provided your Government assumes a larger de-
fense burden we are also prepared to consider some increased economic as-
sistance.”45 In effect, Nixon was promising more than what he could pro-
vide. And so, unsurprisingly, Park  later asked Ambassador Porter for 
greater clarification regarding the “nature and extent of modernization” of 
South Korean military forces.46 Park even threatened noncooperation in re-
duction talks should negotiations over South Korean military moderniza-
tion prove to be unsatisfactory.47 The desire for stronger assurances consti-
tuted a major theme in South  Korea’s diplomacy  toward the United States 
just as it began to consider nuclear weapons research.
South  Korea’s desire for stronger assurances persisted throughout the year. 
Interestingly, its diplomacy softened shortly  after the establishment of ADD 
and WEC in August 1970.48 The most palatable change occurred in early No-
vember, when, following a pre sen ta tion by Porter on the status of troop 
withdrawals and the military modernization package, Park appeared “ac-
quiescent.”49 He even “abandon[ed] efforts to obtain diplomatic assurances 
regarding US troop reductions.” Rogers thus observed that “he has prob ably 
realized that  there is no chance that we  will reconsider our positions and that 
further adamancy on his part could cost him heavi ly with both our Congress 
and the Korean electorate. What ever the reasons for Park’s apparent acqui-
escence, the result is entirely favorable.”50 The explanations offered by mem-
bers of the State Department seem plausible, but Park might have begun 
treating  these troop withdrawals as inevitable.
This new understanding between the two allies did not ease their rela-
tions, however. With the date for implementing the troop withdrawals ap-
proaching in early 1971, American government officials complained of the 
South Korean government’s “delaying tactics” in deploying replacement 
troops along the DMZ.51 Ironically, South  Korea began implementing its own 
troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. This action frustrated American of-
ficials for some of the same reasons expressed by the South Korean govern-
ment in 1970. Ambassador Porter’s successor stated that he “requested [the 
South Korean government] not move suddenly with decisions or announce-
ments of further withdrawals. [Acting minister of foreign affairs Yun Sok- 
Hon] said that they had no intention of making known their plans at this 
time. I reminded him I had already seen articles in newspapers, sourced to 
officials, that his government was planning withdrawals in ’72 and mention-
ing [the South Viet nam ese government’s] request for their retention. It 
struck me this kind of loose talk was not helpful. He agreed but did not leave 
with any assurance it would cease.”52 Furthermore, South  Korea resumed 
its efforts to extract even more assurances from the United States.53 Despite 




Summary and Alternative Arguments
South  Korea’s rec ord of nuclear interest demonstrates the primacy of alli-
ance politics. The alliance broke down so as to encourage South  Korea to 
seek nuclear weapons. Specifically, the Nixon Doctrine entailed some shift 
of American conventional military assets away from East Asia. Its impact 
on South Korean security interests  toward the region became manifest with 
Nixon’s announced withdrawal of one troop division from the Korean 
peninsula. Documents show that the South Korean government reacted 
harshly to this change in American force posture, demonstrating the impor-
tance of in- theater conventional military deployments for extended nuclear 
security guarantees. South Korean leaders, especially Park, responded by 
adopting a set of mea sures: they repeatedly sought verbal reassurances 
from their American interlocutors, they threatened to unilaterally with-
draw South Korean troops from Vietnam, they engaged in foot- dragging 
to slow American withdrawal from the region, and, more importantly, they 
established the WEC and the ADD to oversee an eventual nuclear weapons 
program.
The adversary thesis would argue that South  Korea responded primarily 
to the threat posed by adversaries rather than to unfavorable changes in 
American security guarantees. At first blush, this counterargument seems 
to have some merit, since North  Korea intensified its provocations in the late 
1960s. However, it had long maintained a threatening posture  under Kim 
Il- sung’s leadership, and its patron, China, behaved aggressively through-
out the de cade, including border clashes with India and its 1964 nuclear 
detonation. The North Korean threat was necessary but insufficient for 
South  Korea’s nuclear interest; indeed, its salience made the announce-
ment of American troop withdrawals even more alarming. Abandonment 
fears, rather than the threats alone, led South  Korea to engage in nuclear 
proliferation– related be hav ior.54
An instructive irony exists in the case of South  Korea. In the late 1960s, 
American conventional deterrence against North  Korea might have pre-
vented full- scale invasion, but it barely thwarted other provocations.  After 
the Blue House raid, Park was unnerved by Johnson’s reluctance to respond 
against the Pyongyang military. He voiced his frustrations to the former 
deputy secretary of defense Cyrus Vance. Writing to Johnson, Vance noted, 
“Highly emotional volatile, frustrated and introspective, Park wanted to 
obtain from me a pledge for the United States to join his Government in 
instant, punitive, and retaliatory actions against North  Korea in the event of 
another Blue House raid or comparable attack on some other impor tant 
South Korean economic, governmental, or military fa cil i ty. He wanted my 
assurance of an ‘automatic’ US response in the event of another serious raid 
against the ROK [Republic of  Korea]. I refused to give any such assurances.” 
Park partially blamed the United States for the Blue House raid itself.55 
cHAPter 5
120
Nevertheless, this rec ord of deterrence failure was insufficient for pushing 
Park Chung- hee to start a nuclear weapons program. The real push came 
when the United States weakened its conventional deterrent even when the 
number of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula remained unchanged. 
The adversary thesis cannot explain why South  Korea would seek nuclear 
weapons following conventional military reductions when the presence of 
tactical nuclear weapons remained stable.
The domestic politics thesis fares poorly in illuminating Seoul’s decision 
to start a nuclear weapons program. Park should not have begun a nuclear 
weapons program at all,  because his po liti cal survival depended on his 
export- oriented economic program. Although South  Korea was very sensi-
tive to positive and negative economic inducements, as we  will see  later in 
this chapter, Park was willing to compromise his own preferred model of 
economic development when alliance commitments appeared uncertain. In-
deed, if Park valued economic development so much, why would he jeo-
pardize it by having a nuclear weapons program in the first place? Although 
the program was secret, its usefulness as a deterrent required Seoul to re-
veal its nuclear activities eventually.
The prestige thesis is more valid.  After all, the strategic benefit that 
Park was hoping to gain from nuclear weapons remains unclear. With 
Seoul located so close to the DMZ, South  Korea lacks strategic depth and 
therefore would have not absorbed a retaliatory strike from at least one of 
North  Korea’s allies, the Soviet Union or China. If North  Korea  were to 
have matched South Korean nuclear efforts, then the South Korean nu-
clear threat would lose credibility. Also uncertain are the conditions  under 
which they would have revealed the program. Much like the doomsday 
device in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove, the utility of the arsenal would 
have been limited at best if adversaries  were ignorant of it. Perhaps South 
 Korea would have had what Vipin Narang describes as a catalytic nuclear 
posture, whereby Seoul would mobilize its nuclear forces so as to provoke 
an American intervention on its behalf in the event of a military crisis.56 
Yet such a hypothesis is highly speculative when Park other wise fits the 
profile of an oppositional nationalist. One description of him alludes to 
“his revolutionary ideological vision of ‘rich nation, strong army’ ”; de-
scribes his leadership style as “more Nietzschian”; calls him a patriotic 
“populist . . .  critical of his  people’s alleged passivity.”57 That said, the 
prestige thesis cannot account for the timing of his interest in nuclear 
weapons. Park might have seen nuclear weapons as some sort of military 
cure- all without a clear understanding of the doctrinal and operational 
implications associated with the possession of  these weapons. This na-
iveté could have reflected an overabundance of faith that nuclear weap-
ons could resolve South  Korea’s strategic prob lems. Such a view is not 




Alliance Coercion and South  Korea
South  Korea did not succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. Why? Conven-
tional accounts of this proliferation episode emphasize the degree to which 
South  Korea was vulnerable to American coercion. As the following analy-
sis demonstrates, notwithstanding the uncertain size of South  Korea’s nu-
clear program, this view is largely correct. Nevertheless, this instance of 
counterproliferation success should not be overstated. To begin with, the 
Ford administration executed a counterproliferation that combined reassur-
ance and coercion. In acknowledging the importance of providing military 
commitments to South  Korea, the Ford administration leveraged South 
 Korea’s economic and technological dependence on the United States to ex-
tract counterproliferation commitments. Unfortunately, the Car ter adminis-
tration risked jeopardizing this rather successful effort by one- upping the 
Nixon Doctrine with its proposal to withdraw fully from the Korean Penin-
sula. As such, mystery abounds as to  whether South Korean nuclear activi-
ties  really did end during the Ford administration.
the ford administration’s multifaceted 
counterproliferation effort
The United States detected the nascent program by the end of 1974. In 
November 1974, it was aware that South  Korea was acquiring a type of 
Canadian nuclear reactor that “was most vulnerable to clandestine diver-
sion.” Nevertheless, an NSC memorandum expressed satisfaction over 
the safeguards implemented on American- and Canadian- supplied nuclear 
facilities to South  Korea.58 An internal Department of State memorandum 
circulated in October 1974 on South  Korea made no mention of a nuclear 
weapons program.59 However, a tele gram sent two months  later from the 
American embassy in Seoul alerted the secretary of state to South  Korea’s 
nuclear activities.60 It added that “evidence accumulated that the [South] 
Korean [government] has deci ded to proceed with the initial phases of a nu-
clear weapons program.” On February 28, 1975, the NSC agreed with the 
embassy’s assessment and asserted that South  Korea’s nuclear activities 
would have a “decidedly destabilizing effect in Northeast Asia.”61
With knowledge of the nuclear program, the Ford administration directed 
a counterproliferation effort against South  Korea. The strategy underpinning 
this effort focused on achieving four objectives. The first objective was to 
force the termination of the South Korean nuclear program “through uni-
lateral US action and through the development of common supplier nation 
policies.” The second objective was to resolve informational issues and force 
Seoul to become more transparent in its uses of nuclear material. Greater 
transparency helped to advance a third objective: ensuring that South  Korea 
could not restart its nuclear weapons program at a  future date when the 
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current controversy subsided. The fourth objective concerned the very issue 
that prompted the nuclear program in the first place. Washington had to al-
lay skepticism over the reliability of its security commitments.62 What gave 
special impetus for this counterproliferation effort was the Indian “peaceful 
nuclear explosion,” which a Canadian reactor and American heavy  water 
allegedly made pos si ble.63 The nonproliferation regime—as embodied in the 
NPT— seemed toothless.
To obtain the first objective, the Ford administration threatened to cut off 
financing for the Kori 2 nuclear power plant and other planned nuclear fa-
cilities through the Export- Import Bank, the American export credit agency. 
Sneider reported that he had asked a South Korean official “ whether  Korea 
[is] prepared [to] jeopardize availability of technology and [the] largest 
financing capability which only [the] US could offer, as well as vital part-
nership with [the] US, not only in nuclear and scientific areas but in broad 
po liti cal and security areas.”64 Furthermore, the United States applied pres-
sure to third- party states to stop them from lending sensitive nuclear assis-
tance to South  Korea. The Canadian government was attuned to the risk of 
proliferation following India’s nuclear test and had already faced severe criti-
cism for supplying a repressive state with nuclear technology.  After some 
wrangling, France agreed to withdraw its assistance to South  Korea’s ef-
forts in obtaining a repro cessing capability. Belgian com pany Belgonuclé-
aire terminated its contract with South  Korea in November 1977.65
As for the second objective, the United States pressured South  Korea to 
participate in a multilateral initiative that would enable East Asian states to 
repro cess spent fuel from a shared regional fa cil i ty.  Later in October 1976, in 
a public speech outlining the proliferation risks of repro cessing, Ford iden-
tified South  Korea and Taiwan as two countries in which the United States 
forced the cancellation of local repro cessing activities.66 For the third (and 
related) objective, getting the South Korean government to ratify the NPT 
was a significant step in addressing the issue of making a credible commit-
ment to eschew nuclear weapons acquisition.67 Some Pentagon officials 
agreed with this assessment, observing that “President Park’s fears of isola-
tion and the pos si ble withdrawal of American forces have led him to embark 
on a secret program to develop nuclear weapons.”68 Indeed, the American 
embassy in Seoul noted the importance of South Korean perceptions of 
American security commitments ahead of a visit by Vice President Nelson 
Rocke fel ler: “Existing danger to [South  Korea] has been greatly increased by 
communist successes in sea. [South Korean] security rests heavi ly on deter-
rent effect US force presence and military assistance provide. Any indica-
tion of lessening of US commitment  will encourage already dangerous North 
Korean belligerence. Decline of military assistance below levels earlier agreed 
and criticism in US on [South  Korea] have already created concern over US 
intentions  towards its commitments.”69 NSC member William R. Smyser 
even circulated an old internal memorandum to Kissinger that outlined the 
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decision- making  behind the 1949 American troop withdrawal from South 
 Korea. In the letter explaining this document, Smyser noted that “it is worth 
reflecting on this, for the obvious reason that we might not have had the 
Korean War if we had not pulled all of our forces out.”70
Such sensitivity regarding troop withdrawals now informed American 
policy- making  toward South  Korea and the region. For example, the Depart-
ment of Defense considered additional restructuring of troop deployments 
on the peninsula. Yet members of the Department of State and the Ford ad-
ministration resisted the Department of Defense’s policy recommendations. 
In a memorandum to Ford, Kissinger advised that “this is the wrong time 
to make any of  these changes, or even to continue planning already under-
way with [South  Korea] for such changes. To proceed would give the wrong 
signal to both Seoul and Pyongyang.”71 Ford apparently agreed. In a note 
addressed to the secretary of defense, Kissinger stated that proposed changes 
to American force deployments and structure in South  Korea  were presently 
“inadvisable.”72 Ford reports in his memoirs that he assured Park that “our 
troops would stay where they  were” in a November 1974 meeting.73
The Ford administration appears to have succeeded in curtailing South 
 Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Admittedly, that the program was at such an early 
stage of development made it relatively easy to cancel. A 1978 intelligence 
estimate that reviewed the program’s history noted that “beginning in late 
1972, physicists assisted by an explosives technician had worked on a nu-
clear weapon design at the [ADD], a semi- independent adjunct of the Min-
istry of National Defense.”74 The technical difficulties encountered early by 
 these researchers indicate the massive challenges that South  Korea con-
fronted in seeking nuclear weapons. And so the United States had vari ous 
nonmilitary tools at its disposal. As Etel Solingen notes, almost all of the for-
eign direct investment in South  Korea came from the United States and 
Japan. The United States accounted for a majority of South  Korea’s debt 
and trade.75 However, the threat of economic sanctions arguably mattered 
less than the specific targeting of South  Korea’s nascent civilian nuclear in-
dustry. South Korean energy de pen dency and the structure of the interna-
tional nuclear industry at the time  were other reasons for the rapid suc-
cess of American counterproliferation efforts. Due to the quick pace of its 
industrialization, existing energy sources available to South  Korea  were 
increasingly unable to meet demand. South Korean coal imports and petro-
leum imports both grew twentyfold between 1960 and 1975. Accordingly, 
South  Korea’s dependence on imported energy grew from less than 
10  percent to over 50  percent by the early 1970s.76 Nuclear energy provided 
a solution. Still, the United States exercised a dominant role in the interna-
tional nuclear industry. Its nuclear reactors  were the most appropriate and 
cost efficient in light of South Korean needs.  Because  these reactors required 
low- enriched uranium, the United States supplied the vast majority of ura-
nium on the world market, especially if one  were to exclude the Soviet 
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Union and China.77 This de pen dency meant that South  Korea was extraordi-
narily sensitive to the possibility that its access to peaceful American nuclear 
technology during the 1970s would be denied. Simply put, South  Korea 
was susceptible to American pressure.78
In compelling South  Korea to behave more favorably, the United States 
still had to offer some concessions.  After all, even though South  Korea 
succumbed to American pressure to ratify the NPT, its leaders clarified that 
its  future be hav ior would be contingent on American security commitments. 
Such statements imply that South  Korea was willing to compromise on its 
economic objectives if its security needs would not be satisfactorily met. 
Thus, as already discussed, the Ford administration refrained from opening 
any discussions of further troop withdrawals. Key officials verbally commu-
nicated their commitment to South Korean security as well as offered so-
phisticated military hardware to strengthen the South Korean military.79 An 
opportunity to demonstrate American military support came when North 
Korean soldiers killed two US Army officers who  were cutting down an ob-
structive poplar tree in the DMZ. Operation Paul Bunyan, as this effort was 
called, consisted of a convoy of military vehicles (supported by nearby he-
li cop ters, bombers, and jet aircraft) entering the DMZ without warning in 
order to cut down the tree.80
To be sure, American decision makers expressed such reassurances at a 
time when American credibility in the region was other wise at its nadir. On 
April 12, 1975, the United States airlifted its nationals and members of the 
military- led government out of Cambodia. The communist Khmer Rouge 
subsequently gained control of that country. At the very end of the month, 
the  People’s Army of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front captured 
Saigon, the South Viet nam ese capital. Its capture not only prompted the 
evacuation of most American civilian and military personnel from the city 
but also enabled the Provisional Revolutionary Government to gain nomi-
nal authority in South Vietnam. American losses in the region did not stop 
 there: communist forces began acquiring significant control in Laos, another 
country whose government received American support. With  these losses 
occurring in rapid succession, American decision makers, such as Kissinger 
and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, recognized that the international 
stature of the United States was now diminished. Such concerns likely mo-
tivated the forceful but clumsy effort by the Ford administration to rescue 
the SS Mayaguez and its American crew from Khmer Rouge forces.81
Did the United States threaten to abandon South  Korea completely? Don 
Oberdorfer writes that in May 1976 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
informed the South Korean minister of defense that  there might be a “review 
of the entire spectrum of [the United States’] relations with the ROK.”82 Yet 
this threat is vague and does not contain explicit warnings that the alliance 
would be abrogated. Moreover, the citation for the Rumsfeld threat is a 1995 
interview with a Korean source dated in the Monthly Chosun.83 Again on the 
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basis of interviews, Kissinger allegedly also “threatened the withdrawal 
of the US security commitment.”84 Similarly, Oberdorfer notes that in Au-
gust 1975 Schlesinger informed Park that nuclear proliferation by South 
 Korea would undermine the alliance, whereas Ambassador Sneider asked a 
high- ranking South Korean official “ whether  Korea [is] prepared [to] jeo-
pardize availability of best technology and largest financing capacity which 
only U.S. could offer, as well as a vital partnership with U.S., not only in 
nuclear and scientific areas but in broad po liti cal and security arenas.”85 Yet 
Seung- Young Kim offers a slightly dif fer ent version of events, namely, that 
“Habib said the United States would recalculate the entire security alliance 
including the withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella,” which seem to im-
ply the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean 
Peninsula.86 No direct documentary evidence shows that American deci-
sion makers ever delivered an unambiguous threat linking South Korean 
nuclear weapons activities to the termination of the alliance. However, in 
an undated note summarizing his conversation with Sneider, the British 
ambassador to Seoul recounted that “Mr Sneider said it had been a very 
tough  battle. . . .  He was  under  orders to go straight to the President [Park] 
and to make it clear that if the Koreans went through with their plans then 
the Americans would both cut off all economic assistance and withdraw 
their nuclear weapons from  Korea.”87 Perhaps Sneider did not want to tell 
his British counterpart that the United States would willingly terminate the 
military alliance with South  Korea. Nevertheless, this con temporary re-
counting of events squares better with the documentary rec ord than inter-
views conducted de cades  after the fact. Both threats  were credible, whereas 
the  wholesale termination of the alliance would not have been  because 
of the instability it would generate in the wider East Asian region.
a potential unraveling of the  
nonproliferation settlement
Emerging developments in American politics threatened the Ford admin-
istration’s success with South  Korea’s nuclear program. The economic crisis 
and continuing fallout from the Watergate scandal doomed Ford’s presiden-
tial bid in the 1976 election. His Demo cratic replacement— Jimmy Car ter— 
entered the White House with a new vision for foreign policy that centered 
on  human rights advocacy. Consistent with this approach, Car ter found 
American support for a repressive regime like Park’s distasteful.88 During 
the campaign, Car ter had even promised the complete withdrawal of all 
American military forces from the Korean Peninsula. He wanted to re orient 
American foreign policy away from East Asia and back  toward Eu rope in 
the wake of the Vietnam War.89 Such campaign rhe toric turned out to reflect 
Car ter’s true intentions for South  Korea.90 About forty thousand American 
troops still remained in South  Korea in 1977, but Car ter sought to reduce 
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that number to zero shortly  after assuming the presidency. He directed the 
NSC to produce a feasibility report regarding the implementation of a com-
plete troop withdrawal from South  Korea. Being so committed to this ini-
tiative, the White House did not even wish for an analy sis of its probable 
consequences.91
Car ter’s position provoked a backlash from leading officials in the mili-
tary, the NSC, and the Department of State. The chief of staff of the UN Com-
mand in Seoul even spoke publicly against Car ter’s proposal. The se nior 
American commander in South  Korea and the American ambassador in 
Seoul  were less explicit in their opposition. An official privy to  these inter-
nal debates  later wrote that the NSC sought to persuade Car ter to modify 
his position. Apparently, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of De-
fense Harold Brown privately recommended a softer policy position.  These 
efforts came to naught as Car ter ignored the advice of other se nior decision 
makers and proceeded to issue Presidential Decision 12 on May 5, 1977. This 
statement called for the complete withdrawal of all troops by 1982, starting 
with one brigade of the second division (at least six thousand troops) to be 
removed from South  Korea by late 1978.92
International opposition  toward the planned troop withdrawal grew dur-
ing the summer of 1977. The Chinese vice foreign minister cryptically told 
Australian government officials that “ there  will be war”  after the American 
troop withdrawal. Though this statement was most likely not a reflection 
of the official Chinese position, it nevertheless communicated their unease 
over the larger geopo liti cal implications of this change in the American 
military presence in East Asia.93  After all, China saw the American military 
presence in East Asia as a desirable offset to Soviet encirclement, despite 
being forced to call for troop withdrawals as part of its ideological competi-
tion with the Soviet Union.94 American East Asian allies also seemed con-
cerned about the implications of the withdrawal for the “wellsprings of US 
foreign policy.” NSC staff member Mark Armacost noted  after his trip to 
Asia that “since no concessions are being sought from [North  Korea], most 
Asians conclude that diplomatic considerations got short shrift.” If military 
reasons did not account for the new policy, then only American “domestic 
politics” seemed to be the last remaining explanation that made sense for 
American allies.95
Given how negative  were the international and administration reactions, 
what was the response of the South Korean government? Though Car ter’s 
plans for a complete withdrawal never bore fruit, his intent might have 
prompted South  Korea to pursue nuclear weapons development more fur-
tively than before. Seung- Young Kim writes that Park instructed his se nior 
economic adviser “to pursue a full scale development of nuclear industry, 
without making much noise” in November 1976, the same month as Car-
ter’s presidential election.96 The next month saw Park’s government es-
tablish a new institute dedicated to the research of nuclear repro cessing 
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and fuel fabrication technologies.97 Seoul even accelerated its efforts in de-
veloping its missile capabilities. According to Jonathan Pollack and Mitch-
ell Reiss, South  Korea worked on managing the nuclear fuel cycle during 
this time.98 Though any such weapons research and development would 
have been highly secret, the vice- premier and foreign minister mooted the 
possibility of South  Korea pursuing its own nuclear capability. Indeed, the 
minister of science and technology— with the likely sanctioning of President 
Park— proclaimed the expansion of South  Korea’s nuclear industry so as to 
domestically produce a fuel supply.99 One source claims that Park announced 
in January 1977 his intention for South  Korea not to go nuclear. Still, around 
this time at a legislative committee meeting convened to discuss Car ter’s 
troop withdrawals, the South Korean foreign minister vaguely threatened 
that “if it is necessary for national security interests and  people’s safety, it is 
pos si ble for  Korea as a sovereign state to make its own judgment on the 
 matter.”100 This statement echoed Park’s earlier declarations that “if the US 
nuclear umbrella  were to be removed, we have to start developing our nu-
clear capability to save ourselves” and that “ there  were and still are quite a 
number of Koreans doubting the commitment of the United States.”101
Car ter’s plans for complete withdrawal renewed fears of alliance abandon-
ment among South Korean leaders.102 Interestingly, American officials an-
ticipated such a response  because they knew of Park’s desire to maintain the 
status quo. As one tele gram observed, “convinced of the necessity for a credi-
ble expression of continuing US support as a deterrent to the North, [Park] has 
told us directly he wants close relations with the US, high- lighted by continu-
ation of pres ent US ground and other force levels.”103 Nevertheless, within a 
few months, Ambassador Richard Sneider reported that Park and his govern-
ment  were “reconciled to ground troop withdrawal.” The challenge, however, 
concerned the question of how “to prepare its public.”104 Sneider repeated this 
view two weeks  later, adding that Park is “almost isolated” and “ will press for 
satisfactory compensatory actions particularly on timing and availability 
of weapons.” He “ will not resist ground force withdrawal despite his grave 
misgivings.” Still, the ambassador now recognized that many members of 
the South Korean government did not share Park’s attitudes. Sneider noted 
that “to many, the ground force withdrawal connotes loss of US tripwire 
and with it loss of US military support in event of North Korean attack 
following withdrawal which is now broadly expected.”105
The announced troop withdrawal provoked concern over  whether South 
 Korea would try to acquire nuclear weapons. Car ter recommended that 
“Park should be told that any move to produce nuclear weapons would 
terminate our security relationship”— a threat that seemed vacuous, since 
his planned withdrawals would already be a dramatic alteration to the alli-
ance.106 However, South Korean attitudes  toward the bomb  were difficult to 
gauge. To the surprise of American diplomats, one worry expressed by 
their South Korean interlocutors touched on  whether their country would 
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still enjoy the benefits of American extended nuclear deterrence. As Sneider 
related,
In response to  these suggestions of embracing  Korea  under US nuclear um-
brella, I pointed out that in fact  Korea, as any ally, would be covered by US 
nuclear umbrella and I was surprised that  there was any misunderstanding 
on that point. Both Korean sources pointed out that Koreans have considered 
assumed [sic] stationing of nuclear weapons in  Korea as providing them with 
nuclear protection. US in past has not talked specifically of placing  Korea 
 under nuclear umbrella but this was not considered necessary. However, with 
possibility of withdrawal of at least ground force nuclear weapons, Koreans 
suggested that we take some public posture vis- à- vis  Korea as we do Japan 
with re spect to nuclear umbrella.107
The American embassy in Seoul thus became acutely aware of the need to 
reassure South  Korea. Sneider anticipated that South  Korea would search 
for a way to achieve security in de pen dently. He noted that “one specific evi-
dence of this concern is a continuing dialogue and heightened interest in 
the possibility of [South Korean] acquisition, as a means of bolstering [South 
Korean] self- reliance.”108 A CIA report dated June 1978 states that “officials 
in the Korean nuclear research community believe that, even while bowing 
to US preferences on the line of work they pursue, certain activities can and 
should be undertaken to keep Seoul’s nuclear option open.”109 That the South 
Korean government signed the NPT just two years before did not seem to 
allay  these fears.110 And with good reason: South  Korea still committed safe-
guard violations throughout the 1980s due to experiments involving pluto-
nium separation and uranium enrichment.111 Nuclear misbehavior did not 
necessarily end with Park’s assassination in October 1979.112
The Car ter administration eventually deci ded against the troop withdraw-
als. Yet this controversial policy had already inflicted much damage. Lead-
ing Demo cratic congressmen such as Robert Byrd, Sam Nunn, and Tip 
O’Neill reproached the Car ter administration for its  handling of South  Korea, 
not least  because North Korean military forces appeared to be gathering 
strength.113 The American military also had reservations. To the dismay of 
the NSC, the Department of Defense leaked po liti cally sensitive Joint Chiefs 
of Staff cables to Congress in June 1977. The purpose of this action was likely 
to bolster congressional opposition to Car ter’s initiative.114 The probable ac-
tions of the South Korean government during this period also suggest a 
deep- seated unease over Car ter’s foreign policy. At a minimum, South  Korea 
became a more difficult ally. When Car ter explored the possibility of having 
a trilateral meeting with the two  Koreas, one NSC member cautioned that 
“Park would not go along.  There is  little in such a meeting for him,  unless 
we agreed to stop troop withdrawals entirely.”115 Even the Japa nese govern-
ment seemed relieved when the issue was fi nally resolved.116
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If South  Korea did engage in nuclear activities in the late 1970s, then Car-
ter’s stated intentions for a complete withdrawal likely had much to do with 
it. Park’s earlier warnings about the consequences of a removal of the Amer-
ican nuclear umbrella cast a shadow over this episode. American officials 
understood the implications of such an action for the American alliance with 
South  Korea and regional stability in East Asia, not least for the counterpro-
liferation settlement that the Ford administration was able to impose.
Summary and Alternative Explanations
Alliance politics played an impor tant role in the demise of the program. 
Had it not been for American pressure on South  Korea and its international 
suppliers of nuclear assistance, South  Korea might not have terminated its 
program when and how it did. Of course, the Ford administration was as 
successful as it was  because of how much the South Korean program de-
pended on outside support. The United States had nonmilitary leverage 
over South  Korea that it used. Nevertheless, it still had to reassure South 
 Korea as to the dependability of the alliance. And so the success of the Ford 
administration was put in jeopardy when Car ter advocated for a full troop 
withdrawal. The uncertainty regarding the exact nature of South  Korea’s 
nuclear activities in the late 1970s (and early 1980s) aside, the evidence at least 
shows that South  Korea reacted negatively to Car ter’s planned troop with-
drawal. As such, South  Korea persisted, albeit intermittently, in proliferation- 
related be hav ior even in the early 1980s.
Changes in the threat environment cannot account for why Seoul re-
nounced nuclear weapons, to the extent that it did. In fact, the threat envi-
ronment facing South  Korea remained intense. Direct evidence of how South 
Korean leaders understood the regional security environment is difficult to 
ascertain so as to evaluate the adversary thesis properly. Still, the available 
evidence highlights how the South Koreans  were still anxious over the 
broader repercussions of communist successes in Indochina. They worried 
that the subsequent American withdrawal might even embolden regional 
adversaries. Crucially, North  Korea retained an aggressive posture and even 
made preparations for war. Kim Il- sung even toured China and Eastern 
Eu rope to make weapons and fuel purchases. Accordingly, “President Park 
believed that war could break out at any time.”117 Making  matters worse, 
relations between Seoul and Tokyo deteriorated  after a North Korean sympa-
thizer attempted to assassinate Park in August 1974, fatally injuring the 
South Korean president’s wife in the pro cess.  Because the would-be assas-
sin was Japa nese and entered South  Korea on a Japa nese passport, Park 
demanded an apology and the disbandment of a pro– North Korean resi-
dents’ association. Insensitive to anti- Japanese sentiments in South  Korea, 
the Japa nese foreign minister further antagonized South Korean leaders by 
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refusing to accept any responsibility for the attack. Though this contro-
versy eventually subsided, the strain on their diplomatic relations added to 
an already conflict- ridden regional environment.118 Considered together, re-
gional tensions remained sufficiently high to warrant the continuation of a 
nuclear weapons program.
The domestic politics thesis fares no better. Solingen argues that Park 
capitulated to American counterproliferation demands in order to protect 
the viability of his strategy for economic development. Specifically,  because 
economic development directly affected his po liti cal survival, Park had to 
renounce the nuclear weapons proj ect openly by making nonproliferation 
commitments. As Solingen writes, “suspicions about South  Korea’s nu-
clear intentions had to be put to rest if the export- led growth strategy was 
to have any chance.”119 The alliance with the United States mattered, but 
largely  because it was the locus of South  Korea’s strategy for economic 
development.
 Little evidence exists to show that economics motivated Park more than 
alliance considerations. To support the assertion that Park renounced nuclear 
weapons to protect his country’s economic development, Solingen cites a 
quote by Park in which he argues in  favor of “ doing away with  those ac-
tivities that tend to drain or waste our natu ral resources in a broad sense.”120 
She adds that “even  after North  Korea assassinated Park’s wife in 1974, he 
continued to focus on the synergies between South  Korea’s economic vitality, 
regional stability, and a positive ‘recognition in the world community.’ ”121 
 These passages are problematic for several reasons. The prob lem with the 
first statement by Park is that the specific “activities” to which he is refer-
ring remain unclear. Wasteful activities could encompass anything from bu-
reaucratic red tape to inefficient production. Moreover, even if he did refer 
to the nuclear weapons program, the statement might be an example of post 
facto rationalization. Park marshaled vari ous sectors of the economy  toward 
nuclear research, and his nuclear interest suggests that for several years he 
did not regard such activity as a “waste.” The prob lem with the second state-
ment regarding Park’s be hav ior following his wife’s murder is that it has no 
historical support. The assassination by a North Korean sympathizer from 
Japan led to a crisis between Seoul and Tokyo. Park even mobilized large 
anti- Japanese protests in Seoul to demonstrate his country’s dissatisfaction 
with how Japan handled the controversy.122  These actions  were inconsistent 
with any desire to improve regional stability and to receive positive interna-
tional recognition.
The domestic politics thesis—as conceptualized by Solingen— misconstrues 
the nationalist character of Park’s decision to integrate with the global 
economy. From the perspective of the South Korean government, its un-
derstanding of self- reliance was that of technological advancement rather 
than of economic self- sufficiency implied by the term “autarchy.”123 How-
ever, Sheila Jasanoff and Sang- Hyun Kim take this argument further, 
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claiming that South  Korea’s nuclear proj ects in the late 1960s and 1970s 
 were part of a larger state- led initiative that aimed at “the modernization 
of the fatherland” and a “self- reliant economy.” They point to the national-
ist rhe toric that extolled the achievements of scientists and engineers work-
ing on nuclear energy.124 Yet Seoul’s nationalist rhe toric did not focus on 
defense  matters  until  after North Korean provocations and Nixon’s troop 
withdrawals from the peninsula. During the 1960s nationalist rhe toric was 
necessary for economic mobilization. Seung- Young Kim writes that Park 
promoted self- reliance “to defend South  Korea and to keep national dig-
nity in the face of American meddling in South  Korea’s domestic affairs.”125 
Still, Nixon’s policies arguably compromised Park’s strategy for achieving 
national self- reliance. As Ambassador Habbib noted, “Park’s view of self- 
reliance, paradoxically, includes a desire and an expressed need for the U.S. 
presence and assistance to continue—at least in the short run. His concern 
that we  will reduce our aid program, withdraw our troops sooner than he 
would like, and his doubt over the firmness of our treaty commitment, 
come to the surface from time to time. Generally speaking, he wishes to 
hold on to  these ele ments of strength for as long as he can, expecting they 
 will diminish as time goes on.”126 Park continued this line of argument with 
Ford, asserting that “of course, we do not expect the US presence to remain 
in defi nitely, given the mounting US public opinion and pressure in Con-
gress. However, Korean self- reliance must be insured [sic] before US troop 
reductions take place.”127 Simply put, Park saw American protection as 
complementing, rather than constraining, self- reliance.
Issues of prestige do not surface so much with regard to the drawdown 
of South  Korea’s nuclear weapons interest. In contrast, alliance consider-
ations appear to have had more of an effect on how South  Korea toned 
down its proliferation- related be hav ior. Nevertheless, some speculate that 
the nuclear weapons program lasted as long as Park Chung Hee—an op-
positional nationalist leader— lived. Rumors have even circulated that the 
CIA was  behind the October 1979 assassination of Park Chung Hee in a bid 
to terminate the weapons program.128 What ever the veracity of such claims, 
safeguard violations did occur in the early 1980s, suggesting that the pro-
gram cannot be reduced simply to one man and the beliefs he might have 
had about nuclear weapons. The role of prestige is indeterminate in account-
ing for this phase of South  Korea’s nuclear interest.
Like West Germany, South  Korea was a frontline state in the Cold War that 
emerged out of a nation divided territorially by communism and anticom-
munism. And like West Germany, it saw American ground forces as neces-
sary for bolstering its received security guarantees. Yet South  Korea was both 
more forthright in its nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior and more vul-
nerable to American pressure. Washington used its leverage, but South  Korea 
was still able to persist in questionable activities thereafter.
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chapter 6
Nuclear Proliferation and Other 
American Alliances
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examined three allies of the United States and argued 
that military alliances played less of a role in forestalling nuclear prolifera-
tion than often assumed. Yet some unconvinced readers might still argue that 
West Germany, Japan, and South  Korea are somehow an unrepresentative 
sample of alliance politics more broadly. In anticipating this critique, this 
chapter widens the variation by considering additional cases in the order in 
which they tran spired:  Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan. 
Though space constraints preclude an intensive analy sis on them,  these cases 
highlight at least some of the propositions derived from my theoretical ac-
count of the connection between alliances and nuclear proliferation. The 
United States treated NATO members  Great Britain and France differently 
with regard to their nuclear weapons programs: only France was truly able 
to retain an in de pen dent nuclear capability. The other countries varied in 
the quality of their received security guarantees and the level of nuclear 
proliferation– related be hav ior they undertook. Norway was another NATO 
ally on the front line, but it had  little interest in hosting in- theater American 
deployments or acquiring its own nuclear capabilities. Australia had a secu-
rity pledge from the United States, but it coveted more military commitments 
and even attempted a nuclear weapons program. Taiwan was a formal treaty 
ally that hosted in- theater conventional forces. It sought to develop an in de-
pen dent nuclear arsenal as well.
This chapter examines each American security partner in turn. Several key 
findings emerge from this discussion. Though prestige was a major driver 
of  Great Britain’s interest in nuclear weapons, security concerns relating to 
American actions prompted both it and France to seek nuclear weapons. 
However, differences in economic and technological vulnerabilities account 
for why the British nuclear arsenal and not the French one became at least 
partially subordinated to the United States. Notwithstanding its frontline sta-
tus, the combination of its Nordic geography and domestic politics reduced 
Norway’s appetite for  either in- theater deployments or nuclear capabilities. 
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Australia more clearly fits the pattern of a state that seeks nuclear weapons 
out of frustration with its received security commitments, only to renounce 
its interest for mostly domestic reasons. Although Taiwan is a case in which 
alliance coercion did suppress a nuclear weapons program, it also illustrates 
the difficulties of ending the nuclear interest of even a diplomatically iso-
lated, eco nom ically dependent state that relies so much on the United States 
for its security.
 Great Britain: A Partially Subordinated Nuclear- Armed Ally
British interest in nuclear weapons preceded the Cold War and thus any se-
curity partnership with the United States. In July 1940— the same month 
that the  Battle of Britain began— the government- commissioned Maud Com-
mittee determined that  Great Britain could and should develop a “uranium 
super bomb” so as to shorten the war. Technical difficulties hamstrung this 
proj ect, and so  Great Britain’s nuclear ambitions had to wait  until 1946 when 
the British government  under Prime Minister Clement Attlee began a civil-
ian nuclear program that was also intended to produce fissile material nec-
essary for making a weapons stockpile. London deci ded fi nally to acquire 
the bomb in 1947.  Great Britain detonated a nuclear weapon successfully in 
1952, becoming the third nuclear weapons state  after the United States and 
the Soviet Union.
Two  factors drove London’s interest in nuclear weapons. The first was the 
British experience in World War II. While the United States stood neutral, 
 Great Britain confronted Nazi Germany alone following the spring 1940 
defeat of France and withstood a sustained air attack called the Blitz dur-
ing the  Battle of Britain. A nuclear deterrent was now necessary for deter-
ring a similar attack in the atomic age.1 To be sure, London would have 
preferred developing nuclear weapons with Washington, but the Mc-
Mahon Act— a law passed by Congress that forbade the sharing of atomic 
bomb information with all other countries  under penalty of death or life 
imprisonment— and American concerns over espionage frustrated British 
attempts at cooperation.2
The second  factor was prestige. Already during World War II, British lead-
ers realized that  great power status would soon require mastery over atomic 
technology. They saw the bomb as the “key to national power in the post- 
war world.”3 The chief scientist working on the British nuclear program 
noted that “the discriminative test for a first class power is  whether it has 
made an atomic bomb and we have  either got to pass the test or suffer a se-
rious loss of prestige both inside the country and internationally.”4 The of-
ficial historian of the British nuclear program concluded that driving the 
decision to acquire the bomb was “a feeling that Britain must possess so 
climacteric a weapon in order to deter an atomically armed  enemy, a feeling 
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that Britain as a  Great Power must acquire all the major new weapons, a feel-
ing that atomic weapons  were a manifestation of the scientific and techno-
logical superiority on which Britain’s strength, so deficient if mea sured in 
sheer numbers of men, must depend.”5
 Great Britain is a peculiar case  because— unlike France—it held the sta-
tus of being a nuclear weapons state while relying on the United States for 
extended deterrence. Indeed, to some extent, abandonment fears amplified 
London’s interest in nuclear weapons.6 However,  Great Britain represents 
a case study of nuclear reversal insofar as the United States sought to cur-
tail the in de pen dence of its nuclear weapons program. Consistent with 
one proposition of my argument, economic vulnerabilities and techno-
logical gaps gave Washington opportunities to subordinate British nuclear 
forces. Nevertheless, the United States only partially succeeded. Competing 
foreign policy priorities in Washington allowed London to claim opera-
tional in de pen dence of its nuclear arsenal despite its dependence on Amer-
ican technology.
To understand why a British nuclear reversal was conceivable even  after 
1952, consider the nature of  Great Britain’s nuclear deterrent itself. Already 
before embarking on a nuclear weapons program, London experienced dif-
ficulties with atomic energy. Technological challenges continued to mark the 
weapons program despite the successful 1952 detonation.  Great Britain first 
relied on strategic bomber aircraft (the V- force) to deliver nuclear weapons 
against Soviet targets. However,  toward the late 1950s, the V bombers faced 
obsolescence as the Soviet Union acquired intercontinental missile capa-
bilities and effective antiaircraft missiles. The V bombers  were so beset by 
difficulties that they eventually lost operational in de pen dence as a nuclear 
deterrent force.7 Highlighting this inability to keep pace with technological 
developments was the economic weakness of postwar  Great Britain. Follow-
ing the American example, the British chiefs of staff wanted to implement 
“massive nuclear retaliation” so as to “allow reductions of the manpower 
goals” set for withdrawing British forces from Eu rope.8
To upgrade its deterrent in view of Soviet military advances,  Great Britain 
recognized that delivering nuclear gravity bombs was becoming infeasible 
and that rocket- powered supersonic missiles carry ing nuclear or thermo-
nuclear warheads  were more desirable. Such capabilities would take time to 
develop, and so  Great Britain sought to deploy a U.S. Air Force– designed, 
liquid- fueled IRBM called Thor in the meantime. Yet London needed to over-
come the injunctions of the McMahon Act in order to obtain American as-
sistance. Three  factors allowed  Great Britain to reinvigorate Anglo- American 
nuclear cooperation and to receive sixty land- based Thors. First,  because 
Eisenhower saw atomic energy as a diplomatic tool, he was more open to 
sharing it with allies,  whether through Atoms for Peace or nuclear- sharing 
arrangements within NATO. Since  Great Britain already had nuclear weap-
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ons, it was less of a proliferation threat than  others.9 Second, Anglo- American 
relations needed mending  after the Suez crisis saw Eisenhower threaten to 
undermine the sterling so as to restrain  Great Britain.10 Atomic cooperation 
was useful for relieving alliance tensions.11 Third, the Sputnik launching 
alarmed NATO capitals such that Western Eu ro pean allies sought not 
only more IRBM deployments on their territories but also a greater say in 
alliance nuclear decision- making.  These propitious circumstances thus 
prompted agreement between London and Washington over the Thor de-
ployment. Although British decision makers coveted this arrangement, it 
came at a cost. The dual- key formula meant that  Great Britain “would own, 
man and operate the Thor missiles; the United States would retain owner-
ship, custody and control of the missiles’ nuclear warheads.”12 Indeed, do-
mestic controversy ensued over the inability of London to veto the launch 
of nuclear weapons by the United States from British territory.13 The Thor 
deployment signified greater integration of British nuclear forces into 
NATO.14
 Great Britain tried to develop its own missile capability with the Blue Steel 
standoff missile and the Blue Streak intermediate- range ballistic missile, but 
neither proved satisfactory.15 Consequently, London looked to Washington 
for access to the AGM-48 Skybolt system, which could be mounted on the 
Vulcan bomber and launched without the aircraft having to penetrate So-
viet airspace. Excited by this technology, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
received authorization from Eisenhower to acquire the Skybolt and commit-
ted the British defense establishment to focus exclusively on integrating 
this weapon system. Nevertheless, British decision makers neglected a crit-
ical aspect of the agreement struck by Eisenhower and Macmillan: Washing-
ton saw the deal as contingent on the technological success of Polaris, the 
submarine- launched ballistic missile program.16 Some members of the Brit-
ish defense establishment understood the implication. Quietly, they spoke 
of how “the time [had] come to consider giving up the concept of in de pen-
dent control of the British nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and 
that [they] should negotiate the best terms pos si ble with the Americans in 
return or handing over control to them.”17
Unfortunately for  Great Britain, the Skybolt failed early tests amid im-
provements in silo- based and submarine- based missiles like the Polaris. 
When the Kennedy administration informed London that it was contem-
plating the cancellation of the program altogether, a crisis quickly engulfed 
Anglo- American relations. Yet the so- called Skybolt affair was not rooted in 
technical differences and bureaucratic misunderstandings, as one account 
suggests.18 The controversy was po liti cal. Members of the Kennedy admin-
istration thought lowly of  Great Britain and even less of the so- called spe-
cial relationship. Dean Acheson once remarked that “ Great Britain has lost 
an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate 
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power role— that is, a role apart from Eu rope, a role based on a ‘special re-
lationship’ with the United States . . .  is about played out.”19 Moreover, the 
United States sought to integrate NATO allies into the MLF  under its lead-
ership. Without the Skybolt, London might have to join the MLF, thus fully 
subordinating its nuclear forces. British decision makers  were unhappy. A 
parliamentarian opined that “some of us on this side, who want to see Britain 
retain a nuclear deterrent, are highly suspicious of some of the American 
motives.”20 To repair their relationship, both countries successfully negoti-
ated the Nassau Agreement. It provided that London would obtain nuclear- 
capable Polaris missiles, whereas Washington would receive rights to use a 
nuclear submarine base located in Scotland. The Polaris missiles would 
also be fitted on British submarines that would go on to be integrated into 
the MLF. How to interpret and how to  handle this specific provision pre-
occupied the British government for some time, but getting Macmillan to 
agree to consider the MLF was a major concession that the United States 
extracted.21
I have argued that in rolling back the nuclear weapons program of an ally, 
the best coercive of action available to the United States consists of exploit-
ing economic and technological vulnerabilities, if not reassuring credibly. To 
this effect, Britain was susceptible to American pressure. Its postwar econ-
omy failed to exhibit the same dramatic growth as France’s and West Ger-
many’s. Though London played a central role in the establishment of the 
Bretton Woods system, it was unable to meet the requirements of having the 
sterling be a reserve currency. The weaknesses of the postwar British econ-
omy created much stress on the sterling, sparking a run on the currency in 
1947 and devaluation in 1949. A mixture of internal and external constraints 
inhibited British economic growth. Internal constraints included inefficient 
industrial production, shortage of credit, and management- union relations. 
External constraints included per sis tent balance- of- payments deficits in ad-
dition to more financial and economic commitments than London could 
bear.22 Despite its postwar recovery and low unemployment, the British 
economy had to endure several major adjustments due to a costly national-
ization program, the  Labour Party’s creation of the welfare state, and the 
opening of the British pound sterling bloc— specifically, members of the Brit-
ish Empire and Commonwealth that had pegged their currencies to the 
pound sterling—to international trade.23 Pressure on the sterling continued, 
with another devaluation occurring in 1967.24
Could the United States have exploited British vulnerabilities for nonpro-
liferation ends? To be sure, shutting down a program when it is still in its 
planning stages is easier than shutting down one that has successfully pro-
duced nuclear weapons devices and has already received substantial gov-
ernment and military investment. The costs associated with compelling a 
British nuclear reversal of this magnitude would have been high for the 
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United States. Nevertheless, some American decision makers did consider 
the possibility of using economic levers to reduce  Great Britain’s nuclear ca-
pabilities. Se nior American diplomat George Ball tried to persuade Johnson 
to do as much ahead of the president’s meeting with the recently elected 
prime minister, Harold Wilson. Ball argued that  Great Britain “cannot afford 
the resources and foreign exchange that go into the construction of the pres-
ent four nuclear submarines.” Rusk believed that London would benefit 
from canceling the Polaris program and reaping the savings. Both believed 
that an in de pen dent British nuclear capability complicated NATO decision- 
making and American nonproliferation objectives.25 Johnson ultimately deci-
ded against using such tactics.
Nevertheless, the British nuclear weapons program had already lost some 
degree of in de pen dence. By the early 1970s, the nuclear deterrent force con-
sisted of four nuclear submarines, each armed with sixteen Polaris A-3 
missiles. Only one submarine would reliably be operational at a given time 
owing to the demands of refitting and overhauling  after long patrols. The 
nuclear warheads and the submarines  were of British manufacture. The 
MIRVs used on the missiles  were also of British design.26 Still, nuclear coop-
eration with the United States ceased again on Nixon’s  orders, leaving the 
British to modify the Polaris system on their own in response to perceived 
advances in Soviet missile technology.27 Accordingly, London retained the 
ability to destroy Moscow and other Soviet industrial centers on its own with 
high probability even if the United States supplied parts of navigation, fire- 
control, and communications systems for the missiles.28 Such technological 
reliance continues to this day:  Great Britain uses the ballistic missile Trident 
II as its delivery system— a technology that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
had to request from the United States in the early 1980s.29
 Whether Johnson could have pressed further against  Great Britain is a dif-
ficult counterfactual to assess. He had good reasons not to. Consistent with 
one of my propositions, other foreign policy goals can arise that inhibit the 
nonproliferation mission. As David James Gill writes, “[Johnson] remained 
reluctant to push nuclear issues when they threatened to undermine coop-
eration in more impor tant areas. The president instead desired the continu-
ation of Britain’s international defense commitments, in order to share some 
of the Cold War burden and thus help his own increasingly costly policies 
in Vietnam.”30 Further complicating any campaign is that the United States 
would have still had to address the po liti cal prob lem that produced British 
nuclear interest in the first place. Why would  Great Britain voluntarily sur-
render even a technologically dependent (but operationally in de pen dent) 
nuclear capability if the American security guarantees to Eu rope remained 
problematic? And so the final outcome may have been the best of all pos si-
ble worlds:  Great Britain could have its nuclear weapons program, while the 
United States would retain its technological supremacy.
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France: An Insubordinate Nuclear- Armed Ally
France’s interest in nuclear energy predated the Cold War.  After all, the lab 
of Pierre and Marie Curie was where radioactive isotopes  were first isolated. 
Their son- in- law Frédéric Joliot- Curie also undertook atomic research and, 
thanks to an appointment by de Gaulle following the Liberation, became the 
high commissioner for atomic energy.31  Under his supervision the first French 
atomic reactor was built.32 However, French government outfits and work-
ing groups aimed at nuclear weapons production first appeared at the end 
of 1954.33 The Centre Saharien d’Expérimentations Militaires— which would 
oversee French nuclear tests in central Algeria— was established in 1957.34 
In the same year, France entered into a trilateral proj ect with Italy and Ger-
many (the F- I- G initiative) to research and to develop nuclear weapons, but 
some French government officials still did not want to upset Washington, 
since they wanted (and expected) American assistance to their own national 
nuclear program.35 French nuclear ambitions thus preceded de Gaulle’s 1958 
return to power and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Yet his influ-
ence on the French nuclear weapons program was significant. Upon becom-
ing president, he canceled the F- I- G initiative, since he believed that France 
should arm only itself and not its allies, especially a West Germany of dubi-
ous intent. The French nuclear program accelerated thereafter and had ceased 
to be clandestine with a memorandum dated September 17, 1958, sent to 
Washington. In February 1960, France detonated a 70- kiloton nuclear weapon 
(four times the power of the bomb dropped over Hiroshima) in the Alge-
rian desert.
Security was a primary motivation for France’s nuclear weapons interest. 
The change in military thinking embodied by the New Look impressed on 
French decision makers the military value of nuclear weapons. French mili-
tary leaders noted “the fact that Eu rope cannot be defended against an at-
tack from the east without the use of atomic weapons leads to the ac cep tance 
of the princi ple that this weapon  will be used, first of all to discourage the 
aggressor, and if necessary to defeat him.”36 Yet the New Look had one star-
tling implication for them. As the chef d’état- major (or the French equivalent 
of the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) believed, “the determining impor-
tance of atomic weapons is that from now on only  those countries that pos-
sess their own arsenals of this type  will conserve some degree of autonomy 
in defense and would be able to have a real influence in the development of 
common (defense) plans.”37 A French diplomat concurred with this assess-
ment, observing that “an army deprived of atomic means  will no longer 
be an army. . . .  National in de pen dence, the autonomy of our diplomacy . . . 
demand that France make its own atomic effort in the military domain.”38 
Thus, when the French National Assembly considered a treaty regarding the 
Eu ro pean Defense Community (EDC), one area that drew heavy criticism 
was a clause stipulating that all member states would be forbidden to 
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undertake an atomic military program. Though out of government, de 
Gaulle charged that this treaty would reduce France to a permanent state of 
de pen den cy.39  These criticisms smack of prestige concerns, but at this time 
French leaders  were disappointed that communist aggression in Indochina 
failed to elicit a nuclear response from the Eisenhower administration de-
spite the rhe toric of the New Look.40 That Washington took a hard- line 
approach against Paris and London during the Suez crisis also left a deep 
impression.41 While France was still developing its first nuclear weapons, 
de Gaulle famously asked Eisenhower in 1959, “ Will they [Eisenhower’s 
successors] take the risk of devastating American cities so that Berlin, 
Brussels and Paris might remain  free?”42
In contrast to  Great Britain, France succeeded in retaining the full in de-
pen dence of its nuclear forces. What explains this difference? Why did the 
French nuclear deterrent not become folded into NATO or reliant on Amer-
ican technology?
The standard response to  these questions might echo the prestige thesis and 
emphasize de Gaulle’s strong personality. Consistent with what Hymans 
describes of oppositional nationalists, de Gaulle had a vision for French gran-
deur and pursued whichever military policy was necessary for advancing 
that vision.43 Not all of his policies  were rooted in such motives; his approach 
to the question of British participation in the EEC seems driven by interest 
group demands.44 Nevertheless, as the prestige thesis would hold, his acute 
need to preserve French po liti cal sovereignty and diplomatic status influ-
enced his military policies. The bomb was the most vis i ble and tangible 
manifestation of de Gaulle’s strategic vision. It was beyond compromise.
My argument is that economic and technological levers represent the best 
option for the United States to curb nuclear proliferation to the extent that 
the ally is susceptible to their use. On this score, Paris did not share Lon-
don’s vulnerabilities, allowing de Gaulle to have it relatively easy when 
dealing with the United States. To begin with, the economic circumstances 
he faced  were more favorable than  those faced by his Fourth Republic pre-
de ces sors, to say nothing of his British counter parts. In the immediate post-
war period, France was indeed in a state of de pen dency. Describing the 
postwar economic relationship between the United States and France, Philip 
Nord writes that the “France that emerged from the war was dif fer ent in-
deed from what it had been before, but the change was not a welcome one. 
France was reduced to an economic satellite of the United States.”45 And yet 
over time the leaders of the Fourth Republic used their cunning to extract 
more favorable bargains from the United States.46 France’s economic devel-
opment proceeded rapidly. When de Gaulle returned to power, France had 
already enjoyed the beginning of what would be termed as les trentes 
glorieuses— a thirty- year period of high economic growth.
France prospered despite the damage it endured in the two world wars 
and the false economic starts of the immediate postwar years. It was steadily 
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becoming an economic power house that benefited its highly productive and 
well- salaried citizens with one of the best standards of living in the world. 
Its growth rates for the years between 1950 and 1973  were among the highest 
in Eu rope and about twice as much as  Great Britain.47 Not all was rosy, how-
ever: French balance- of- payments did weaken over the course of the 1950s 
as a result of per sis tent reserve losses. Fighting colonial wars in Indochina 
and Algeria drove  these losses.48 But even this situation soon changed to the 
advantage of Paris, since both London and Washington saw growing deficits 
in their balance- of- payments. By 1965 France was converting its balance- 
of- payments excesses into gold, thereby generating pressure on the American 
dollar.49 France went from depending on American economic power to 
challenging American efforts to preserve the integrity of the international 
economic order.50
Paris was thus able to pivot its diplomatic power to support  either a con-
tinental Eu ro pean or a transatlantic vision for defense cooperation. Amid 
deepening suspicions regarding American alliance reliability, France had 
allies in West Germany and Italy with which it could pursue a continental 
vision.51  Those countries  were not always receptive to de Gaulle’s over-
tures: the relationship between de Gaulle and Adenauer was uneven, and 
de Gaulle found Erhard’s Atlanticist tilt distasteful.52 Yet de Gaulle was not 
entirely hostile to Washington.53 The American military presence in West 
Germany,  after all, posed a welcomed constraint on that country’s foreign 
policy ambitions. Still, structural conditions  were permissive for de Gaulle 
to pursue an in de pen dent and assertive foreign policy in the 1960s, thus 
allowing him to reject American proposals for nuclear- sharing arrange-
ments like the MLF, to retain the autonomy of its force de frappe, and even 
to withdraw France from NATO’s military command structure in 1966. 
Washington had  little choice but to re spect the strength of Paris, even  going 
so far as seeking its cooperation in the area of nuclear weapons by the late 
1960s.54
Norway: An Abstaining Frontline Ally
 Great Britain and France  were two NATO members that had acquired nu-
clear weapons, whereas West Germany was on the front line and so coveted 
greater nuclear decision- making befitting of its status. Yet Norway was also 
on the front line in Cold War, albeit farther north on more difficult terrain. 
Though Norway was among the first to commit to the NPT, its military 
leaders briefly contemplated in the early Cold War period  whether an in de-
pen dent nuclear arsenal was worthwhile. With a civilian nuclear industry 
dating back to the 1940s, Norway engaged in enrichment and repro cessing 
activities over the course of the 1960s.55 By the late 1960s, however, Oslo 
became an active proponent of stringent nuclear safeguards for the IAEA to 
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oversee.56 To what extent did alliance considerations shape Norway’s nu-
clear choices?
Norway benefited from a combination of geography and American nu-
clear extended guarantees. To be sure, Astrid Forland argues that Norwe-
gian decision makers in the 1940s saw a military nuclear program as too 
expensive for a country that was still relatively poor.57 The defense estab-
lishment considered it to be more cost- effective for the country to rely on 
the American nuclear deterrent. Yet costs might be more tolerable if the se-
curity environment  were more threatening. Despite its shared borders with 
the Soviet Union and war time experience with Nazi occupation, Norway 
enjoyed a favorable geo graph i cal position among its NATO allies.  After 
all, the Soviet Union would have experienced  great difficulty in invading 
Norway in a purely conventional military conflict. To attack Norwegian 
population centers by land from the north would have required the Soviet 
Union to traverse difficult terrain in addition to attacking neutral Sweden.58 
From the south, Soviet forces would have first had to overrun West Ger-
many and Denmark. That is not to say that Norway held no interest for the 
Soviet Union. US Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal noted that “the ac-
quisition of a common frontier with [Norway] in the Far North and the 
proximity of Norwegian territory to Murmansk, Rus sia’s only ice- free port 
opening directly on the high sea, give Norway a very special place in Rus-
sian eyes.”59 However, Oslo could afford to be selective about the sort of 
alliance commitment it desired from Washington.
Despite being a founding member of NATO, Norway did not receive many 
security goods. It never hosted American military bases, only agreeing to 
store oil and provide airfields for American use should a crisis develop. Ad-
mittedly, the growing vulnerability of forward air bases that the United 
States could use lowered their appeal.60 And only in the 1980s did U.S. 
Marines pre- position weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other equipment 
in climate- controlled caves and buildings in central Norway to support a task 
force of over thirteen thousand Marines.61 Earlier in the Cold War, however, 
the American presence was very limited. The Norwegian government even 
regulated access rights to allied naval and aerial units operating in and 
around Norwegian territory. Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen announced 
at a 1957 NATO summit meeting that Norway would not host nuclear weap-
ons on its territory.62 A greater military presence would have courted po liti-
cal controversy. For one, domestic politics constrained Norwegian decision 
makers  because of the desire to achieve cross- party consensus on foreign and 
defense policy even when the ruling  Labour Party commanded a parliamen-
tary majority. For another, Gerhardsen wished to reassure the Soviet Union 
of NATO’s defensive nature.63 This policy of détente was typical of the Nor-
dic experience in the Cold War: the Scandinavian countries would embrace 
disarmament and social democracy while holding both the United States 
and the Soviet Union at bay.64
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The case of Norway illustrates the ambivalent connection between nuclear 
proliferation and military alliances. It was a frontline state on NATO’s so- 
called northern flank, but it expressed only a limited interest in hosting in- 
theater conventional weapons and hardly any in acquiring its own nuclear 
weapon capability. The threat environment might have militated against de-
siring  either strong military assurances or a robust in de pen dent defense 
policy. Domestic politics was certainly a key  factor, since Prime Minister 
Gerhardsen wished to forge a cross- party consensus on defense and foreign 
policy. He did not have a moral aversion to nuclear energy, since his gov-
ernment did agree to provide a heavy  water reactor for Israel to use at Di-
mona, to say nothing of Norwegian shipments of heavy  water for France’s 
thermonuclear arsenal.65 However, if Norwegian leaders had more severe 
threat assessments early in the Cold War, then perhaps they would have de-
manded greater security goods from the United States. This counterfactual 
could involve a full- fledged interest in nuclear weapons if the United States 
failed  either to provide or to sustain military deployments on Norwegian 
territory.
Australia: The Archetypal Nuclear Proliferating Ally
Unlike Norway, Australia clearly engaged in nuclear proliferation– related 
be hav ior. Between 1956 and 1963, it tried to procure tactical nuclear weap-
ons from  Great Britain. When this effort failed, Australia began trying to 
develop its own indigenous nuclear capability. By the late 1960s, Australia 
had a ten- megawatt heavy- water moderated, enriched- uranium research re-
actor and a smaller reactor for physics experiments.66 Australia signed the 
NPT in 1969, but Prime Minister John Gorton declared that “the treaty is not 
binding on us  until it is ratified.”67  Under his leadership the Australian gov-
ernment sought to find a way to work around the NPT in light of its plans 
to develop a five hundred– megawatt nuclear power reactor. It even signed 
a secret nuclear cooperation agreement with France.68 Nevertheless, Can-
berra ratified the NPT in 1973.
Australia nicely embodies the dynamics that my theory expects of most 
alliances: it became interested in nuclear weapons  because of perceived gaps 
in its received security commitments, but it ended that interest on its own 
accord. To begin with, unease over British imperial defense arrangements 
in Asia prompted Australian decision makers to reevaluate their national 
armament policies. At this time, too, they  were probing the nature of Amer-
ican defense planning and commitment. Despite being party to a security 
treaty with New Zealand and the United States, Australia unsatisfactorily 
received only a pledge that the United States would support them in a mili-
tary crisis, mostly likely resulting from a Chinese intervention in Indochina.69 
Washington did not  couple its pledge with in- theater conventional deploy-
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ments. And so starting in the mid-1960s when Canberra embraced the no-
tion of developing an indigenous nuclear weapons program, its security 
partnerships became even more problematic. Despite China’s nuclear weap-
ons detonation in 1964, British prime minister Harold Wilson announced in 
January 1968 that  Great Britain would be withdrawing its forces from South-
east Asia and the  Middle East (“East of Suez”) over the next several years.70 
Worsening the deteriorating security situation was how the United States 
began to contemplate a military disengagement from Vietnam. Such was the 
context when nuclear weapons advocate Gorton served as Australia’s prime 
minister.71
Did alliance coercion play any part in Australia’s ultimate decision to 
ratify the NPT four years  after signing it? The available evidence suggests 
it did not. Signing the treaty became a more acceptable proposition once 
West Germany and Japan also signed.72 Nevertheless, Gorton believed that 
signing the treaty did not by itself foreclose the nuclear option. Moreover, 
domestic politics intervened. A faction within Gorton’s Liberal Party suc-
cessfully launched a leadership challenge against him, only to lose power 
eventually to the pro- disarmament  Labor Party. Putting an end to Austra-
lia’s nuclear ambitions, the  Labor Party ratified the NPT.  After all, a nu-
clear weapons program was too expensive, especially when the  Labor 
Party was intent on instituting universal health care and  free university 
education.73 Thus, as Jim Walsh argues, explanations highlighting the role 
of American coercion in obtaining Australian commitments to the NPT are 
prob ably exaggerated.74 Indeed, the irony is that the security concerns that 
prompted Australia’s nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior in the first 
place should have intensified instead of softening when the decision to re-
nounce nuclear weapons was made. The United States was pulling out of 
Vietnam amid domestic turmoil and improved relations with China. De-
spite such circumstances, Australian leaders seem to have accepted Ameri-
can promises of extended nuclear deterrence.75 Similarly, Hymans finds 
that some Australian leaders  were more concerned about entrapment by 
the United States than abandonment.76 Australia renounced nuclear weap-
ons for its own reasons.
Taiwan: A Per sis tent Proliferation Risk
Though it received its first nuclear reactor from the United States via the At-
oms for Peace program in 1956, Taiwan began its nuclear weapons program 
in 1967.77 The Taiwanese Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) pur-
chased a forty- megawatt heavy  water reactor from Canada. Taiwan also 
received from Canada heavy  water and twenty- five metric tons of natu ral 
uranium fuel rods, thereby giving the small East Asian country the possi-
bility of producing at least ten kilograms of weapon- grade plutonium a year. 
cHAPter 6
144
Additionally, INER built a small repro cessing laboratory.78 In 1973, the Tai-
wan Research Reactor (TRR) became operational. Despite  these efforts, 
Taiwan never acquired nuclear weapons. It represents an archetypal 
case in which the United States suppressed the nuclear ambitions of an 
ally. To what extent did alliance considerations  really shape Taiwan’s nu-
clear trajectory? I argue that abandonment fears  were a major driver of Tai-
pei’s nuclear interest, but Washington has had uneven success in curbing its 
activities.
Abandonment fears intensified among Taiwanese decision makers follow-
ing China’s 1964 nuclear test.  After all, the previous de cade saw China 
threaten to use force against Taiwan so as to destroy the anticommunist Na-
tionalist government in Taipei and to conclude definitively the Chinese 
Civil War. Although China lacked the means to mount a cross- strait inva-
sion, vague nuclear threats issued by Eisenhower during the Taiwan Straits 
Crises arguably made Mao de- escalate.79 Having his own nuclear arsenal 
might embolden Mao against Taipei and inoculate him against American 
threats. China’s military capabilities alarmed President Chiang Kai- shek. He 
described to American officials that Chinese communists “already have three 
very disturbing capabilities which they are reserving mainly for use against 
Taiwan, viz.: short range missiles, submarines capable of operating effec-
tively in Taiwan Strait, and MIG-21s.”80 Moreover, although Taiwan had 
been an American treaty ally since 1954, Chiang Kai- shek was already an-
ticipating some sort of rapprochement between Washington and Beijing in 
the 1960s. Indeed, American military and intelligence support to Taiwan 
started to wane by the end of that de cade.81 Nor did Chiang Kai- shek agree 
with other American allies in East Asia on the Vietnam War. He saw that con-
flict as futile and believed that Washington should leave the war for Asians 
to fight.82 What strategic uses Chiang Kai- shek had for nuclear weapons are 
difficult to determine, but if Taiwan  were to acquire ballistic missiles, then 
it might have hoped to hold Chinese military assets and population centers 
at risk so as to deter a cross- straits invasion.
The counterproliferation effort that the United States mounted against Tai-
wan might have seemed to result in a satisfactory outcome, but the pro cess 
was arduous and oftentimes inconclusive. To begin with, credible reassur-
ance would have been hard to achieve when the United States seemed intent 
on improving, and  later normalizing, diplomatic relations with China.83 
Not helpful,  either, was Nixon’s declared policy that the United States was 
retracting its military commitments from East Asia more generally. Wash-
ington did resort to applying nonmilitary tools to curb Taiwan’s nuclear ac-
tivities, but with varying degrees of success. In fact, the United States had 
been observing suspiciously Taiwanese nuclear activities since at least 1966, 
when it learned of Taiwanese efforts to obtain nuclear materials from Israel 
and nuclear reactors from West Germany.84  Little mystery seemed to swirl 
around Taiwan’s intentions. As one embassy airgram from June 1966 notes, 
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“At the direction of President Chiang, the GRC Defense Ministry continues 
to try to develop an atomic weapon and delivery system, according to a 
source close to the effort. The President has overridden the advice of Lt. Gen-
eral T’ang Chun-po, Vice Minister of Defense who also heads up the de-
fense scientific program; T’ang believes the attempt impractical and beyond 
ROC [Taiwan] resources. Thus far the GRC has been frustrated in its efforts 
to procure the necessary nuclear materials and has been similarly unsuc-
cessful in its attempts to hire scientists from abroad to work on the proj-
ect.”85 The local American embassy had no illusions as to what was afoot in 
Taiwan. Funny enough, in a case where the dog of alliance coercion did 
not bark, the United States could not prevent Taiwan from acquiring the 
West German nuclear reactor, since Bonn insisted that the reactor would 
have IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, Taiwan did not receive the nuclear 
reactor,  because its costs sparked too much bureaucratic controversy.86
Taiwan remained undaunted in its attempts to import nuclear technology. 
In 1972, Taiwanese government officials approached a West German firm to 
discuss the “delivery of parts to an ROC repro cessing plant (not a complete 
plant), as well as a contract for design and construction of such a plant.”87 
 Because Taiwan lost recognition of its sovereignty to China at the United Na-
tions, any attempt to impose IAEA safeguards would be challenging, 
despite how “such a plant repro cesses spent reactor cores and also pro-
duces significant quantities of plutonium, an essential component of nuclear 
weapons.”88 The next year saw the State Department tussle with Taiwan 
over this potential purchase, having informed the Taiwanese foreign minis-
ter that the United States opposed it.89 In a repeat of what happened be-
fore, Taiwan signed a contract with the West German firm UHDE to ac-
quire the repro cessing plant only to see the purchase canceled. Washington 
had this time notified Taipei and Bonn of its objections. This time Bonn suc-
cessfully pressured UHDE to terminate the deal, but Taipei insisted that its 
nuclear intentions  were peaceful.90
As Taiwan persisted in its proliferation- related be hav ior, the United States 
sought to collect information, sometimes collaborating with  Great Britain.91 
In 1973, the American embassy learned of a Canadian research reactor, which 
it deemed to be a “military secret,” that Taiwan imported.92 But despite the 
1968 embassy airgram that plainly stated that Taiwan was seeking nuclear 
weapons, the State Department itself seemed hesitant to draw definitive con-
clusions. Its Bureau of Intelligence and Research found “at pres ent no plans 
for proceeding to systematically undertake the development of nuclear 
weapons. We have no evidence of such plans, or of plans to acquire a nu-
clear delivery capability— the lack of which would substantially diminish 
the value of nuclear weapons to the ROC.”93 Suspicions abounded, and 
American officials  were dismayed when they learned that Taiwan was 
intent on developing a nuclear repro cessing plant. The Atomic Energy 
Commission’s international director warned that “it would be extremely 
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imprudent for the ROC to begin planning for a repro cessing plant and 
that he wished to discourage the ROC from proceeding with any such 
plans.”94 Some diplomats became frustrated. William H. Gleysteen observed 
that “we cannot guarantee that certain  people  will not continue to nudge 
[Taiwan] into activities associated with a nuclear weapons program but 
short of a flat statement to Premier Chiang I think we have done every thing 
pos si ble to underscore the firmness of our position.”95 But uncertainty over 
Taiwan’s intentions began to dissipate, and by late 1974, CIA analysts as-
serted that “Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon op-
tion clearly in mind, and it  will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device 
 after five years or so.”96
A cat- and- mouse game ensued despite Taiwan’s alleged dependence on 
the United States. The Ford administration issued a demarche to Taiwan so 
that it would abandon its nuclear weapons program. Kissinger even cau-
tioned the American ambassador in Taipei that “Fonmin Shen [the Taiwan-
ese foreign minister]  will reiterate assurances that ROC  will not develop nu-
clear weapons and  will not seek to acquire a national repro cessing fa cil i ty. 
In that event you should refrain from expressing satisfaction with such 
assurances. . . .  We do not wish to convey impression that  matter is closed.”97 
Kissinger’s concerns  were well founded. Within months of the demarche, 
more intelligence emerged that concerned Taiwan’s nuclear activities.98 Even 
during the Car ter administration, unsafeguarded ports at TRR  were discov-
ered, prompting more assurances from Taipei as to its nuclear intentions. 
Washington subsequently demanded that Taipei “include all pres ent and 
 future ROC nuclear facilities and materials  under the US/ROC bilateral 
agreement for cooperation . . .  terminate all fuel cycle activities and re orient 
facilities involving or leading to weapons- usable materials” and “transfer 
all pres ent holdings of plutonium to the US  under appropriate compensa-
tory arrangements.”99 Taiwan eventually acquiesced to  these demands, in 
part  because of extreme pressure that the United States put on it. Thereaf-
ter, Car ter’s national security adviser declared that “the American effort to 
crack down on this proj ect clearly yielded its desired results.”100 Such opti-
mism might have been premature: the United States discovered a secret ura-
nium enrichment program that it  later shut down in the summer of 1978. 
As President Chiang observed, the United States could  handle Taiwan “in a 
fashion which few other countries would tolerate.”101
The American intelligence community continued to monitor its actions, 
and for good reason: Taiwan’s nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior did not 
 really end in the 1970s. Taiwan experimented with plutonium separation in 
the early 1980s, and the INER began construction of a hot cell fa cil i ty where 
scientists could perform repro cessing experiments.102 Fortunately for the 
United States, its intelligence ser vices had infiltrated the INER: American- 
trained deputy director Col. Chang Hsien-yi defected from Taiwan and re-
vealed the scope of its illicit nuclear activities. The United States subsequently 
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worked with the IAEA to shut down this new fa cil i ty. Washington also forced 
Taipei to close its heavy  water reactor  after threatening to cease heavy  water 
shipments.103 Even with democ ratization and greater market liberalization, 
suspicion hangs over Taiwan’s nuclear ambitions. In July 1995, shortly  after 
China test- fired missiles that landed near the island, President Lee Teng- hui 
publicly suggested that Taiwan’s nuclear weapons policy should be recon-
sidered,  later proclaiming that Taiwan “has the ability to develop nuclear 
weapons but  will not develop” them.104
Washington did apply coercive pressure on Taipei to curb its nuclear ac-
tivities. Since Taiwan failed to acquire nuclear weapons, and has had to re-
sort to much duplicity and secrecy in its proliferation- related be hav ior, such 
coercion appears to have been effective. However, the protracted character 
of this counterproliferation effort reveals the difficulties associated with sup-
pressing a determined state’s appetite for nuclear weapons, even when that 
state is as diplomatically isolated and as dependent on its guarantor for eco-
nomic and security goods as Taiwan.  These difficulties might have resulted 
from the uncertainty over how much the United States would punish nu-
clear proliferation at the time. Nicholas Miller claims that  because the Sym-
ington Amendment— which banned American economic and military assis-
tance to countries that do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections 
with regard to enrichment technology— was only passed in June 1976 and 
went into effect in August 1977, Taiwanese officials  were unsure as to “ex-
actly how far the US government would go to enforce congressional dic-
tates.”105 They halted their efforts once they learned of the stiff penalties that 
they would receive if they continued certain nuclear activities. The prob lem 
with his account is that only within a year of this uncertainty being resolved 
did the United States discover yet another secret uranium enrichment pro-
gram, to say nothing of the secret repro cessing program disclosed by the 
CIA agent about a de cade  later. The real secret to success lies not with the 
economic sanctions that Taiwan wished to avoid, as Miller argues, but with 
the American intelligence efforts that detected  those programs. William 
Burr is thus correct in observing that “the repeated U.S. interventions in 
Taipei’s nuclear affairs show the  great difficulty of imposing nonprolifera-
tion standards even on friendly client states.”106 And so Taiwan may have 
been so resilient precisely  because its decision makers had judged that they 
had  little to lose. It had lost its treaty alliance with the United States in 1979 
and subsequently had to accept weaker, less committal mea sures such as 
arms sales through the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Six Assurances 
despite the gathering strength of China.
The cases examined in this chapter further illustrate that the rec ord of mili-
tary alliances in curbing nuclear proliferation is more mixed and ambigu-
ous than some accounts suggest. To be sure, perceptions of security commit-
ments mattered for  those states that did embark on proliferation- related 
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be hav ior. France sensed its interests  were diverging from  those of the United 
States, Australia did not receive the military commitments it wanted, and 
Taiwan came to realize that its interests  were becoming out of step with  those 
of the United States as China became a potential balancer to the Soviet Union. 
For its part, Norway represents the least straightforward case. Its frontline 
status in the Cold War notwithstanding, Norwegian leaders had  little inter-
est in hosting in- theater American deployments ( until the 1980s) or acquir-
ing nuclear weapons.
 These additional cases also demonstrate that alliance coercion has at best 
a spotty rec ord. Australia gave up on nuclear weapons for domestic reasons, 
and Taiwan demonstrated a unique per sis tence in spite of the best efforts of 
the United States.  Great Britain eventually saw its nuclear arsenal at least 
partially subordinated to the United States, especially when we consider its 
technological reliance. Yet this de pen dency arose less from an active Ameri-
can campaign to reverse  Great Britain’s nuclear status and more from  Great 
Britain’s economic and technological weaknesses early in the Cold War. 
France was so strong that it did not have  those weaknesses that the United 
States could exploit. Put together, the cases highlight that the connection 




Understanding and Managing Alliances in the 21st  Century
How do alliances curb potential or  actual cases of nuclear proliferation, if at 
all? Many scholars argue that alliances are effective tools for bridling the nu-
clear ambitions of states. When allies do try to acquire nuclear weapons, 
their alliance relationships serve as conduits for the guarantor to coerce a 
nonproliferation outcome. In this book, I show that such optimism about the 
role military alliances play is overstated. Alliances can deter nuclear prolif-
eration if they marry written pledges of support with compatible foreign 
policy and defense doctrines as well as in- theater conventional deployments. 
Yet alliances are prone to severe adjustments that can unsettle the ally. When 
guarantors make major unilateral changes to the security relationship, 
through undesirable doctrinal announcements or troop withdrawals, aban-
donment fears intensify. The affected ally becomes so doubtful of its received 
guarantees that it becomes more likely to engage in nuclear proliferation– 
related be hav ior. Unfortunately for the guarantor, curbing such be hav ior 
once it has started is very difficult. It requires fixing the broken security guar-
antee that prompted the nuclear interest in the first place. Nonmilitary tools 
like economic sanctions may be the best coercive instruments available, but 
their viability depends on the extent to which the ally relies on the guaran-
tor. Simply put, alliances are better for deterring potential than for prevent-
ing  actual nuclear proliferation.
The empirical cases support this argument.  Table 2 summarizes the main 
findings. Fears of abandonment in West Germany intensified  after July 1956 
amid rumors that the Eisenhower administration would reduce the size of 
the US Army by a third. Shortly thereafter, West Germany joined France and 
Italy in a short- lived and unsuccessful effort to develop nuclear weapons. 
Throughout the subsequent de cade, Bonn deflected calls for it to make clear 
nonproliferation pledges while obtaining enrichment and repro cessing ca-
pabilities. Its alliance with the United States certainly constrained its decision- 
making, but arguments that distinct coercion episodes prompted West 
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German leaders to renounce nuclear proliferation are overstated. Domes-
tic politics and prestige considerations  were impor tant  factors as well.
Japan followed a somewhat similar trajectory. It began evaluating the 
strength of its received security guarantees more fastidiously following 
China’s nuclear device detonation in late 1964. Yet Japan did not begin 
making serious moves in investing in nuclear technology  until the prospect 
of American withdrawal from Vietnam and even East Asia became highly 
likely at the end of the de cade. Similarly to West Germany, Japan did not 
have an  actual program dedicated to the production of an indigenous nu-
clear weapons capability. But like that of West Germany, Japan’s stance 
 toward nuclear nonproliferation remained dubious. When Japan fi nally 
ratified the NPT, it did so largely  because of domestic politics. Ideational 
arguments about the inherent value of the bomb  were also influential. The 
United States provided assurances when asked to do so but had largely 
refrained from efforts to compel Japan into making nonproliferation com-
mitments. Nevertheless, some controversy ensued not long  after NPT rati-
fication regarding activities at a Japa nese repro cessing plant.
South  Korea had a clear intent to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite South 
 Korea’s weathering vari ous provocations by North  Korea, what triggered 
South  Korea to seek nuclear weapons was Nixon’s unexpected announce-
ment that the United States would withdraw one US Army division from 
the peninsula. Thankfully for Washington, South  Korea depended on the 
United States for economic and technological goods, thus rendering South 
 Korea vulnerable to American efforts in suppressing the program in 1976. 
Still, South  Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons was not entirely snuffed out. 
Some speculate that the program went further underground. What ever the 
truth, safeguard violations did occur in the 1980s.
Although I have not studied them at the same level of detail, the five 
smaller cases further corroborate the argument.  Great Britain and France 
both sought nuclear weapons in part  because of having to fight alone and 
without American support. What distinguishes  Great Britain from France is 
that  Great Britain came to depend on American technology for its nuclear 
 Table 2  Summary of the main cases
Explanation
Start Stop Start Stop Start Stop
West Germany Japan South  Korea
Alliance ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ●
Adversary ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Domestic ✗ ✓ ✗ ● ✗ ✗
Prestige ✓ ✓ ✓ ● ✓ ●
✓ denotes empirical support, ✗ little to no empirical support, and ● inconclusiveness.
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deterrent.  Great Britain still retains operational in de pen dence, but the French 
nuclear arsenal is fully autonomous from the United States. For its part, Nor-
way remained satisfied with the security provided by the United States, so 
much so that it rejected having much of an American conventional military 
presence  until the 1980s when it accepted pre- positioned gear from the US 
Marine Corps. Only very briefly at the beginning of the Cold War did Nor-
wegian military leaders consider nuclear weapons. By contrast, Australia 
wanted more alliance goods but had no guarantor— whether the United 
States or  Great Britain— that would supply them. On the basis of its secu-
rity fears, Australia had a nuclear weapons program that it eventually re-
nounced following a change in government. Alliance coercion arguably 
played no part. Fi nally, Taiwan began its attempt to produce nuclear weap-
ons once it sensed that the geopo liti cal tide was turning against it. The United 
States gradually seemed more open to accommodating China, which had by 
that point come to possess nuclear weapons. What ensued was a cat- and- 
mouse game that spanned about two de cades. The United States used dif-
fer ent levers to ensure that Taiwan would not go nuclear, but its success in 
restraining Taiwan’s ambitions appears to have had more to do with intel-
ligence than with sanctions per se.
The takeaway of this book is that alliances are better for deterring states 
from engaging in nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior than for compelling 
states to give up their nuclear weapons programs. In this chapter, I address 
the implications for theory and policy. In so  doing, I outline pos si ble ave-
nues for  future research as well as how my analy sis sheds light on con-
temporary policy prob lems.
Theoretical Implications
My argument has several theoretical implications for how we should think 
about key questions in international relations theory. First, I show that my 
analy sis bears on a con temporary debate in international relations regard-
ing how beliefs about credibility are formed. Second, I argue that scholars 
are wrong to divide the study of nuclear weapons from that of conventional 
military power. Third, I add to the growing scholarship on the effectiveness 
of coercion in international relations by considering the alliance politics of 
nuclear proliferation.
the basis of credibility
One major debate among international relations scholars concerns the 
basis of credibility: what makes threats— and, for that  matter, promises— 
believable? A dominant school of thought holds that assessments of credi-
bility turn on situational considerations like the war- fighting capabilities and 
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geopo liti cal stakes involved  behind the threats or promises that states make 
to one another.1 Policy makers are thus foolish to believe that they can de-
velop reputations on the basis of their historical rec ord for keeping or 
breaking commitments. This perspective has received criticism. For one, 
past actions communicate— intentionally or not— the interests that states 
have, whereas situational assessments depend partly on the historical rec-
ord.2 For another, this school of thought has mischaracterized the work of 
Thomas Schelling, which it has held responsible for the belief that commit-
ments are so interdependent that reputations for keeping commitments are 
necessary for deterrence. Schelling instead argued that past actions  matter 
in cases where states are continuously negotiating with each other, not in 
all coercive bargaining encounters.3
My findings further challenge the perspective that current, ahistorical cal-
culations of power and interest determine credibility. I find that in attend-
ing to the foreign policy doctrines and conventional military deployments 
of their guarantors, allies accord importance to the local military effective-
ness of their guarantors. Still, some actions undertaken by the guarantor can 
provide information as to its interests and foreign policy interests, especially 
if  those actions include major and unfavorable military redeployments. In 
brief, my findings blur the distinction between reputation, on the one hand, 
and current calculations like power and interest, on the other hand. To be 
sure, I do not offer a systematic test as to the sources of alliance credibility. I 
examined narrowly how abandonment fears intensify so as to make states 
more likely to engage in nuclear proliferation– related be hav ior. Scholars 
should thus focus more on alliance credibility as a dependent variable.
nuclear weapons and conventional military power
States form judgments about the security guarantees that they receive with 
reference to the conventional military capabilities that their guarantor could 
muster on their behalf for defense and deterrence purposes. The reason why 
allies look to the conventional capabilities of their guarantor is that they value 
deterrence- by- denial as much as they do deterrence- by- punishment, if not 
more. Indeed, from the perspective of allies like West Germany and espe-
cially South  Korea, nuclear weapons are partly a means for offsetting the 
conventional superiority of adversaries, especially when  those same adver-
saries possess nuclear weapons as well.
Unfortunately, scholars separate the study of nuclear weapons from that 
of conventional military power. Many studies of nuclear proliferation sim-
ply assume that nuclear weapons represent a special category, even though 
the  factors that predict which states have nuclear weapons can also predict 
which states would have access to fifth- generation fighter jets, third- 
generation advanced tanks, ballistic missile capabilities, and so forth.4 In 
social scientific parlance,  these studies neglect an impor tant endogeneity 
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prob lem, whereby conventional and nuclear weapons systems are related 
to each other. States that experience unfavorable alterations in their received 
security guarantees might opt for nuclear weapons,  because they cannot de-
velop sufficient conventional military capabilities for deterring an adver-
sary in time. Some states, like  Great Britain and France, acquire nuclear 
weapons  because they already have most leading military technologies. In-
terestingly, the best works on conventional deterrence and military power 
neglect the nuclear dimension altogether.5 To take one example, excluding 
the role nuclear weapons have played in the Arab- Israeli conflict—as John 
Mearsheimer has done— could lead to mistaken understandings of how de-
terrence in general succeeds.6
the effectiveness of coercion
The core message of this book is that military alliances are better at pre-
venting nuclear proliferation than stopping it once it has started. I have pre-
sented evidence that apparent success stories of alliance coercion are less 
than what they appear. What does this finding mean more generally for in-
ternational relations scholarship?
Schelling famously wrote that compellence is harder than deterrence 
 because the former seeks to change the status quo, whereas the latter seeks 
to maintain it. Much of the recent lit er a ture seems to support this maxim, 
notwithstanding the difficulties in empirically distinguishing deterrence 
from compellence.7 Drawing on data regarding compellent threats, Todd 
Sechser observes that strong states have trou ble compelling weaker states 
 because  those weaker states worry that capitulation would lead to new de-
mands. Their very strength leads strong states to underappreciate  these 
reputational concerns.8 Using similar data, Todd Sechser and Matthew 
Fuhrmann show that nuclear weapons rarely confer any bargaining lever-
age on its possessors, since they are useless for territorial conquest and in-
volve high costs as tools for punishment.9 Dianne Chamberlain finds that 
 because using military force has become less costly for the United States, 
weak adversaries discount its threats.10 Dan Altman argues that states do not 
even bother with coercion at all in making territorial gains— they grab what 
they want rather than dispute a proposed territorial division in a crisis.11 
Some disagreement exists among scholars. Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal 
write that “the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their 
confrontations with other states even when they do not ‘use’  these weap-
ons,” whereas Matthew Kroenig argues that nuclear superiority confers an 
advantage in crisis bargaining.12
All  these studies, however, focus on coercive bargaining between adver-
saries rather than between allies. When scholars examine military or non-
military threats that states make to their allies, the issue- area  under dispute 
usually revolves around nuclear proliferation.13 My case studies show that 
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alliance coercion in this domain is often difficult for the United States to do 
effectively. That is not to say that alliance coercion is never effective. Such a 
view would be sorely mistaken. Rather, my argument is that its effect is more 
subtle and indirect than commonly presumed. Still, a more general or com-
parative study of intra- alliance coercion would benefit international relations 
scholarship— one that encompasses other issues such as war time co ali tion 
participation and peacetime burden- sharing.14 Many empirical questions still 
need an answer. For example, is alliance coercion more effective in some is-
sue areas than in  others? Why or why not?
the nuclear sources of american primacy
The case studies also suggest that to understand the preponderant role of 
the United States in international politics, we should not overlook the nu-
clear dimension. Unfortunately, many existing theories of hierarchy and he-
gemony often view the world in largely conventional military terms, as the 
books of David Lake and John Ikenberry do.15 This oversight is problematic 
for the very reason that what ever one thinks of the global military presence 
of the United States, it is at least partly the product of a consistent desire to 
forestall nuclear proliferation. Daniel Deudney adds that “unipolarity, to 
the extent it still exists, is made much easier and more durable by nuclear 
weapons”  because the deterrent effects they generate help stabilize inter-
state relations and inhibit encroachment and counterbalancing.16 Nuclear 
proliferation undercuts hegemony  because it negates American power pro-
jection capabilities.
Claiming that nonproliferation has been as much a goal of American  grand 
strategy as openness and containment might be a slight overstatement, how-
ever.17 Sometimes other foreign policy goals get in the way— the Kennedy 
administration discovered this tension when it came to value nuclear non-
proliferation while voicing its frustrations with the defense and monetary 
policies of West Germany. On occasion foreign policy goals are complemen-
tary so as to reinforce each other: quashing Taiwan’s nuclear ambitions was 
impor tant for Sino- American relations. Moreover, the United States has good 
reason not to enshrine nuclear nonproliferation as an overriding priority that 
trumps all other foreign policy objectives: states would have an incentive to 
manipulate American interest in nonproliferation. Accordingly, despite what 
realists say about the lack of a central enforcer of rules in the international 
system, states would be able to “dial 911” for help by signaling some intent 
to acquire nuclear weapons.18 But partly  because the United States has con-
flicting foreign policy interests, this option remains problematic for allies to 
use.
The nuclear dimension of American global leadership might, then, be more 
complicated than what seems to be the case at first glance. If the United States 
views nonproliferation as a goal unto itself, then it might be an offensive 
conclusIon
155
realist: that is, it uses what ever means to secure regional—if not global— 
hegemony at the expense of other states.19 In contrast, if nonproliferation is 
a goal that is  either subordinate or complementary to other interests, then 
the United States might be a defensive realist. In other words, it might not 
see nuclear proliferation as problematic per se and can in fact be open to it, 
but it sometimes works hard to forestall it lest the spread of nuclear weap-
ons would complicate other foreign policy objectives.20
 great power management of weaker states
This book addresses how American security guarantees can forestall nu-
clear proliferation. It does not investigate how the security guarantees of 
other major powers— namely, the Soviet Union and China— can affect the 
nuclear interest of their own security partners.
My argument has implications for understanding nuclear proliferation 
and nonproliferation within non- American alliance systems. Consider first 
the Soviet Union and its alliances.21 Romania was the only Warsaw Pact 
member out of seven to covet nuclear weapons, whereas both East Asian 
allies— China and North  Korea— made efforts to acquire nuclear weapons 
in the Cold War with varying degrees of success. Despite the contiguity of 
the Soviet Union with all  those countries, its security guarantees to them 
varied in quality. For better or for worse, none of  these countries held the 
Soviet geopo liti cal interest and hosted Soviet armed forces to the same ex-
tent, if at all, as the industrialized Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact (Po-
land, East Germany, and Czecho slo va kia).22 Romania might have been a 
member of the Warsaw Pact, but it perceived a growing disconnect between 
its security interests and  those of the Kremlin between the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. In par tic u lar, it did not wish to be consigned to being the soft 
agricultural underbelly of the Soviet bloc.23 Moreover, the Soviet Union ac-
corded so much significance to its holdings in Central and Eastern Eu rope 
that it cared less about developments in East Asia. Chinese and North 
Korean leaders might have reached this conclusion in the 1950s when the 
Soviet Union appeared disinterested in the fate of its communist partners 
during the Korean War.24  Those countries thus discounted Soviet support 
early and deci ded to develop nuclear weapons. And so the dynamics out-
lined in this book could very well be applicable to the Soviet context.25
My argument bears insights for how China has managed the North Ko-
rean proliferation prob lem. Interestingly, North  Korea began considering 
 whether to acquire nuclear technologies shortly  after China withdrew its 
forces from North  Korea in 1958.26 North  Korea had good reason to discount 
Chinese security guarantees, formalized as they  were with a 1961 mutual de-
fense treaty.  After all, China came to North  Korea’s aid in the Korean War 
only when American- led forces approached the Yalu River. As Jonathan Pollack 
writes, Pyongyang “faced four de cades of continuous nuclear threat . . . 
conclusIon
156
without a countervailing nuclear retaliatory threat of its own or allied nu-
clear deployments on its own territory.”27
But what has China done about North  Korea? A common refrain is that 
China can and should do more to curb its ally’s destabilizing ambitions, es-
pecially since China is the main source of North  Korea’s trade, food, arms, 
and energy.28 Despite how scholars sometimes argue that guarantors seek 
to prevent nuclear proliferation in order to preserve their standing and power 
projection capabilities, China appears exceptional in having shielded its ally 
from multilateral sanctions for the most part. One can argue that it has even 
free- ridden on American efforts to restrain Taiwan and South  Korea with-
out  doing much of the same  toward North  Korea. However, my analy sis 
yields two notes of caution. The first is that China might have perceived that 
reversing North  Korea’s nuclear program was not in China’s interest, espe-
cially if China’s worries about regime stability, refugee flows, and a reuni-
fied  Korea are legitimate. The second is that experts might be overestimating 
China’s ability to restrain its ally, especially when North  Korea has by now 
developed certain missile capabilities and thermonuclear weapons. To be 
sure, Beijing could have at least forbidden North Korean citizens from re-
ceiving training in China— scientists who prob ably went on to participate 
in advanced weapons development in their native country.29 Still, in the im-
probable event that North Korea renounces its nuclear weapons, it would 
likely do so for non-alliance reasons.
Policy Implications
The policy implications of this study seem grim. Not only does the denucle-
arization of North  Korea seem fantastical, but also any move  toward acquir-
ing nuclear weapons on the part of an ally would be extraordinarily difficult 
for the United States to reverse. The policy community should take small 
comfort in how American decision makers have restrained the ambitions of 
South  Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany. The successes of  those decision 
makers  were at best overstated.
Yet  there are upsides. One is that the United States can deter nuclear weap-
ons interest among its allies. Given how vital strong security guarantees are 
 toward this end, American decision makers thankfully have a say. More spe-
cifically, they can recalibrate doctrines and deployments so as to shape per-
ceptions of credibility. Ally leaders appear to refer to  these metrics in their 
own nuclear decision- making. We should thus remember that it is of the ut-
most importance that American defense planners take the time to think 
about the effects of their moves from more than just a bud getary or rational 
perspective. Having Marines in Okinawa might make  little tactical or opera-
tional sense, but shifting them thousands of miles away could still be destabi-
lizing. Symbols  matter, and they may  matter more from the perspective of 
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allies than from the perspective of Washington.30 Nevertheless, the sym-
bolic nature of such deployments should not be overstated. Allies value 
them  because they believe such forces can put up a fight against an adver-
sary should deterrence fail. In a world of anti- access and area denial (A2/
AD) military technology, a United States that practices offshore balancing 
might experience overwhelming difficulties in entering a theater of opera-
tions so as to aid an ally  under siege. An onshore presence makes the United 
States look more capable and resolved to allies and adversaries alike.31 That 
said, withdrawing forces unilaterally might be counterproductive when it 
comes to having an ally bear a greater share of the collective defense bur-
den. If the ally feels threatened by a nuclear- armed aggressor, then it might 
arm itself in ways that are to the detriment of the guarantor’s own interests.
Another upside is that decoupling does not make nuclear proliferation in-
evitable.32  Because North  Korea is developing capabilities so that it could 
strike the continental United States with nuclear weapons, some observers 
fear that Washington would become less likely to defend South  Korea and 
Japan in order to avoid being attacked. Accordingly,  those two allies sense 
that their interests are becoming decoupled from that of the United States 
and so would strive to secure themselves nuclear weapons of their own. Yet 
this fear is overstated. For one, they have already endured decoupling 
throughout the Cold War and  after the Soviet Union and China had acquired 
survivable second- strike capabilities. For another, my analy sis suggests that 
decoupling need not translate to nuclear proliferation as long as  those allies 
believe that the United States would fight on their behalf and deny adver-
saries battlefield success. Providing hostages for the sake of extended deter-
rence is insufficient. Having aligned doctrines and in- theater deployments 
capable of inflicting harm on the adversary can influence such beliefs in a 
positive direction.
Perceptions of credibility are malleable, but we must be careful not to over-
state idiosyncratic  factors. Many analysts and experts worry that President 
Donald Trump’s unique style of communication can undercut deterrence and 
destabilize alliance relations. For example, in an excellent overview of his 
attitudes  toward nuclear weapons, Jeffrey Michaels and Heather Williams 
caution that his use of social media could lead to misperceptions and mis-
calculations by friends and foes alike.33 According to this argument, an er-
rant tweet would undermine American credibility. My analy sis suggests that 
such concerns may be slightly exaggerated. A tweet is but one signal among 
many. Allies like South  Korea and Poland  will pay more attention to the 
military basis of their received commitments than to Twitter accounts in 
 going about their nuclear decision- making.
Allies that host large- scale American forward- deployed forces might learn 
the wrong lessons from this book. Specifically, they might feel that they 
would be unstoppable if they elect to seek nuclear weapons  after determin-
ing that their received commitments are not as strong as they used to be. 
conclusIon
158
That the United States would likely experience im mense difficulties in sup-
pressing their activities could even embolden them. Yet  those allies should 
remember that most countries that flirted with nuclear proliferation ulti-
mately deci ded against acquiring their own arsenals, not least  because they 
reasoned that nuclear weapons did not serve their interests, po liti cal or 
military. Though Taiwan and Poland have dramatically dif fer ent relation-
ships with the United States, they would do well to heed this lesson. Po-
land has already begun investing in A2/AD to deter Rus sian aggression, 
whereas Taiwan should do the same  thing with re spect to China. In both 
cases, they have a special interest in bolstering their nonproliferation cre-
dentials. Any ambiguity might undermine the deterrent value of their con-
ventional A2/AD capabilities if their adversary worries that an incoming 
cruise missile might be nuclear tipped. As such, Rus sia and China could 
escalate tensions when faced with the prospect of nuclear proliferation in 
their neighborhood— something that we have seen when fears of West 
German nuclearization led Khrushchev to harden his line over the status of 
Berlin.
Some security experts argue that a new, more dangerous age in international 
security is upon us. This gloomy vision holds that unlike in the Cold War, 
the prevention of nuclear wars no longer depends on the superpowers— the 
United States and the Soviet Union— managing their competition ratio-
nally. Rather, a multipolar nuclear order beckons as states in the  Middle 
East, Asia, and even Eu rope may come to see nuclear weapons as essential 
for their security.34 Much is at stake if growth in the number of nuclear 
weapons states means a greater risk of nuclear mis haps or even accidental 
nuclear war.
Perhaps such pessimism is warranted amid the Teutonic shifts in interna-
tional politics that attend the rise of China and the apparent decline of the 
United States. Yet the view that the  future is unlike the past is an overstate-
ment. American security commitments  will come  under stress, just as they 
have in the past. The difference may well be that the United States would 
not have the same clout over its allies as before if predictions of its relative 
decline are correct. If the United States had trou ble suppressing the nuclear 
interest of industrializing allies like South  Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s, 
then  future nonproliferation efforts  will be much more hard- pressed to 
achieve success. Nevertheless, as in the past, the United States may well con-
tinue to hold sufficiently strong military and technological capabilities over 
adversaries.35 As such, allies’ be hav ior could reflect how the United States 
decides to allocate its strategic attention and military resources more so than 
deep structural trends. Nuclear proliferation among allies is not inevitable, 
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